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Is innocence still irrelevant? In his influential 1970 article, 
Judge Henry Friendly provocatively asked why innocence is ir-
relevant to federal habeas corpus review.1 Judge Friendly pro-
posed that innocence should provide a ground for relief from a 
criminal conviction, but his call went unheeded, perhaps be-
cause at that time innocence could rarely be proven with any 
certainty. For reasons of reliability, courts distrusted exculpa-
tory witnesses who came forward years after a trial, when their 
memories had faded and their motives were suspect. In addi-
tion, forensic evidence was usually not very probative. Claims 
asserting the existence of new evidence of innocence were con-
sidered fundamentally equivocal, and, as a result, states im-
posed strict rules of finality, barring claims brought after limi-
tation periods expired. Thus, in the decades since Judge 
Friendly first asked whether innocence should be relevant to 
criminal appeals, the Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to 
 
 1. See Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on 
Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 159–60 (1970). 
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recognize a constitutional claim of innocence. Most prominent-
ly, in 1993, in Herrera v. Collins, the Court narrowly failed to 
recognize a constitutional innocence claim in the context of cap-
ital cases, emphasizing the dual concerns of finality and relia-
bility.2 
The advent of DNA testing technology inaugurated an era 
in which innocence can be proven with far greater certainty 
long after a crime has occurred. In the process, DNA has un-
dermined the concerns of finality and reliability that supported 
the result in Herrera. No longer is a witness’s recollection or 
even a confession the most reliable evidence of guilt. Instead, 
physical evidence has taken on central importance in claims of 
innocence: a cigarette butt, a half-eaten cinnamon bun, a 
sweat-soaked bandana, or a cotton swab—pieces of stray evi-
dence that would play at most a tangential role two decades 
ago—can now demonstrate guilt or innocence decades after a 
crime with no decrease in accuracy. Since 1989, 216 prisoners 
have been exonerated by post-conviction DNA testing, and 
thousands of others have been exonerated before trial.3 
Despite this shift, the Court has failed to recognize a con-
stitutional claim of innocence, and even the most straightfor-
ward claims of innocence continue to face substantial ob-
stacles.4 An illustrative case is that of Frank Lee Smith, a man 
who spent fourteen years in prison in Florida after a jury con-
 
 2. 506 U.S. 390, 401, 403–04 (1993); see infra Part III. 
 3. See The Innocence Project, Home Page, http://www.innocenceproject 
.org (last visited Apr. 26, 2008). Throughout this Article, by an exoneration, I 
mean a legal determination that the conviction should be vacated, either by a 
court or an executive pardon, based in part on new evidence of innocence, 
which was not followed by a new trial. 
 4. The Court had an opportunity in the 2005 Term to reconsider Herrera 
in a case involving post-conviction DNA testing. See House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 
2064, 2078 (2006); infra Part I.A. An empirical study that I conducted examin-
ing the criminal appeals brought by the first two hundred people exonerated 
by post-conviction DNA testing presented data regarding how those exonerees 
often faced difficulties obtaining the DNA testing that ultimately exonerated 
them and described how few prevailed on claims of innocence. See generally 
Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (2008). All 
who raised innocence claims before obtaining DNA testing were denied relief. 
Id. at 111. In seeking DNA evidence, approximately half of the two hundred 
were refused access to DNA testing by law enforcement, often necessitating a 
court order. Id. at 120. Twenty percent required a pardon because, even after 
being excluded by DNA test results, they lacked any judicial forum for relief; 
at least twelve were denied relief by courts even after DNA test results exclu-
ded them. Id. 
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victed him and sentenced him to death in 1986 for a rape-
murder that he did not commit.5 In 1998, Smith’s lawyers ob-
tained a stay of execution and began seeking DNA testing to 
bolster their case for his innocence, which rested on the recan-
tation of the State’s star eyewitness.6 The district attorney suc-
cessfully opposed motions seeking DNA testing for years; state 
laws provided no post-conviction right of access to such evi-
dence.7 It was not until DNA tests implicated another man in a 
series of rapes and murders in the area that law enforcement 
consented to testing. DNA testing ultimately inculpated that 
man and excluded Smith, but only in December 2000, after 
Smith had already died of cancer on Florida’s death row.8 Part-
ly in reaction to Smith v. State,9 Florida passed a statute in 
2001 entitling a petitioner to obtain DNA testing and, if the re-
sults are exculpatory, the right to relief.10 Like most states that 
have enacted new innocence claims in recent years, however, 
Florida included several restrictions limiting access to testing, 
such as a requirement that a petitioner satisfy a preliminary 
showing of innocence to receive DNA testing, and until the sta-
tute was amended in 2006, time limits on obtaining testing and 
denial of testing to those who had pleaded guilty.11 Our system 
remains at a crossroads, not yet fully adopting an approach 
that directly assesses the probative impact of evidence of inno-
cence, but failing to discard many of the traditional limitations 
on innocence claims. 
In this Article, I argue that our criminal system should en-
sure full access to evidence of innocence at trial, and that dur-
ing appeals and post-conviction proceedings our criminal sys-
tem should review claims of innocence based only on the 
probative power of the new evidence of innocence, freed from 
 
 5. See Smith v. State, 515 So. 2d 182, 185 (Fla. 1987) (affirming a convic-
tion of first-degree murder and a sentence of death); Frontline, Requiem for 
Frank Lee Smith, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/smith/eight 
(last visited Apr. 26, 2008). 
 6. Smith, 515 So. 2d at 185. 
 7. See Frontline, supra note 5. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Smith, 515 So. 2d 182. 
 10. See, e.g., Alisa Ulferts, Bill Allows Inmates to Request DNA Tests, ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Feb. 9, 2001, at 1B, available at 2001 WLNR 
11083434. 
 11. See FLA. STAT. § 925.11(2)(f )(3) (2007); id. historical and statutory 
notes. 
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traditional restrictions that have hindered even meritorious 
claims. By a claim of innocence, I mean a legal contention seek-
ing relief from a criminal conviction based chiefly on evidence 
that the convict did not commit the criminal acts. I divide inno-
cence claims into three basic categories: (1) substantial claims; 
(2) outcome-determinative claims; and (3) inconclusive claims. 
These categories reflect a spectrum based on the varying de-
grees to which the new evidence of innocence—evidence not 
available at the time of trial—may undermine the evidence 
that was introduced at the criminal trial. In cases involving 
substantial showings of innocence, new evidence overwhelm-
ingly shows that the convict was not the perpetrator of a crime. 
A second category, termed outcome-determinative, includes 
cases in which the new evidence of innocence does not substan-
tially undercut an element of a crime, conviction, or sentence, 
but makes it more likely than not that a new jury would fail to 
convict. The Supreme Court employed such “holistic” analysis 
regarding the outcome in House v. Bell,12 its first decision to 
confront DNA evidence of innocence. Finally, the category of in-
conclusive claims encompasses cases in which DNA technology, 
although providing information regarding a genetic profile, has 
limited probative value, such as where biological evidence does 
not show identity or identity is not disputed.13 
Courts typically evaluate claims of innocence based on ex-
trinsic considerations, including the trial attorney’s diligence, 
the crime of conviction, the amount of time that has passed 
since conviction, whether the petitioner pleaded guilty, and 
whether a purely hypothetical scenario could explain the DNA 
exclusion.14 Such standards may result in courts denying relief 
to petitioners who raise meritorious claims of innocence. Under 
the standard of review that I propose, claims of innocence 
would be assessed based upon the degree to which new evi-
dence of innocence undercuts the evidence of guilt presented at 
trial. After delineating an approach that simply evaluates the 
probative impact of new evidence of innocence, I show that our 
 
 12. House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2078 (2006) (explaining how the appro-
priate inquiry for the Court is a “holistic judgment” on how a reasonable jury 
would apply the reasonable doubt standard in light of new evidence supple-
menting the record). 
 13. See, e.g., State v. Armstrong, 700 N.W.2d 98, 127 (Wis. 2005); infra 
note 396 and accompanying text.  
 14. See infra Part II.C.  
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criminal justice system still fails to uniformly take such an ap-
proach, despite the enactment of new statutes permitting post-
conviction innocence claims. While rules governing how inno-
cence can be asserted differ at each stage of a criminal case, at 
no stage is evidence consistently assessed based on its proba-
tive value. 
With DNA testing in wide use, evidence of innocence has 
never been more relevant to criminal investigations and trials. 
Even so, criminal procedure rules still fail to ensure full and 
accurate access to physical and forensic evidence probative of 
innocence. Many commentators and legislators have assumed 
that DNA exonerations would fade away.15 However, I present 
new longitudinal empirical analysis of DNA exonerations to 
show why treatment of DNA during investigations and trials 
may cause such exonerations to continue for far longer than 
previously thought. Strikingly, more than one-quarter of post-
conviction DNA exonerees were tried and convicted in the DNA 
era (since 1990).16 The exonerees did not obtain DNA testing 
during the trial stage because of, among other reasons, errors 
or misconduct by forensic experts, ineffective lawyering, and 
the inadequacies of then-existing DNA technology. Criminal 
procedure rules, however, do not ensure access to independent 
forensic experts, preservation of biological evidence, or discov-
ery regarding state forensic analysis. Although DNA testing is 
conducted more frequently than ever before, the failure of crim-
inal procedure rules to address these problems means that 
claims of innocence may persist for some time, albeit with a dif-
ferent focus: the proper handling and disclosure of biological 
material and DNA test results. 
Meanwhile, state criminal appeals and post-conviction re-
view, though reshaped by nearly nationwide legislative change, 
 
 15. See JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE 250 (2000) (“In a few 
years, the era of DNA exonerations will come to an end.”); James S. Liebman, 
The New Death Penalty Debate: What’s DNA Got to Do with It?, 33 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 527, 547–48 (2002) (describing how “the backlog of existing 
post-trial cases in which there is DNA evidence to test will not be replenished” 
but also reasons why exonerations may recur); Michael J. Saks et al., Toward 
a Model Act for the Prevention and Remedy of Erroneous Convictions, 35 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 669, 669 (2001) (“The window will soon close . . . .”); infra note 
247 (noting state statutes that include sunset provisions for post-conviction 
DNA testing based on an assumption that such testing will prove unnecessary 
after a short period of time). 
 16. Garrett, supra note 4, at 130. 
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typically lack an avenue for courts to simply assess the proba-
tive value of new evidence of innocence. The Supreme Court’s 
failure to recognize a constitutional innocence claim has 
created substantial pressure on the states that have faced first-
hand embarrassment from more than two hundred post-
conviction DNA exonerations. In response, within the space of a 
decade, forty-five jurisdictions enacted statutes providing 
rights to post-conviction DNA testing and a vacatur if DNA 
testing, or occasionally other evidence, demonstrates innocence. 
In this Article, I survey those statutes and evaluate judicial 
rulings interpreting them. These statutes represent a remark-
able change in the law, upending rules of finality and creating 
the first system of review focused exclusively upon claims of in-
nocence. 
Despite these innovations, post-conviction DNA statutes 
also routinely impose severe limitations on access to DNA test-
ing and relief. Almost all statutes require a preliminary show-
ing of innocence in order to obtain DNA testing itself, and they 
often bar access to petitioners who pleaded guilty and those 
whose attorney failed to request DNA testing at trial. More-
over, they impose other substantive and procedural hurdles. 
Compounding the problem, courts still deny access to potential-
ly exonerating evidence such as DNA testing, typically because 
of stilted interpretations of the newly enacted statutes or stark 
misapprehension of the potential probative power of DNA tests. 
Courts continue to deny relief even to some individuals who ac-
tually demonstrate their innocence through testing. 
Incomplete recognition of claims of innocence in the states 
occurred in the shadow of the Supreme Court’s reluctance to 
recognize a constitutional claim of innocence. In 1993, the same 
year that modern DNA testing began to reshape our criminal 
system, the Court had an opportunity to decide whether an in-
nocence claim exists under the U.S. Constitution. In Herrera, 
the Court evaded the question, stating hypothetically that a 
prisoner might have a right not to be executed given an “ex-
traordinary” showing of innocence; no subsequent case has 
been held to satisfy this standard.17 In 1995, the Court again 
 
 17. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993); infra Part III.A. Anthony 
Amsterdam calls this a “state of denial,” explaining that “[t]he fixation of 
courts on the issue of guilt or innocence almost always takes the form of deny-
ing claims of error because the judges believe that a convicted defendant is 
guilty, not of willingness to provide forums for the vindication of convicted 
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addressed innocence, ruling in Schlup v. Delo that no constitu-
tional claim of innocence exists.18 It did say, however, that in-
nocence may excuse the procedural default of some other con-
stitutional claim.19 In its 2005 Term, the Court reiterated these 
holdings in its first post-conviction DNA case, House v. Bell. 
The Court ruled that a showing of innocence so strong that a 
new jury “more likely than not” would not convict did not result 
in freedom for the convicted, but only that the court could reach 
the merits of a defaulted ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim.20 
Although the Supreme Court in Herrera and House did not 
recognize a constitutional innocence claim, evidence of inno-
cence has already impacted constitutional criminal procedure 
in three largely unnoticed ways. First, lower federal courts 
grant DNA testing to obtain new evidence of innocence during 
discovery or pursuant to § 1983 actions.21 Second, several fed-
eral courts have held that new evidence of innocence can but-
tress constitutional claims by illuminating State misconduct or 
by supporting claims regarding the State’s use of tainted, inac-
curate evidence. Third, new evidence of innocence supports re-
lief where, absent such evidence, a court might otherwise find 
error harmless, including by relying on the perceived reliability 
of the State’s evidence of guilt. Unfortunately, while these ap-
proaches begin to close the gaps at the state and federal levels, 
they do not provide a uniform standard for claiming innocence. 
Adopting a uniform freestanding innocence claim that en-
titles a court to review the probative impact of new evidence of 
innocence would require changing existing constitutional crim-
inal procedure. DNA technology has eroded the twin pillars 
supporting the Court’s ruling in Herrera: reliability and finali-
ty. Hence, the Court could reconsider establishing a due 
process right to relief from a conviction or sentence on the 
ground of innocence. The Court’s “more likely than not” stan-
 
persons who present colorable claims of innocence.” Anthony G. Amsterdam, 
Verbatim: Lady Justice’s Blindfold Has Been Shredded, CHAMPION, May 2007, 
at 51, 51. 
 18. See 513 U.S. 298, 313–17 (1995). 
 19. See id. at 326–27. 
 20. House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2086–87 (2006). 
 21. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). For a discussion of such a case, see infra 
notes 302–03 and accompanying text. 
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dard in Schlup already provides a logical standard of review for 
such a claim.22 
Until a claim of innocence is established by the Court or by 
farther-reaching legislation, the clearly innocent will not al-
ways readily receive access to proof or relief. Granting relief for 
unusual claims of innocence in a narrow band of cases should 
not overly tax the system, so long as a framework is adopted to 
identify those claims; as the Court has acknowledged, “such de-
cisions are rare.”23 This is especially true since DNA technology 
has already transformed the way that actors handle certain se-
rious criminal cases at every stage in the criminal system. 
Nevertheless, our courts might not adopt an innocence 
claim resembling the one I advocate any time soon, nor may 
they properly apply an optimal standard should one be enacted. 
After all, under existing state statutes, courts have denied in-
nocent people relief even after DNA testing excluded them. 
Thus, I describe means outside the existing post-conviction sys-
tem for granting relief on the basis of innocence, such as inno-
cence commissions or other independent bodies tasked with the 
review of innocence claims. Whatever the mechanism, as a 
growing constellation of rights and remedies gradually shifts 
the focus of our system from solely remedying violations of pro-
cedural rights to creating new avenues for redressing substan-
tive claims of innocence, the emphasis should be placed on 
what makes DNA technology so transformative: the probative 
impact of new evidence of innocence. Furthermore, our criminal 
system can avoid the need to later judge innocence if protec-
tions better ensure access to evidence of innocence at the time 
of trial. 
This Article begins in Part I by examining the case of 
House v. Bell, in which the Supreme Court confronted the defi-
nition of innocence in its first post-conviction DNA case, and 
then framing how innocence can be assessed based on the 
probative impact of new exculpatory evidence. Part II then 
shows how our system fails to strictly assess innocence in that 
manner at any stage. Our system does not ensure access to 
DNA evidence of innocence at trial, which results in wrongful 
convictions. Although states have adopted post-conviction DNA 
statutes, almost all states exclude entire categories of convicts 
 
 22. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329. 
 23. Id. at 322 n.36. 
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and impose substantial hurdles unrelated to whether testing 
could prove innocence. Meanwhile, federal courts lack any ac-
tual innocence claim, though they adopt several approaches 
that begin to move in that direction. Finally, Part III concludes 
by arguing that the Constitution supports the adoption of a 
freestanding innocence claim that would grant relief to those 
who can show that, more likely than not, no reasonable jury 
would convict in light of the new evidence. 
I.  DEFINING INNOCENCE   
Which prisoner’s habeas petition poses the easiest question 
for a federal court to decide: (a) the prisoner whose trial lawyer 
was ineffective and presented a poor defense case; (b) the pris-
oner who alleges that police officers concealed evidence that 
would have undermined the prosecutor’s case; or (c) the prison-
er who offers new DNA evidence of his innocence? The common 
sense lay-person’s answer might be (c): scientific evidence of 
innocence should most readily lead to the release of a convict. 
The hard-nosed post-conviction attorney would counter 
that, in any federal court, the prisoner in (c) would have little 
to no chance of success because proving “actual innocence” does 
not entitle a prisoner to constitutional relief. On the other 
hand, the claims of (a) and (b) both involve established consti-
tutional criminal procedure rights and thus would have a bet-
ter chance for success. Indeed, the prisoner in (c) might only 
have a shot at success if his petition involved both DNA evi-
dence of innocence and the sort of run-of-the-mill procedural 
claim brought by prisoners (a) and (b). This is true because, as I 
describe below, the Court ruled in Herrera and then reaffirmed 
in House that prisoners lack any substantive right to be freed 
because they are innocent. 
A. THE CASE OF HOUSE V. BELL 
In House, the Supreme Court for the first time acknowl-
edged the central role that DNA technology can play in crimi-
nal cases. The Court ruled that Paul House, a death row pris-
oner in Tennessee, had presented evidence, including post-
conviction DNA testing, showing a reasonable probability of his 
innocence.24 The DNA testing showed that semen obtained 
 
 24. House, 126 S. Ct. at 2074. 
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from the victim’s clothes did not match Paul House.25 Yet de-
spite this evidence, rotating combinations of federal judges at 
different times ruled that (1) House was actually innocent and 
deserved a new trial; (2) House was guilty and should be ex-
ecuted; and (3) House showed a reasonable probability of his 
innocence such that his defaulted ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim should be considered on remand.26 The House 
case exemplifies how almost two decades into the DNA era, 
courts remain uncertain about how to approach new evidence of 
actual innocence, even evidence as powerful as DNA test re-
sults.  
House’s case begins, like many in which DNA evidence has 
been relevant, with a gruesome crime. Carolyn Muncey was 
found murdered in the woods near her East Tennessee home in 
the summer of 1985.27 The police quickly focused on two sus-
pects: her husband, Hubert, who had grown up in the area and 
had a history of serious domestic abuse, and Paul House, a con-
victed sex offender who had recently moved to the area.28 When 
someone claimed to have seen House emerge, the day after the 
murder, from the woods near where Mrs. Muncey’s body was 
found, the police investigated House.29 He stated he had been 
at his girlfriend’s house that night.30 She reported that he left 
her home the night of the murder and returned without his 
shirt and shoes but with a bruise and scratches.31 He claimed 
to have been scratched by his girlfriend’s cats and to have 
bruised his fingers at his construction job.32 
The State’s theory at trial was that House raped and mur-
dered Mrs. Muncey. The testimony of the witness who saw him 
emerge from the woods and of House’s girlfriend provided cir-
cumstantial evidence connecting him to the crime. Direct evi-
dence of House’s connection rested upon serology evidence de-
rived from semen on the victim’s clothes, blood on her 
nightgown, and from bloodstains on House’s jeans.33 
 
 25. Id. at 2078–79. 
 26. Id. at 2075–76. 
 27. Id. at 2070. 
 28. Id. at 2071. 
 29. Id. at 2070–71. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 2072–73. 
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At trial, FBI Special Agent Paul Bigbee presented the fo-
rensic evidence from the victim’s clothes at trial in a manner 
that improperly exaggerated its probative power.34 The semen 
evidence consisted of ABO serology evidence,35 as DNA testing 
would not be in use for several more years. The A blood group 
substances found on the victim’s nightgown were consistent 
with House’s A blood type, but also with the victim’s blood type. 
Semen stains on the victim’s panties did not exhibit A blood 
group substances; instead, where only the H substance was de-
tected, those stains were consistent with having originated 
from an O type secretor. Nonetheless, the FBI Agent told the 
jury that both sets of stains could have come from House. As 
the Innocence Project later pointed out in their amicus brief, 
this testimony was improper science.36 Special Agent Bigbee at-
tempted to resolve the inconsistency as follows: 
Q: Can you tell us whether or not the A substance could have been 
there, prior to you doing the testing? 
A: It could have, yes. 
Q: Does the age of the stain make a difference as to whether you find 
both of these substances? 
A: The age of the stain does to some extent make a difference. The 
environment in which the stain remained after it was deposited could 
also make a difference. The H blood group substance is the precursor 
to the B and A blood group substances, chemically, and it can also be 
degraded from the A or the B to the H. 
Q: Which means that the H lasts longer, so to speak? 
A: In certain cases, yes. 
 
 34. See Brief of the Innocence Project, Inc., as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of the Petitioner at 24, House, 126 S. Ct. 2064 (No. 04-8990), 2005 WL 779581, 
at *18 [hereinafter Innocence Project Brief ] (describing “that the FBI serolo-
gist who analyzed the stains on the victim’s underwear and nightgown, and 
compared them to the defendant’s own blood type, appears to have wholly mis-
represented the results of the original tests to the jury on both items”).  
 35. Serology refers to a range of laboratory tests that utilize serum and 
antigen reactions to antibodies to examine, among other things, ABO blood-
type groups. JOHN M. BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING 39 (2d ed. 2005). The 
ABO blood group substances are found on red blood cells, and for about eighty 
percent of the population, called “secretors,” those substances are expressed in 
other body fluids, including saliva, semen and vaginal fluid. ABO typing tests 
fluids for the presence of the A, B, and H blood group substances. See House, 
126 S. Ct. at 2072. 
 36. See Innocence Project Brief, supra note 34, at 25–26, 2005 WL 779581, 
at *19. 
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Q: So, A could deteriorate into H? 
A: Yes.37 
While biological material may degrade, the prosecution’s 
witness made up the notion that only certain antigens would 
“selectively degrade” (“the conveniently ‘Vanishing A’”)—not 
only was there no evidence to support the conjecture, but amici 
pointed out that this concept is “simply unheard of in the field 
of serology.”38 If “antigens could selectively ‘vanish,’” and blood 
types could mutate from one to another, “then serology would 
never have been a reliable method.”39 Hence, Special Agent 
Bigbee was either grossly incompetent, or he fabricated his tes-
timony to “conform with the State’s case against Paul House, 
i.e., to fraudulently misrepresent the results to make him a po-
tential donor of that semen stain.”40 
Moreover, the testimony regarding the nightgown was also 
false. Bigbee told the jury in crucial testimony that “the person 
who deposited that semen was blood type A,” although the 
permissible scientific inference, as any competent serologist 
knew, was that the “donor need not be an ‘A secretor’ like Paul 
House, but could have been any man on the planet.”41 This is 
because in a mixed male-female stain, the female donor’s 
greater proportion of cells may “‘mask’” male antigens; the A 
stain could have originated entirely from the victim.42 
At trial, the prosecutor stated that “the fact that there was 
semen on the outer garment”43 was the basis for seeking death, 
as it would support a finding that House murdered the victim 
“in the process of either rape or attempted rape.”44 After all, the 
bloodstains on House’s jeans and the witness near the woods 
connected House with a murder, but only the semen provided 
any evidence of a rape.45 In response, House maintained his in-
nocence and attacked the forensic evidence.46 The jury unani-
 
 37. Id. at 25, 2005 WL 779581, at *18–19. 
 38. Id. at 25 & n.17, 2005 WL 779581, at *19 & n.13. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. at 26, 2005 WL 779591, at *19. 
 41. Id. at 26, 2005 WL 779591, at *20 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 42. Id. 
 43. House v. Bell, 386 F.3d 668, 685 (6th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 126 S. Ct. 2064 
(2006). 
 44. Id. at 693. 
 45. House, 126 S. Ct. at 2074–75.  
 46. Id. at 2066. 
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mously found three aggravating factors and, finding no mitigat-
ing factors outweighing them, sentenced him to death.47 
During his appeals, state and federal judges sharply di-
vided over how to handle new evidence of innocence uncovered 
by House. In his direct appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court 
called the trial evidence against House circumstantial but 
“quite strong.”48 Then, in House’s subsequent pro se state ha-
beas petition, he defaulted his ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel claim.49 When House brought a federal habeas claim he 
argued that the district court, under Schlup, should excuse this 
procedural default based on evidence of actual innocence.50 
House’s attorney presented newly discovered evidence, includ-
ing testimony from the State’s medical examiner that the blood 
on House’s jeans likely came from the sample taken from the 
victim after her body was discovered.51 Half a vial of this sam-
ple was unaccounted for, and the State’s medical examiner tes-
tified that law enforcement must have spilled it onto House’s 
pants, either accidentally or intentionally.52 House also pre-
sented two witnesses who had known Mr. Muncey for years and 
who said he had confessed to them that he murdered his wife, 
several witnesses who said Muncey had physically assaulted 
his wife, and two witnesses who contradicted Muncey’s alibi.53 
But most striking, as the Supreme Court would later note, 
newly conducted DNA testing demonstrated “in direct contra-
diction of evidence presented at trial . . . that semen on Mrs. 
 
 47. At the sentencing stage, the State sought to prove three separate ag-
gravating factors to support a capital sentence: 
(1) that House had previously been convicted of a felony involving the 
use or threat of violence; (2) that the homicide was especially heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or depravity of mind; and 
(3) that the murder was committed while House was committing, at-
tempting to commit, or fleeing from the commission of, rape or kid-
napping. 
Id. at 2074. The first factor was straightforward given House’s prior aggra-
vated sexual assault conviction. As to the second two factors, the prosecutor 
argued that, based on the serology evidence and the nature of the victim’s in-
juries, she was raped and kidnapped. Id. 
 48. See State v. House, 743 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tenn. 1987), rev’d sub. nom, 
House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064 (2006). 
 49. House, 126 S. Ct. at 2075. 
 50. Id. at 2075; see also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325–27 (1995). 
 51. House, 126 S. Ct. at 2080. 
 52. Id. at 2083. 
 53. Id. at 2084.  
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Muncey’s [clothing] . . . came from her husband, . . . not 
House.”54 Nevertheless, the district court, after an evidentiary 
hearing regarding new evidence of innocence, denied relief.55 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit divided over which innocence 
standards applied and which were satisfied. The initial panel 
affirmed the district court’s decision.56 However, an en banc 
circuit court changed course, concluding that House made a 
compelling showing of actual innocence under the demanding 
standard the Supreme Court announced in Herrera: in an ex-
traordinary case, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment might hypothetically prevent the execution of an 
actually innocent person.57 The circuit also certified to the Ten-
nessee Supreme Court the question of whether state procedure 
remained open.58 But after the state court refused to answer 
the certified questions,59 the circuit reversed its en banc deci-
sion, with a narrow eight-judge majority ruling that House did 
not meet his burden under Schlup to excuse the procedural de-
fault of his Strickland claim.60 In contrast, the seven dissenting 
judges concluded that not only had House met the Schlup bur-
den, but he made such a “persuasive” showing of innocence that 
his conviction should be vacated under the Herrera standard.61 
Did House show that he was actually innocent, clearly 
guilty, or somewhere in between? The Supreme Court, divided 
5-3, ruled that House fell in between guilty and innocent.62 By 
showing that, more likely than not, no reasonable juror could 
have found him guilty, House satisfied the Schlup standard. In 
perhaps the most significant passage of the opinion, the Court 
emphasized that the new DNA evidence was of “central impor-
tance,” particularly because the proof at trial was circumstan-
tial, and because the evidence that the DNA testing contra-
 
 54. Id. at 2078–79. 
 55. See id. at 2075. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See House v. Bell, 311 F.3d 767 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc). Six judges 
ruled to certify, with four dissenters arguing he could not obtain relief under 
Schlup, much less Herrera. Id. at 780–81 (Boggs, J., dissenting). 
 58. Id. at 768 (majority opinion). 
 59. See House v. Bell, 386 F.3d 668, 670 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc), rev’d, 
126 S. Ct. 2064 (2006). 
 60. See id. at 685. 
 61. Id. at 708 (Merritt, J., dissenting). 
 62. House, 126 S. Ct. at 2086–87. 
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dicted “was the only forensic evidence at the scene that would 
link House to the murder.”63  
The Court held that the DNA evidence, together with the 
showing of forensic tampering with the blood evidence that the 
prosecution introduced at trial and the testimony of witnesses 
implicating Mr. Muncey, “cast considerable doubt on his 
guilt.”64 Despite the powerful showing of innocence, however, 
the Court did not grant a new trial because under Schlup, de-
monstrating that a new jury would probably not convict merely 
entitles the petitioner to pass through a “gateway” in which his 
procedural default is excused and a court may reach the merits 
of a claim.65 Thus, the Court remanded for consideration of the 
merits of the otherwise procedurally defaulted claim of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel.66 
Yet even if House could have more powerfully shown his 
innocence, the result might have stayed the same, as no doc-
trine currently permits relief beyond excusing a procedural de-
fault. The last time the issue came before the Court, in Herrera, 
the Court did not decide whether an actual innocence claim ex-
isted.67 Similarly, in House, the Court ruled that “whatever 
burden a hypothetical freestanding innocence claim would re-
quire, this petitioner has not satisfied it.”68 Therefore, under 
current law, even a showing of innocence sufficient to prove 
that, more likely than not, a jury would not find an individual 
guilty, fails to merit a new trial. 
A perverse result could have followed. Having satisfied the 
very stringent Schlup standard, an individual like House might 
nonetheless be denied relief under the less-stringent showing 
required on his constitutional claim. Under the Strickland 
analysis, House need only show a reasonable probability that 
attorney ineffectiveness prejudiced the outcome.69 However, the 
failure to discover House’s potentially exculpatory evidence in 
time for the original trial might not be attributable to his coun-
sel’s errors.70 Fortunately for House, and as I develop in Part 
 
 63. Id. at 2079. 
 64. Id. at 2087. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417–19 (1993). 
 68. House, 126 S. Ct. at 2087. 
 69. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). 
 70. For example, if DNA testing was not available at the time of trial the 
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II, his new evidence of innocence does at minimum impact the 
prejudice inquiry for his underlying Strickland claim, providing 
a potential ground for relief. 
Indeed, the district court recently granted House’s habeas 
petition71 and ordered his release pending the State’s appeal.72 
In the meantime, the Sixth Circuit will hear the case yet again. 
Twenty-two years after his trial, House will leave death row 
and return home. House is also now wheelchair-bound due to 
an advanced case of multiple sclerosis.73 Should the Sixth Cir-
cuit affirm the grant of House’s petition, the prosecutor stated 
he plans to pursue a retrial.74 
B. ASSESSING THE PROBATIVE IMPACT OF NEW EVIDENCE OF 
INNOCENCE 
The House case represents the first time that the Court 
confronted DNA evidence of innocence, recognized its “central” 
importance, and engaged in a “holistic” analysis regarding its 
effect on the prosecution’s case. Before constructing the existing 
framework of procedural and substantive rights relating to in-
nocence, I first step back to examine what the term “innocent” 
means in connection with a criminal trial. 
The word “innocence” is used casually in the media and by 
lawyers, convicts, scholars, and courts. I define the innocent as 
those who did not commit the charged crime. Even though they 
 
lawyer would not be at fault, although the lawyer could have attacked forensic 
evidence, like the FBI analyst’s faulty testimony, or could have better develop-
ing evidence of third-party guilt.  
 71. See House v. Bell, No. 3:96-cv-883, 2007 WL 4568444, at *9 (E.D. 
Tenn. Dec. 20, 2007) (granting a conditional writ of habeas corpus that will 
result in a vacatur unless the State commences a new trial within 180 days 
after the instant judgment becomes final); see also id. (noting the State’s fail-
ure to disclose certain forensic evidence, and as to third party guilt, that “[i]n a 
case such as this one . . . where the only evidence against petitioner was cir-
cumstantial and the theory of the defense was to shift suspicion from petition-
er to the victim’s husband, it was incumbent on counsel to discover and 
present all witnesses who could testify as to the husband’s abuse of his wife 
and thus lend credence to the defense theory”). 
 72. House v. Bell, No. 3:96-cv-833, 2008 WL 972709, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. 
Apr. 7, 2008) (granting motion for release pending appeal).  
 73. Id., at *3 (“[House] now suffers from an advanced case of multiple 
sclerosis, is unable to walk, and has been confined to a wheelchair for the past 
several years.”). 
 74. Rose French, Death Row Inmate Says No Reason to Retry Him—Could 
Go Free if Tenn. Doesn’t Pursue Case, MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL, Apr. 17, 2008, 
at B7, available at 2008 WLNR 7157135. 
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know they are actually innocent, many lack the evidence to 
prove their innocence to others, making it difficult to distin-
guish them from the convicts and prisoners who falsely claim 
innocence.75 
People seek to prove innocence in several ways, including 
through an alibi defense, a theory of third-party guilt, or an ar-
gument that no crime took place. Claims of innocence can be 
made at different stages during the criminal process, including 
during an investigation, as a defense theory at trial, or as a le-
gal claim during post-conviction appeals. 
Furthermore, although some commentators casually refer 
to DNA testing as potentially “conclusive” of innocence or guilt, 
evidence typically cannot be conclusive of innocence or guilt.76 
This is because all evidence must be evaluated in light of other 
evidence and the elements of the crime or sentence. DNA evi-
dence, for example, is typically probative only as to the issue of 
identity, which may or may not be contested in a given case.77 
Consequently, I suggest that any claim of innocence must be 
evaluated based on its strength: namely, how the particular 
evidence of innocence interacts with the evidence of guilt. I di-
vide claims of innocence into three classes: (1) substantial cas-
es, limited to those who can offer DNA or other evidence highly 
probative of identity; (2) outcome-determinative cases, in which 
DNA results, scientific evidence, or other evidence does not 
substantially undercut the conviction, but undermines the con-
viction to some lesser degree, such that a reasonable jury would 
not convict in light of the new evidence;78 and (3) inconclusive 
cases, in which it is equivocal whether the evidence tends to 
show innocence. These categories represent points along a spec-
trum of the probative impact of exculpatory evidence. 
 
 75. See Garrett, supra note 4, app. C at 141–42 (providing suggestive data 
regarding cases in which post-conviction DNA testing confirmed guilt). Fur-
ther, innocent recidivist low-level offenders may not only have little incentive 
to pursue evidence of innocence, but they may typically accept guilty pleas ra-
ther than face pretrial detention and a possible conviction. See Josh Bowers, 
Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008). 
 76. Cf. House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2086 (2006) (“This is not a case of 
conclusive exoneration.”). 
 77. See id.; see also Anna Franceschelli, Motions for Postconviction DNA 
Testing: Determining the Standard of Proof Necessary in Granting Requests, 
31 CAP. U. L. REV. 243, 245 (2003) (“DNA alone does not prove guilt or inno-
cence, as DNA is only one piece of the evidence . . . .”). 
 78. See House, 126 S. Ct. at 2078. 
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1. Substantial Claims of Innocence 
The most powerfully supported innocence claims are 
termed “complete exonerations,” and involve cases in which 
new evidence of innocence is highly dispositive of identity, per-
haps meeting an elevated “substantial” or “clear and convinc-
ing” evidence standard. DNA testing is currently most common-
ly relevant in cases involving sexual assaults committed by a 
single person who is a stranger to the victim.79 In such cases, 
when DNA left by the perpetrator does not match the convict, 
courts can convincingly resolve the issue of the perpetrator’s 
identity. Such evidence is significant because identity typically 
is a central issue in several types of serious criminal cases with 
stranger-perpetrators, including rapes and murders. 
DNA evidence is different from traditional evidence of 
identity, such as eyewitness testimony, confession testimony, 
and physical evidence left at the scene of a crime. While other 
evidence can lose reliability—the meaning of physical objects 
left at a crime scene may be contested, memories of witnesses 
may be uncertain and subject to deterioration over time, and 
confessions may be coerced or false—DNA evidence is “uniquely 
probative” and “‘timeless’” if preserved and tested properly.80 
DNA testing techniques have become more discerning,81 and 
have established the gold standard for forensic evidence gener-
ally. Unlike many other forms of forensic science, DNA “offer[s] 
data-based, probabilistic assessments of the meaning of eviden-
tiary ‘matches.’”82 Indeed, scientists can now determine wheth-
er one person out of billions or trillions of people (many times 
the number of all humans who have ever lived) could randomly 
 
 79. As more resources have been dedicated to DNA testing, DNA has been 
increasingly used to exonerate or inculpate individuals in burglary cases and 
other less serious felonies. See, e.g., Jeff Reinitz, DNA Database Closes Bur-
glary Cases, WATERLOO-CEDAR FALLS COURIER (Iowa), Apr. 5, 2007, available 
at 2007 WLNR 6551246. 
 80. See Innocence Project Brief, supra note 34, at 19, 2005 WL 779581, at 
*13–14. 
 81. Cf. id. at 16, 2005 WL 779581, at *12 (“[T]he probative value of DNA 
testing has been steadily increasing [due to] technological advances . . . .” 
(quoting NAT’L INST. JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, POSTCONVICTION DNA 
TESTING: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HANDLING REQUESTS (1999))). 
 82. See Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm 
Shift in Forensic Identification Science, 309 SCIENCE 892, 893 (2005) (“DNA 
typing can serve as a model for the traditional forensic sciences . . . .”). 
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match a DNA profile.83 DNA testing can be performed reliably 
on a few dozen cells using the modern short tandem repeat 
(STR) method, and the science continues to advance to permit 
testing of smaller samples.84 DNA evidence may also contain 
proof of its origin at the crime scene, where typical rape case 
samples contain a mixture of the perpetrator’s semen or saliva 
and the victim’s epithelial cells.85 This is not to say that DNA 
testing is foolproof. Human error or misconduct can lead to un-
sound results or analysis. A series of DNA laboratories have 
been investigated for systemic errors, and at least three indi-
viduals have been wrongly convicted based on faulty DNA test-
ing or analysis.86 
More recently, DNA evidence has become important in pro-
ceedings following an individual’s conviction. Post-conviction 
DNA testing was first used to exonerate an innocent man in 
1989, clearing Gary Dotson after ten years of incarceration in 
Illinois.87 Two hundred and sixteen innocent people have now 
been exonerated post-conviction.88 In addition to post-
conviction exonerations, many more people have been cleared 
by DNA results during criminal investigations and at trial.89 
 
 83. See Martinez v. State, 549 So. 2d 694, 697 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) 
(affirming admission of DNA testimony that one in 234 billion people shared a 
profile); NAT’L COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, THE FUTURE OF FORENSIC DNA TESTING 19 (2000) (noting that the 
statistical probability of a thirteen-STR-loci DNA match between two unre-
lated persons in the Caucasian American population has been estimated at 
one in 575 trillion); Edward K. Cheng, Reenvisioning Law Through the DNA 
Lens, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 649, 649 (2005) (“DNA evidence comes pre-
packaged with all the indicia of scientific reliability: population statistics, pre-
defined and pre-tested procedural standards, and known error rates.”). 
 84. See also 4 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE  
§ 30:23, at 149, § 30:31 n.4, at 161 (2007); cf. BUTLER, supra note 35, at 146–48 
(explaining the usefulness of the STR method with degraded DNA samples). 
 85. See Keith A. Findley, New Laws Reflect the Power and Potential of 
DNA, WIS. LAW., May 2002, at 20, 23. 
 86. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 84 n.109. 
 87. See Rob Warden, Executive Dir., Ctr. on Wrongful Convictions, Gary 
Dotson: The Rape That Wasn’t—The First DNA Exoneration in Illinois, http:// 
www.law.northwestern.edu/cwc/exonerations/ilDotsonSummary.html (last vi-
sited Apr. 26, 2008). 
 88. The Innocence Project, supra note 3. 
 89. See, e.g., William S. Sessions, DNA Evidence and the Death Penalty, 
JURIST, May 30, 2007, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/05/dna-evidence 
-and-death-penalty.php (“In approximately 25 percent of cases the genetic evi-
dence recovered during an investigation does not match the DNA of the sus-
pect.”). 
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Such powerful showings of innocence can be made in non-
DNA cases where nonscientific evidence may undercut the con-
viction so substantially as to make a vacatur necessary. For in-
stance, in colonial times when people were less easy to locate, 
murder convictions were vacated when the supposed victim re-
surfaced, alive and well.90 While courts often regarded new ex-
culpatory evidence—such as recantations—with suspicion, 
courts have reversed convictions based on convincing presenta-
tions of such evidence.91 Today, although the vast majority of 
prisoners lack relevant DNA from the crime scene,92 they may 
increasingly benefit from new technology-based evidence that 
also contains strong indicia of reliability, such as video evi-
dence.93 Additionally, DNA evidence may result in a “partial 
exoneration” by demonstrating that a sentence for a crime was 
improper and resulting in relief just as to that aspect of the 
sentence.94 Such partial exonerations may arise when the evi-
 
 90. See EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT, at xviii (1932) 
(recounting eight examples where, after murder convictions, the victim resur-
faced “hale and hearty” and in some the convict “was saved from hanging or 
electrocution by a hairbreadth”). 
 91. Examples recounted by Edwin Borchard in his pioneering book in-
cluded: corroborated confessions of third parties, unusual modus operandi and 
a continued pattern of crimes after conviction, and corroborated confessions by 
accomplices who exclude the convict as a participant. See id. at xix. 
 92. See Protecting the Innocent: Proposals to Reform the Death Penalty: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 221 (2002) (state-
ment of Barry Scheck, Co-Director, Innocence Project) (“The vast majority 
(probably 80%) of felony cases do not involve biological evidence that can be 
subjected to DNA testing.”). 
 93. The Court’s decision to remand for consideration whether actual inno-
cence should excuse procedural default in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 303 
(1995), emphasized the probative power of video evidence. The Court’s decision 
last Term in Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1776 (2007), similarly empha-
sized, in the civil rights context, the probative power of video evidence. With 
video surveillance increasing, as well as the fact that video cameras are in-
creasingly incorporated into cell phones and PDA’s, video may provide a more 
important source for alibi evidence in the future. Other electronic evidence 
may provide a similar degree of certainty. For example, an electronic signa-
ture from an ATM machine or a credit card with a signature may show a per-
son’s physical location. 
 94. Those cases may not often arise because disproving identity will typi-
cally exonerate and will not merely result in a sentence reduction. Further, 
challenging a capital sentence—even with evidence of innocence—is very diffi-
cult under current law. For example, if a capital habeas petitioner procedural-
ly defaults on a claim, the Court requires a “clear and convincing” showing 
that both the elements of the crime and the aggravating factors would not 
have been found but for an underlying constitutional violation. See Sawyer v. 
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dence exonerates an individual of a crime that served as a pre-
dicate crime, or that constituted a sentence-enhancing prior 
conviction.95 
2. Outcome-Determinative Claims of Innocence 
In a second category of cases, new evidence of innocence 
does not substantially disprove identity or elements of the con-
viction or sentence. Nevertheless, it undermines the conviction 
more generally, and under an outcome-based standard, to such 
a degree that no new jury would reasonably convict. In House, 
DNA testing negated a significant piece of forensic evidence 
that linked House to the murder, and it undermined any evi-
dence that the motive was rape, which was one of the aggravat-
ing factors supporting the death sentence.96 The Court em-
ployed a “holistic judgment”—an evaluation of the evidence in 
the context of the entire criminal record—to determine whether 
a new jury would still convict.97 Thus, under this approach, 
DNA results that exclude an individual may not demonstrate 
lack of identity, but it may show that key facts introduced at 
trial, and likely to have powerfully affected the jury’s decision, 
were false.98 
3. Indeterminate Cases 
Toward the other end of the spectrum, new evidence of in-
nocence can have so little exculpatory power as to be inconclu-
sive. DNA test results can be inconclusive if insufficient biolog-
ical material remained, or if what remained was degraded. 
Furthermore, where it is unclear if the perpetrator actually left 
biological evidence at the crime scene, DNA may not be proba-
tive of identity. In many cases, the defendant did not dispute 
 
Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 349–50 (1992). Several circuits extended the Court’s 
rulings to noncapital sentencing, in the context of a showing of innocence to 
excuse a procedural default. See Matthew Mattingly, Note, Actually Less 
Guilty: The Extension of the Actual Innocence Exception to the Sentencing 
Phase of Non-Capital Cases, 93 KY. L.J. 531, 531 (2004–2005). 
 95. Cf., e.g., Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393–94 (2004). 
 96. See House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2078–79 (2006). 
 97. See id. at 2078 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 328). 
 98. The situation when the jury heard facts that were false increasingly 
confronts courts. The Innocence Project argued to the Supreme Court that 
“DNA has revealed a finite but troubling class of convictions tainted by what is 
best described as ‘false facts.’” Innocence Project Brief, supra note 34, at 3, 
2005 WL 779581, at *3. 
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identity at trial, but rather raised a justification defense such 
as self-defense or consent, and if identity cannot be credibly 
disputed, the new DNA evidence might not significantly under-
cut the State’s case.99 Additionally, DNA testing may be inde-
terminate if the test results match co-perpetrators. 
The vast majority of claims of innocence fall into this third 
category. Courts struggle with claims of new evidence of inno-
cence, particularly those that depend on less reliable forms of 
evidence.100 Thus, for instance, since a witness’s memory may 
become less trustworthy with the passage of time, courts have 
ruled that even where the conviction rested on a single witness, 
that individual’s recantation cannot support a vacatur.101 Along 
the way to that outcome, however, hard questions occur at the 
borderlines between substantial, outcome-determinative, and 
inconclusive cases. Many courts adopt opaque reasoning on 
such complex matters that fails to focus on the probative power 
of such evidence. To explore this conclusion, Part II considers 
how our existing federal and state systems evaluate innocence. 
 
 99. See, e.g., People v. Gholston, 697 N.E.2d 375, 378–79 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1998) (denying a motion for DNA testing on the basis that such testing could 
not exculpate where the defendant was found guilty of committing a sexual 
assault of a woman with accomplices, there was no evidence he ejaculated, and 
where he was also found guilty of a robbery and battery of two male victims). 
DNA evidence may also support a self-defense or consent theory. 
 100. Michael Risinger argues for a more “radical” approach: that showings 
of innocence that could not satisfy an actual innocence claim should neverthe-
less be credited by trial and appellate courts, and exploring a new category of 
“unsafe” verdicts. D. Michael Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts: The Need for Re-
formed Standards for the Trial and Review of Factual Innocence Claims, 41 
HOUS. L. REV. 1281, 1334–36 (2004). 
 101. See Paul von Zielbauer, Accusers Recant, but Hopes Still Fade in Sing 
Sing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2007, at A1 (describing a case in which courts re-
jected appeals where the only evidence of guilt, five eyewitnesses, all recanted 
their testimony, citing “the prevailing wisdom of the American justice system, 
which views recantations as untrustworthy, acts not of conscience, but of sym-
pathy or bribery or coercion”); see also Dobbert v. Wainwright, 468 U.S. 1231, 
1233 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of application for stay of ex-
ecution) (“Recantation testimony is properly viewed with great suspicion.”); 
People v. Shilitano, 112 N.E. 733, 736 (N.Y. 1916) (“There is no form of proof 
so unreliable as recanting testimony. In the popular mind it is often regarded 
as of great importance. Those experienced in the administration of the crimi-
nal law know well its untrustworthy character.”); Janice J. Repka, Comment, 
Rethinking the Standard for New Trial Motions Based upon Recantations as 
Newly Discovered Evidence, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1433, 1434–35 (1986); Daniel 
Wolf, Note, I Cannot Tell a Lie: The Standard for New Trial in False Testimo-
ny Cases, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1925, 1928 (1985). 
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II.  INNOCENCE AND LEGAL CHANGE   
This Part explores the effect of DNA testing on the crimi-
nal system. DNA testing, by providing compelling resolution of 
identity, has reshaped the criminal system. Nevertheless, the 
system fails to simply examine the probative impact of new 
evidence of innocence. At each stage of the criminal process dif-
ferent rules apply, but during each stage scientific proof of 
identity—particularly DNA evidence—has created a new re-
gime increasingly focused on claims of innocence. That regime, 
however, remains tied to an old world in which strict barriers 
obstruct the path to freedom of an innocent convict. Part II.A 
begins by discussing the transformative effect of DNA-testing 
technology on criminal investigations. Next, Part II.B discusses 
how claims of innocence are litigated during criminal trials. 
Part II.C discusses state appeals and post-conviction review, 
including the profusion of statutes that now provide for access 
to post-conviction DNA testing. Finally, Part II.D discusses in-
nocence in the context of federal habeas corpus, in which there 
is no freestanding constitutional innocence claim, but where 
innocence and access to DNA is increasingly litigated. 
A. CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 
DNA changed the nature of criminal investigations in a 
range of cases by making it possible to exculpate or inculpate 
suspects. Typically, law enforcement investigates evidence of 
innocence, such as alibi evidence or evidence of a third party’s 
guilt, to assess the reliability of its cases. Police are also trained 
to test the memory of witnesses using identification procedures 
like lineups; similarly, during interrogations they test the sus-
pect’s account against crime-scene details.102 Such investigative 
techniques are not foolproof, but they aim for accuracy, and 
criminal procedure rules prohibit methods with high risks of 
error, such as coercive interrogations.103 
By quickly providing dispositive evidence as to identity, 
DNA testing changes the investigative process, especially in 
stranger-rape cases. For example, in Virginia, DNA analysis 
 
 102. See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977); Richard A. 
Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations 
of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interroga-
tion, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 438 (1998). 
 103. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223, 226 (1973). 
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eliminates twenty-five to thirty percent of suspects in police in-
vestigations.104 Nationally, early in the DNA era when local po-
lice sent samples to the FBI for testing, about twenty-five per-
cent of primary suspects were excluded.105 In the twenty-five 
percent of cases where testing excludes prime suspects, pre-
sumably the prime suspect was identified through some other 
method, such as eyewitness identification or interrogation. 
Therefore, DNA may not only call into question traditional in-
vestigatory methods and shed light on particular erroneous in-
vestigations, but the availability of DNA may more broadly 
change the way that police investigate cases. For example, law 
enforcement may prioritize cases in which DNA testing can be 
conducted.106 In other cases, law enforcement may use DNA as 
a tool to enhance other investigative techniques, such as inter-
rogation. Police, for example, may falsely tell a suspect that his 
DNA matches during interrogation to elicit a confession.107 
Moreover, DNA inculpates large numbers of suspects, some 
of whom otherwise would never have been located.108 The mod-
ern national DNA databank system, Combined DNA Index Sys-
tem (CODIS), arose from federal legislation109 and pools fifty 
state databanks with the federal databank created by the FBI 
 
 104. See All Things Considered: DNA Gathering (NPR radio broadcast July 
27, 2000). 
 105. See Barry C. Scheck, Barry Scheck Lectures on Wrongful Convictions, 
54 DRAKE L. REV. 597, 601 (2006); see also EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE 
STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRI-
AL, at xxviii (1996). That twenty-five percent figure for FBI exclusions still 
holds true. See Sessions, supra note 89. 
 106. See, e.g., David Kocieniewski, With Witnesses at Risk, Murder Sus-
pects Go Free, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2007, at A1 (“[T]he New Jersey’s Essex 
County prosecutor has established an unwritten rule discouraging pursuit of 
cases that rely on a single witness, and those in which witness statements are 
not extensively corroborated by forensic evidence.”). 
 107. See State v. Chirokovskcic, 860 A.2d 986, 988–89 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2004). 
 108. Indeed, DNA has helped not only to catch serial rapists, but has 
linked together crimes that police, when relying on traditional evidence, had 
thought to be unrelated. Cf. ADVANCED JUSTICE THROUGH DNA TECHNOLOGY 
1–4 (2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/justice/dna_initiative_policy_ 
book.pdf (discussing examples where DNA aided law enforcement). 
 109. DNA Identification Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 210301–
210306, 108 Stat. 1796, 2065–71 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
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in 1990.110 These databanks contain over three million profiles, 
and their size continues to expand, particularly since all fifty 
states and the federal government enacted laws permitting col-
lection of DNA from those convicted of serious felonies.111 The 
federal government and twelve states collect DNA profiles from 
detainees and arrestees who are never charged, and additional 
states are considering similar expansions.112 
As a result of this information, DNA evidence that excul-
pates the convict can also inculpate a new individual. For ex-
ample, more than one-third of the first two hundred post-
conviction DNA exonerations resulted in the inculpation of the 
actual perpetrator, with most of these matches the result of a 
“cold hit” in a DNA databank.113 The availability of such power-
ful evidence of guilt has also resulted in legal changes to make 
new prosecutions possible. This evolution began when prosecu-
tors evaded the statute of limitations by using “John Doe DNA 
indictments,” in which they indicted the DNA profile itself.114 
Several states have recently passed laws that relax statutes of 
limitations in DNA cases to permit such prosecutions.115 Thus, 
 
 110. Cf. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Dep’t of Justice, CODIS: Combined 
DNA Index System 2 (2007), available at http:www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/pdf/ 
codisbrochure2.pdf (“Today, over 170 public law enforcement laboratories par-
ticipate in [a National DNA Index System] across the United States.”). 
 111. See 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a)(1) (Supp. V 2007); Michelle Hibbert, DNA 
Databanks: Law Enforcement’s Greatest Surveillance Tool?, 34 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 767, 774–75 (1999). 
 112. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:609 (Supp. 2008); TEX. GOV’T CODE 
ANN. § 411.1471 (Vernon Supp. 2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2:1 (Supp. 
2007); see also Kevin Johnson, States Expand Taking of DNA, USA TODAY, 
April 14, 2008 at 1A, available at 2008 WLNR 6945263 (noting that twelve 
states now “permit sampling for some or all felony arrests, up from five in 
2006” and that “[a]nother 21 are considering such proposals”); Julia Preston, 
U.S. Set to Begin a Vast Expansion of DNA Sampling, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 
2007, at A1 (“Federal Bureau of Investigation officials said they anticipated an 
increase ranging from 250,000 to as many as 1 million samples a year. The 
laboratory currently receives about 96,000 samples a year . . . .”). 
 113. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 119. 
 114. For statutes extending the statute of limitations in sexual assault cas-
es, see, for example, ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-109(b)(1)(B) (2006), CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 54-193b (2007), FLA. STAT. § 775.15 (15) (2007), and GA. CODE ANN.  
§ 17-3-1(c.1) (2004). For states extending the statute of limitations for all 
crimes, see, for example, ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-109(i)–(j) (2006), DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 11, § 3107(a) (2007), and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-6(c) (West 2005). 
 115. See Meredith A. Bieber, Comment, Meeting the Statute or Beating It: 
Using “John Doe” Indictments Based on DNA to Meet the Statute of Limita-
tions, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1079, 1079 n.1 (2002). Interestingly, Arkansas opens 
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in addition to changing investigative techniques, DNA has af-
fected rules of finality for prosecution. 
B. CRIMINAL TRIALS 
Although law enforcement has strong incentives to pursue 
DNA evidence of guilt, the same incentives do not exist to pur-
sue DNA evidence of innocence. Further, our criminal proce-
dure rules do not yet sufficiently ensure full access at trial to 
this most powerful evidence of innocence. Due process rules 
should be understood to provide complete access to DNA and 
other evidence of innocence at trial. Wrongful convictions will 
persist, however, unless courts ensure that evidence of inno-
cence is fully disclosed at the time of trial. 
Innocence is typically claimed in two ways at trial: through 
an alibi defense or through evidence of third-party guilt. Alibi 
defenses traditionally involve calling witnesses to testify that 
the defendant was not at the scene of the crime. In contrast, 
claims pointing to third-party guilt typically involve highlight-
ing evidence that suggests another, possibly unknown, individ-
ual committed the crime. These claims have not received much 
judicial or scholarly attention, but have long played an impor-
tant role in criminal proceedings.116 Indeed, in my Judging In-
nocence study, four out of eighteen reversals obtained by the 
exonerees were due to appellate or post-conviction courts re-
versing based on the trial court’s improper exclusion or the 
State’s suppression of evidence of third-party guilt.117 Impor-
tantly, while states have long adhered to much-criticized rules 
that limit the ability to present evidence of third-party guilt at 
trial, the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that due process 
entitles a defendant to present a theory of third-party guilt, at 
least in the face of overly restrictive state rules.118 
 
its statute to extension not just in DNA cases, but expecting other advances, to 
any “test that may become available through an advance in technology.” ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 5-1-109(b)(1)(B) (providing such an extension only for rape cas-
es). 
 116. See, e.g., Stephen Michael Everhart, Putting a Burden of Production 
on the Defendant Before Admitting Evidence That Someone Else Committed 
the Crime Charged: Is It Constitutional?, 76 NEB. L. REV. 272 (1997); Brett C. 
Powell, Comment, Perry Mason Meets the “Legitimate Tendency” Standard of 
Admissibility (and Doesn’t Like What He Sees), 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1023 
(2001). 
 117. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 104. 
 118. See Holmes v. South Carolina, 126 S. Ct. 1727, 1735 (2006) (holding 
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In addition to alibi and third-party-guilt evidence of inno-
cence, DNA evidence also may take on a central role in a crimi-
nal trial: DNA evidence is now admissible at trial in all 
states.119 Law enforcement has strong incentives to conduct 
DNA testing before trial to prove guilt. Courts have held that 
uncorroborated inculpating DNA tests, standing alone, suffice 
to prove guilt.120 Thus, in cases in which identity is the primary 
issue, cases with DNA inculpations typically result in guilty 
pleas, while those with DNA exclusions may often lead the 
prosecutor to drop the case. Additionally, DNA test results can 
bolster an alibi by showing lack of identity, and a “cold hit” in a 
DNA databank can provide powerful evidence of third-party 
guilt. 
Commentators have observed that “[t]hese days, DNA test-
ing is common on the front end of prosecutions, meaning that in 
a few years, the window that the 200 exonerations has opened 
on the justice system will close.”121 Though DNA testing is now 
routine before trials, that window may close more slowly than 
many have supposed. Of the 211 post-conviction DNA exonera-
tions from 1989 through the end of 2007, more than one-fourth, 
fifty-five individuals, were convicted even though DNA testing 
was available at the time of their trials.122 
 
 
that a court may not exclude probative evidence of third-party guilt based on 
the strength of the state’s case). For an invaluable set of criticisms of the “di-
rect connection” doctrine, as well as a discussion of the manner in which Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 804 and similar state rules “uniquely disfavor[ ] state-
ments . . . offered by a defendant in a criminal case to show that someone else 
might have committed the crime,” see Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, 
The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. 
REV. 291, 343–46. The direct-connection doctrine “limits admissibility to evi-
dence that not only has a ‘tendency’ to make the defendant’s guilt ‘less proba-
ble,’ but that also has a ‘direct connection’ to the crime.” Id. 
 119. See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 83, 
at 24; Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, Admissibility of DNA Identification 
Evidence, 84 A.L.R.4TH 313 (1991). 
 120. As a New York court put it, “the testimony of even one DNA expert 
that there is a genetic match . . . is legally sufficient to support a guilty ver-
dict.” See People v. Rush, 630 N.Y.S.2d 631, 634 (Sup. Ct. 1995), aff ’d, 672 
N.Y.S.2d 362 (App. Div. 1998). 
 121. Adam Liptak, Study of Wrongful Convictions Raises Questions Beyond 
DNA, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2007, at A1 (describing the results of Garrett, su-
pra note 4). 
 122. DNA was first used in a post-conviction case in 1989 in the United 
States. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 57. 
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Figure 1. Annual DNA Exonerations and DNA-Era Convictions123 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As Figure 1 shows, the annual rate of DNA exonerations 
increased over time (with variation from year to year). Howev-
er, the graph also shows a persistent proportion of DNA exone-
rations of people convicted in the DNA era. Moreover, this pro-
portion has a gradual, though uneven, rise.124 This suggests 
that exonerations will not readily disappear despite the in-
creased use of DNA testing during criminal investigations. A 
range of reasons explain why these individuals were convicted, 
notwithstanding the availability of DNA testing at trial; these 
findings are summarized in Table 1, below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 123. The data compiled reflecting the number of DNA exonerees in each 
year and the year of conviction can also be viewed on the Innocence Project’s 
website, which displays that information in a chart. See The Innocence 
Project, Know the Cases: Browse the Profiles, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
know/Browse-Profiles.php (last visited Apr. 26, 2008).  
 124. Of the five exonerations that have occurred so far in 2008, three, those 
of Ronald Gene Taylor, Kennedy Brewer, and Nathaniel Hatchett, involved 
post-1990 convictions. See id. 
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Table 1. Convictions of the Innocent in the DNA Era (1990–2007)125 
 
 
The reasons for ongoing convictions of the innocent in the 
DNA era include: advances in DNA technology, conviction de-
spite DNA exclusion, forensic fraud or error, attorney ineffec-
tiveness, or court denial of a DNA testing request. For some ex-
onerees, more than one reason applied. Each of these reasons 
suggests why wrongful convictions will still occur unless our 
system recognizes that due process requires meaningful access 
to evidence of innocence at the time of trial. 
1. Improvements in DNA Technology 
Twenty-one of the exonerees were convicted in the DNA 
era because DNA technology at the time was too primitive to 
exonerate the individual.126 Early Restriction Fragment Length 
Polymorphism (RFLP) testing permitted results only where 
fairly large quantities of biological material were available for 
testing.127 Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) testing, which be-
came widely available in the early 1990s, provided an advance 
 
 125. Information regarding the reasons why DNA testing was or was not 
conducted at trial was compiled from available news reports and in several 
instances, from discussions with counsel. For several exonerees, more than 
one reason was implicated. See Brandon L. Garrett, Database: Post-DNA Ex-
onerations (on file with author). 
 126. The exonerees are R. Alexander, A. Beaver, R. Brown, A. Coco, S.  
Cowans, R. Criner, R. Danziger, A. Dominguez, W. Gregory, C. Heins, P. Kor-
donowy, R. Krone, M. Mercer, N. Miller, M. Mitchell, J. O’Donnell, A. Powell, 
P. Rose, F. Saecker, D. Warney, and K. Wyniemko. See id. 
 127. See BUTLER, supra note 35, at 33–35. 
Reason Why DNA Testing Did Not 
Exonerate at the Time of Trial 
Number Percent (of the 55 DNA 
Era Exonerees) 
DNA technology advanced beyond 
that available at the time of trial 21 38 
Found guilty despite DNA testing that 
excluded 12 22 
State forensic experts concealed or 
misrepresented DNA evidence  10 18 
Attorney failed to request DNA  13 24 
Court denied DNA request 5 9 
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in DNA testing by permitting testing of more minute pieces of 
evidence.128 Short tandem repeat (STR) testing, first conducted 
in 1991 but not widely adopted until the mid-to-late 1990s, 
permitted amplification of DNA, as well as examination of 
short fragments of DNA that are more likely to be preserved.129 
These improvements in technology were one reason why the 
annual rate of DNA exonerations sharply increased in the mid-
to-late 1990s.130 Additional advances that enabled new exone-
rations included the advent in the late 1990s of mitochondrial 
DNA testing, which is useful for the testing of hair, and of Y-
STR testing in 2003, which permits testing on the Y chromo-
some.131 Assuming that genetic science and technology continue 
to improve, innocence claims will continue to be important, par-
ticularly as the cost of testing falls and the speed of testing in-
creases. 
Related to improvements in technology, the expansion of 
DNA databanks provided an important source for evidence of 
third-party guilt, creating the possibility of a cold hit—a match 
in a DNA database—with the perpetrator. Almost one-fourth of 
the first two hundred post-conviction DNA exonerations in-
volved such a cold hit.132 Strikingly, in several cases, even after 
DNA excluded a convict, the State did not concede innocence 
until a cold hit occurred.133 Since databanks continually grow 
in size, the likelihood that a cold hit will occur continues to 
grow. As these databases continue to expand, an important, 
unresolved constitutional question is whether Brady v. Mary-
land entitles a defendant to obtain potentially exculpatory dis-
covery from a database search conducted on DNA found at a 
 
 128. Id. 
 129. See id. at 11 (providing a timeline of advances in DNA technology). 
 130. See supra fig.1. 
 131. See generally BUTLER, supra note 35, at 201–98 (providing helpful 
background information about these types of testing). For example, Wilton 
Dedge’s exoneration in 2004 rested on mitochondrial and Y-STR testing, The 
Innocence Project, Know the Cases: Wilton Dedge, http://www 
.innocenceproject.org/Content/84.php (last visited Apr. 26, 2008), and James 
Waller’s exoneration also rested on Y-STR testing, The Innocence Project, 
Know the Cases: James Waller, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/439 
.php (last visited Apr. 26, 2008). 
 132. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 119. 
 133. The case of Douglas Warney provides an example, see Innocence 
Project, Know the Cases: Douglas Warney, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
Content/281.php (last visited Apr. 26, 2008), as do the twelve cases discussed 
infra note 403. 
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crime scene.134 While several states limit post-conviction DNA 
testing to cases involving improvements in DNA technology, 
few provide access to testing where databank searches may lo-
cate the perpetrator. Illinois and Ohio explicitly provide a sta-
tutory right to a CODIS DNA databank search at the post-
conviction stage, while a few states have statutory rights to a 
CODIS search at the time of trial.135 The Brady due process 
rule should be understood to ensure a defendant’s access to 
such powerful evidence of third-party guilt both at the time of 
trial and at the post-conviction stage. 
2. Conviction Despite DNA Exclusion at Trial 
Over twenty percent of these exonerees convicted in the 
DNA era, or twelve individuals convicted during the time pe-
riod discussed, were found guilty despite the existence of exclu-
sionary DNA testing at the time of their criminal trials.136 In 
each case, the prosecution had a theory to explain the DNA ex-
clusion. All twelve of these convictions were vacated only upon 
the occurrence of a cold hit in the CODIS database or a DNA 
match with a subsequently identified suspect.137 
3. Forensic Evidence Concealed or Misrepresented 
Eighteen percent of these exonerees, or ten individuals, 
were exonerated because state crime laboratories failed to con-
duct DNA testing despite its availability, including because po-
tentially exculpatory DNA evidence was concealed or improper-
 
 134. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Federal DNA statutes are 
premised in part on a recognition that “[i]t is crucial for defendants to have 
access to the CODIS system in circumstances that possibly establish inno-
cence.” United States v. Reynard, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1168 (S.D. Cal. 2002) 
(quoting 146 CONG. REC. H8578 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 2000) (statement of Rep. 
Jackson-Lee)), aff ’d, 473 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2007); see also H.R. REP. NO. 106-
900, pt. 1, at 10 (2000), as reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2323, 2325 (discuss-
ing a backlog of DNA samples in crime labs and commenting that “the current 
inadequacies of the system . . . endanger the innocent”). 
 135. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/116-5 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.  
§ 2953.74(A)–(B) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007). For statutes permitting a CODIS 
search before trial, see, for example, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-267(c) (2007). 
 136. The cases are those of J. Deskovic, C. Elkins, T. Hayes, E. Karage, R. 
Krone, R. Matthews, A. McCray, J. Ochoa, K. Richardson, R. Santana, Y. Sa-
laam, and K. Wise. Krone was retried and found guilty and sentenced to life in 
prison despite DNA testing conducted before his second trial. See Garrett, su-
pra note 125. 
 137. See, e.g., People v. Wise, 752 N.Y.S.2d 837 (Sup. Ct. 2002). 
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ly reported as inculpatory, or because results were fabricated 
by the state forensic experts.138 Such cases highlight the need 
for courts to ensure complete disclosure of laboratory notes and 
reports related to the testing of DNA and other biological ma-
terial.139 These categories of cases do not include the far more 
substantial number of cases involving improper use of non-
DNA forensic analysis in exoneration cases, such as serology or 
microscopic hair comparison.140 Moreover, a series of corruption 
scandals at major forensic laboratories has recently resulted in 
exonerations. As a result, several state laboratories have begun 
conducting unprecedented audits and retesting thousands of 
old cases to uncover flawed forensic testing at trial.141 As a re-
 
 138. The cases are those of G. Alejandro, T. Durham, H. Gonzalez, A. Gos-
sett, D. Holland, M. Pendleton, M. Mercer, J. Sutton, A. Villasana, and J. Wil-
lis. See Garrett, supra note 125. Michael Mercer’s case is included here, but 
presents close and unresolved issues based on news reports. In that case, “[a] 
serologist told both juries that an analysis of slides taken for a rape kit had 
revealed no evidence of sperm,” and, as a result, DNA testing was denied on 
appeal. Robert D. McFadden, DNA Clears Rape Convict After 12 Years, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 20, 2003, at B1. However, it is possible that a serologist using 
proper methods would not detect any evidence of sperm, and that it was the 
appellate court that improperly denied access to more sophisticated DNA test-
ing. An additional case, that of Ronald Taylor, is a 2008 exoneration. See The 
Innocence Project, DNA Testing Proves That Houston Man Was Wrongfully 
Convicted of Rape in 1995; Case Highlights Serious HPD Crime Lab Problems, 
Oct. 3, 2007, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/915.php. 
 139. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 84. 
 140. The use of forensic science in the criminal trials of DNA exonerees is 
the subject of a work in progress finding improper forensic science testimony 
by State analysts to have been pervasive in exonerees’ trials. See Brandon L. 
Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Improper Forensic Science and Wrongful Convic-
tions, 95 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009). 
 141. For example, the Virginia lab has begun retesting years after the Gov-
ernor ordered an audit. After assembling thousands of files to test, the labora-
tory estimated that thirty exonerations might result. This estimate may be 
quite conservative when two of the first thirty tested were exonerated. See 
Frank Green, State’s DNA Project Is Slow Going, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Va.), 
Aug. 26, 2007, at A1 (describing the limited progress of a Virginia retesting 
project); Maryland Police Reviewing 480 DNA Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 
2003, available at 2003 WLNR 5247183 (“Baltimore County police are review-
ing 480 cases worked on by a former department chemist who testified at a 
1983 rape trial against a defendant who was later exonerated.”); Candace 
Rondeaux, Virginia DNA Review Hobbled, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2006, at B1 
(quoting the Virginia’s state crime laboratory director admitting “[w]e could 
see as many as 30 possible exonerations when this is all over with”); Robert 
Tanner, State Efforts to Check Crime Lab Work Stall Minnesota and Two Oth-
er States Find Their New Forensics Oversight Boards Are Thwarted by Politics 
and Funding, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Mar. 25, 2007, available at 
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sult, we can expect additional DNA exonerations in the near fu-
ture. In the interim, the focus of post-conviction DNA exonera-
tions may change from uncovering the unreliability of  
traditional forensic sciences, such as hair comparison and blood 
serology, to uncovering human failures or fraud in DNA labora-
tories. Paradoxically, DNA laboratories are currently far more 
carefully regulated than those performing other forensic tech-
niques.142 
The Supreme Court has held that prosecutors violate due 
process if they knowingly introduce perjured testimony at tri-
al.143 If, however, prosecutors merely conceal evidence of inno-
cence, including DNA test results, the defense may never learn 
of a fabrication, even though the Brady rule requires that pros-
ecutors disclose and turn over to the defense all of the poten-
tially exculpatory evidence in the State’s control.144 Recognizing 
this problem, the District of Columbia passed a statute requir-
ing the prosecutor to disclose in open court the existence of any 
“physical evidence seized or recovered” during an investigation 
“which may contain biological material,” and any DNA test re-
sults.145 The statute also offers the opportunity for the defense 
to request or waive DNA testing.146 As this statute recognizes, 
the Brady mandate is particularly important in the DNA con-
text: as one court put it, “Given the well-known powerful excul-
patory effect of DNA testing, confidence in the jury’s finding of 
 
2007 WLNR 5946827 (describing how state forensic review commissions in 
Minnesota, Texas, and Virginia have yet to reopen a case due to lack of fund-
ing or a flat refusal to do so). Private laboratories have also had fabrication 
scandals. See, e.g., Laura Cadiz, Md.-Based DNA Lab Fires Analyst over Falsi-
fied Tests, BALT. SUN, Nov. 18, 2004, at A1 (describing the firing of an analyst 
engaging in fabrication at the prominent Orchid Cellmark laboratory). 
 142. All public DNA laboratories are now required to be accredited and to 
undergo external audits at least every two years, based on the requirements of 
the 2004 Justice for All Act. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b)(2) (Supp. V 2007); Paul C. 
Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to Regulate 
Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163, 210 & n.339 (2007). 
 143. See Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942); Mooney v. Hollohan, 294 
U.S. 103, 112 (1935). 
 144. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86–87 (1963). Although Brady noted 
that this duty existed upon request from the defense, the Supreme Court later 
clarified that the duty existed with a specific request, general request, or no 
request at all. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). 
 145. D.C. CODE § 22-4132 (Supp. 2007). 
 146. Id. 
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plaintiff ’s guilt at his past trial, where such evidence was not 
considered, would be undermined.”147 
Yet, because courts do not understand how the uniquely 
probative nature of DNA evidence can alter the Brady analysis, 
they fail to properly apply the Brady rule. Courts are divided, 
with some granting and some denying relief for the conceal-
ment of biological material in the original trial. The cases of 
Dale Brison and Darryl Hunt starkly illustrate the contrasting 
approaches courts have taken. In Dale Brison’s case, the state 
court ordered DNA testing, finding that a failure to do so would 
violate Brady.148 In contrast, the Fourth Circuit ruled that Dar-
ryl Hunt could not make a Brady claim when the State’s attor-
ney falsely told his lawyer at the time of trial that the biological 
material was “too degraded to be tested,” even after initial DNA 
testing excluded Hunt.149 Instead, the court held Hunt’s lawyer 
“had equal access to the fluid samples, and thus he was under 
an independent duty to pursue testing alternatives.”150 Thus, 
even in cases involving exonerees, courts dismiss claims re-
garding the State’s concealment of crucial biological evidence 
that would have undermined the State’s case. As these cases 
demonstrate, current constitutional rules like Brady do not 
adequately ensure the availability or reliability of DNA testing, 
despite its newfound importance in criminal trials. 
4. Trial Counsel Failure to Request DNA Testing 
More than one-fifth of the exonerees, or thirteen individu-
als, did not receive DNA testing at trial because defense attor-
neys failed to request it.151 Of those thirteen exonerees, only 
three later brought a Strickland claim alleging constitutionally 
ineffective counsel.152 One of the three exonerees, Brian 
 
 147. Godschalk v. Montgomery County Dist. Attorney’s Office, 177 F. Supp. 
2d 366, 370 (E.D. Pa. 2001); see also In re Brown, 952 P.2d 715 (Cal. 1998) 
(noting a prosecutor’s duty to turn over suppressed drug test results). 
 148. Commonwealth v. Brison, 618 A.2d 420, 424–25 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) 
(remanding for DNA testing, finding that DNA evidence was exculpatory evi-
dence that should have been disclosed under Brady). 
 149. Hunt v. McDade, No. 98-6808, 2000 WL 219755, at *4 (4th Cir. Feb. 
25, 2000). 
 150. Id. 
 151. See supra tbl.1. 
 152. Anthony Hicks also brought such a claim, but only after the DNA test-
ing had already exonerated him, and thus he received a reversal. See infra 
notes 162–63, 320 and accompanying text. 
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Piszczek, lost his claim in the Ohio state appellate court, which 
ruled that the DNA testing would not have helped his defense 
given the victim’s apparently reliable identification of him as 
the perpetrator.153 Similarly, in the case of Josiah Sutton, a 
state appellate court ruled that the trial lawyer “(1) [] informed 
appellant’s family he would need more money for the analysis 
to be performed but they failed to pay it; and (2) there were no 
unadulterated samples left for independent analysis.”154 The 
Court added that “appellate counsel d[id] not produce any evi-
dence of independent DNA analysis that would vindicate appel-
lant.”155 The case of Mark Bravo was slightly different, because 
his attorneys claimed to have requested DNA before trial.156 
The prosecutors, however, denied receiving any request and the 
trial court denied a defense request for a continuance to send 
the evidence to a laboratory in Maryland.157 Nevertheless, the 
appellate court found no prejudice, on the theory that “[t]he 
tests may not have been possible or if possible, the results 
might have been inculpatory.”158 A dissenter argued that DNA 
testing should be permitted because it might prove Bravo’s in-
nocence, which ultimately occurred.159 
In this complex catch-22 lies what Seth Kreimer and David 
Rudovsky have called the “double helix, double bind.”160 Al-
though courts may cite defense counsel’s independent obliga-
tion to request DNA testing in support of their refusal to reme-
dy the prosecution’s failure to accurately disclose the nature of 
biological evidence, defense counsel’s failure to request the 
DNA testing may not result in relief for the innocent appellant. 
This is especially true since, under the deferential Strickland 
inquiry, “a particular decision not to investigate must be direct- 
 
 
 153. State v. Piszczek, No. 62203, 1993 WL 106966, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Apr. 8, 1993). 
 154. Sutton v. State, No. 14-99-00951-CR, 2001 WL 40349, at *2 (Tex. App. 
Jan. 18, 2001). 
 155. Id. 
 156. People v. Bravo, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48, 52 (Ct. App. 1993). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. See id. at 61 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (“[T]he DNA test for which ap-
pellant sought a continuance could supply admissible evidence which would 
offer compelling if not conclusive proof of his innocence.”). 
 160. Seth F. Kreimer & David Rudovsky, Double Helix, Double Bind: Fac-
tual Innocence and Postconviction DNA Testing, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 547 (2002). 
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ly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, apply-
ing a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.”161 
Hence, a failure to request ultimately exculpatory DNA testing 
might not, and frequently did not, earn relief on appeal. The 
lone exception among the exonerees was Anthony Hicks, who 
succeeded on a Strickland claim since, although his attorney 
“knew that the root tissue of hair specimens could be subject to 
DNA testing . . . [h]e did not discuss this with his client or with 
the district attorney, or petition the court to have this test per-
formed or do anything to pursue such testing.”162 The Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court found ineffective assistance of counsel—but 
only after DNA testing had already excluded Hicks.163 
While courts denying Brady claims seem to place the bur-
den on defense lawyers to obtain DNA evidence, defense law-
yers may have difficulty evaluating the State’s forensic evi-
dence, as indigent defendants lack a right to obtain funding for 
independent experts to conduct or review DNA testing. Moreo-
ver, most states do not routinely fund such assistance.164 The 
Court’s ruling in Ake v. Oklahoma,165 however, provides a com-
pelling argument justifying provision of independent defense 
experts. In Ake, the Court held that an insanity defense, where 
made, is so critical to a case’s outcome that without the provi-
sion of a defense expert psychiatrist, “the risk of an inaccurate 
resolution of sanity issues is extremely high.”166 Similarly, 
DNA testing “dramatically enhance[s]” the accuracy of a jury’s 
determination.167 Courts nevertheless routinely deny access to 
independent forensic experts, risking inaccurate resolutions.168 
 
 161. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984). 
 162. State v. Hicks, 536 N.W.2d 487, 491 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995), aff ’d, 549 
N.W.2d 435 (Wis. 1996). 
 163. Hicks, 549 N.W.2d at 436, 438, 444–45. The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
also relied heavily on the fact that identity was critical to Hicks’s conviction 
and the State had used the same hair samples that exonerated him as affir-
mative evidence of his presence at the scene of the crime. Id. at 439. 
 164. See Jay A. Zollinger, Defense Access to State-Funded DNA Experts: 
Considerations of Due Process, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1803, 1803–05 (1997) (describ-
ing state case law, and noting that the courts rely on a variety of grounds to 
deny funds for defense DNA experts). 
 165. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). 
 166. Id. at 82; Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert As-
sistance in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305, 1340–
41 (2004). 
 167. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83. 
 168. See Giannelli, supra note 166, at 1312; see also NAT’L RESEARCH 
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Even without an independent expert, the defense could 
cross-examine the law enforcement forensic expert regarding 
their findings. This may not be an effective alternative, howev-
er, as states increasingly permit prosecutors to introduce DNA 
test results at trial using only a laboratory certificate, thus  
forestalling the opportunity to cross-examine the expert.169 
Courts permit this practice even though state forensic analysts 
have mischaracterized forensic results in reports and testimo-
ny.170 Furthermore, prosecutors are not necessarily obligated to 
provide the defense with laboratory notes underlying the report 
stating the results. A good example of the potential injustice 
arising from the combination of these factors is the case of Ar-
 
COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 87 (1996) (urging 
that a second test performed by an independent expert is “[a] wrongly accused 
person’s best insurance against the possibility of being falsely incriminated”). 
At least two courts have held that if the prosecution seeks to introduce DNA 
evidence at trial, then the defendant has a due process right to the appoint-
ment of a defense DNA expert. Dubose v. State, 662 So. 2d 1189, 1194, 1197–
98 (Ala. 1995); Polk v. State, 612 So. 2d 381, 394 (Miss. 1992); see also Husske 
v. Commonwealth, 448 S.E.2d 331, 345 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that the 
defendant was entitled to the assistance of a DNA expert at trial), vacated en 
banc, 462 S.E.2d 120 (Va. Ct. App. 1995), aff ’d, 476 S.E.2d 920 (Va. 1996). 
Other courts have denied requests for DNA experts in cases where forensic 
evidence is central at trial. The Michigan Supreme Court provides one recent 
example, insisting on a greater factual nexus or a showing that the expert tes-
timony would have been helpful, where absent appointment of the expert and 
analysis, no such showing can easily be made. People v. Tanner, 671 N.W.2d 
728, 731 (Mich. 2003). The case is particularly odd in that the court reasoned 
that the defense did not need an expert to independently evaluate the prosecu-
tion’s forensic evidence, because some of that evidence excluded the defendant: 
“DNA analysis not only eliminated the possibility that the blood on the vic-
tim’s shirt belonged to either defendant or the victim, it established that the 
blood belonged to an unidentified female.” Id. Contrary to the court’s reason-
ing, however, the DNA exclusion made the need for expert analysis greater, 
where, as the dissent pointed out, the jury clearly did not understand the pow-
er of the DNA evidence that conclusively excluded the defendant. Rather, “the 
jurors were told that only four percent of black women, women like [the] de-
fendant, match the blood sample found at the scene. This blood was the only 
physical evidence placing defendant at the scene of the crime.” Id. at 732 
(Kelly, J., dissenting). 
 169. See Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV. 
475, 478–91 (2006). 
 170. An example is the case of Dana Holland, in which the trial court re-
fused the defense an independent expert and the Chicago police crime lab ex-
pert Pamela Fish falsely told the court that insufficient material existed to 
conduct DNA testing, which later exonerated Holland. See Bluhm Legal Clin-
ic, Northwestern School of Law, Meet the Exonerated, Dana Holland, http:// 
www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/wrongful/exonerations/ 
ilHollandSummary.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2008). 
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mando Villasana. At his 1999 criminal trial, the State gave the 
defendant’s lawyer only the laboratory report, which stated 
that no semen evidence existed to be tested.171 However, a post-
conviction expert was able to obtain the underlying laboratory 
notes, which disclosed the existence of other testable biological 
evidence. This DNA evidence eventually led to his exonera-
tion.172 Yet when Villasana filed a civil claim arguing that law 
enforcement officials violated his rights by concealing this bio-
logical evidence at his criminal trial, the Eighth Circuit con-
cluded that the officers had no Brady obligation to disclose the 
laboratory notes.173 
Further, if the State refuses to perform DNA testing, the 
defendant may have little remedy available at trial, as the Su-
preme Court has held that “the police do not have a constitu-
tional duty to perform any particular tests.”174 Given the lack of 
a law enforcement duty, courts must then ensure that the de-
fense can perform any potentially probative tests in order to 
ensure access to this critical evidence. 
To prevent miscarriages of justice, our criminal procedure 
rules should be understood to provide greater trial protection 
regarding such highly probative forensic evidence. Ultimately, 
the Brady duty should extend not just to disclosure of the exis-
tence of biological evidence and the results of any testing con-
ducted by the State, but also to require full reports and labora-
tory notes.175 This in turn would permit far more meaningful 
defense expert analysis and cross-examination, would encour-
age consideration of further forensic testing, and would assist 
 
 171. Villasana v. Wilhoit, 368 F.3d 976, 977–78 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 172. See id. at 978. 
 173. Id. at 979 (holding that a forensic technician’s notes underlying dis-
closed lab reports on DNA testing were not exculpatory, though they led the 
defense to perform additional testing, because Brady applies only to evidence a 
reasonable prosecutor would identify at the time as material). 
 174. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 59 (1988). 
 175. See, e.g., State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 427 (Minn. 1989) (“[F]air 
trial and due process rights are implicated when data relied upon by a labora-
tory in performing tests are not available to the opposing party for review and 
cross examination.”); AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
DNA EVIDENCE 81 (3d ed. 2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/ 
standards/dnaevidence.pdf (proposing a requirement that “[t]he prosecutor 
should be required . . . to make available to the defense . . . laboratory re-
ports”); Paul C. Giannelli, Bench Notes & Lab Reports, CRIM. JUST., Summer 
2007, at 50, 50–51. 
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counsel in satisfying their obligations under Strickland.176 Si-
milarly, given the possible consequences for the client, the fail-
ure of counsel to pursue DNA testing should be carefully scru-
tinized at trial and during appeals. Absent such constitutional 
protections, wrongful convictions will persist. 
5. DNA Testing Denied or Unavailable at Trial 
In the early years of DNA testing, five courts denied re-
quests for DNA testing that later exonerated defendants be-
cause the courts believed it was not relevant.177 In retrospect, 
such rulings appear misguided, since all trial courts now admit 
DNA testing as reliable, relevant evidence. Nevertheless, as 
DNA technology continues to evolve, one can imagine a future 
court hesitating to grant a request for a test that employs new 
and thus arguably unproven technologies.178 
None of the cases described above involved the situation in 
which the State failed to collect or destroyed biological evi-
dence; such a failure would effectively prevent exoneration and 
also inculpation of the actual perpetrator. However, many cases 
that could utilize DNA testing do not do so because the relevant 
biological evidence has been destroyed.179 In 1989, the Supreme 
Court ruled that Larry Youngblood could not obtain relief be-
cause he could not show that police acted in bad faith in impro-
perly storing biological evidence, which degraded, from the vic-
tim of the rape of which he was convicted.180 Currently, neither 
negligent nor malicious destruction of biological evidence, nor 
 
 176. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1983) (imposing a 
duty of “reasonably effective assistance” on criminal defense attorneys). 
 177. See supra tbl.1. 
 178. For example, Virginia currently limits requests under its post-
conviction DNA testing statute to testing by the Virginia Department of Fo-
rensic Sciences. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1 (Supp. 2007). That depart-
ment does not yet use Y-STR testing, and thus convicts have had requests for 
such testing denied, though its use is accepted and has lead to exonerations. 
See Frank Green, Two Va. Inmates Seek DNA Tests, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH 
(Va.), Oct. 18. 2007, at B3 (describing the bar to obtaining Y-STR testing in 
Virginia and noting that “[t]he Virginia Forensic Science Board agreed yester-
day to consider proposed legislation that would allow an accredited outside la-
boratory to perform the required DNA testing at the expense of the inmates”). 
 179. See Miles Moffeit & Susan Greene, Foiled Justice, DENV. POST, July 
24, 2007, at A1. The Denver Post found 141 cases where efforts to prove inno-
cence were frustrated by lost or destroyed evidence. See id. 
 180. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988). 
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routine, post-trial disposal of evidence result in a sanction.181 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, twenty exonerees unsuccessfully 
raised destruction-of-exculpatory-evidence claims on appeal or 
post-conviction.182 Each was later able to locate other evidence 
that was fortuitously preserved and that could be subject to 
DNA testing. One of those twenty was Youngblood, who was 
exonerated in 2000 because more sophisticated DNA testing 
produced a profile from the degraded evidence, which both ex-
cluded him and inculpated another individual.183 
Notwithstanding the Court’s 1988 ruling that a defendant 
must show bad faith in storing biological evidence in order to 
establish a constitutional violation,184 the advent of DNA test-
ing has led to some legal change in the area of evidence preser-
vation, with twenty-two states passing statutes that require 
the preservation of DNA evidence. However, violations of these 
statutes are not generally sanctionable.185 Colorado’s statute, 
for example, states that it “does not create a duty to preserve 
biological evidence nor does it create a liability on the part of a 
law enforcement agency for failing to preserve biological evi-
dence.”186 
DNA testing creates more of a six-fold, rather than a 
double, bind. A range of contradictory and incomplete criminal 
procedure rules hinder access to DNA testing at trial, even 
though it is potentially the most probative exculpatory evidence 
available. Further, neither the states nor the federal courts 
have adopted a straightforward right to preserve, disclose, and 
accurately present evidence of innocence. Compounding the 
problem, courts fail to ensure that defendants obtain the repre-
sentation and expert assistance at trial necessary to claim in-
nocence using DNA evidence. Such treatment sharply contrasts 
 
 181. See id.; California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984) (holding that 
the defendant must demonstrate that the evidence “possess[ed] an exculpatory 
value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed”). 
 182. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 96. 
 183. The Innocence Project, Know the Cases: Larry Youngblood, http:// 
www.innocenceproject.org/Content/303.php (last visited Apr. 26, 2008). 
 184. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. 
 185. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 968.205 (2005–2006). Twenty-two states and the 
District of Columbia require by statute preservation of biological evidence 
from crime scenes. The Innocence Project, Preservation of Evidence Fact 
Sheet, available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/253.php (last vi-
sited Apr. 26, 2008).  
 186. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-414(3) (2007). 
GARRETT_5fmt 7/20/2008 8:38 AM 
1670 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [92:1629 
 
with constitutional criminal procedure rules that regulate the 
most probative evidence of earlier eras, such as eyewitness 
identifications, confessions, and psychiatric testimony.187 This 
comparison demonstrates that constitutional criminal proce-
dure has unquestionably failed to fully adapt to the DNA era. 
This failure helps explain why one-quarter of DNA exonera-
tions arose from DNA-era trials and why innocence claims will 
likely persist in our criminal system. Thus, innocence claims 
will continue to be subject to the contradictory rules governing 
our complex system of criminal appeals and post-conviction re-
view, as discussed below. 
C. STATE CRIMINAL APPEALS AND DNA STATUTES 
Just as a dialectic between the federal and state systems 
encouraged the creation of state post-conviction remedies in 
every state, the lack of federal remedies for innocence claims 
and the availability of new forms of evidence have encouraged 
almost all states to develop post-conviction innocence sta-
tutes.188  
1. Traditional Rules Governing New Evidence of Innocence 
Though high percentages of those who received post-
conviction DNA testing have been exonerated,189 a range of 
traditional rules has long hindered post-conviction discovery of 
DNA evidence of innocence. First, state criminal appeals histor-
ically have not provided remedies permitting forensic testing.190 
Direct appeals traditionally have permitted motions regarding 
the sufficiency of the evidence at trial. While such motions do 
 
 187. See supra text accompanying notes 102–03, 166. 
 188. See Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federal-
ism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1046–52 (1977); James 
Liebman et al., A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973–1995, at 
19–20 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group, 
Paper No. 15, 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=232712. 
 189. The Innocence Project reported a forty percent exoneration rate; simi-
larly, in Dallas County, Texas, thirteen of thirty-five cases in which the dis-
trict attorney conducted DNA testing since 2001 resulted in exonerations. 
Scheck, supra note 105, at 601 (“Forty percent of the time, when we finally 
find the evidence . . . the results come out in favor of the inmate.”); see also 
Ralph Blumenthal, For Dallas, New Prosecutor Means an End to the Old 
Ways, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2007, at N28. 
 190. See Holly Schaffter, Note, Postconviction DNA Evidence: A 500 Pound 
Gorilla in State Courts, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 695, 704–06 (2002). 
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not involve newly discovered evidence of innocence, they can 
involve claims of innocence regarding the evidence introduced 
at trial.191 
Second, all states have long allowed new trial motions 
brought either during the direct appeal or at the post-
conviction stage, including those brought on the grounds of 
newly discovered evidence of innocence. Statutes or case law al-
lowing for such motions vary widely in their standards. Most 
permit relief if new evidence of innocence is material or creates 
a probability of a different outcome;192 some do not specify a 
standard except that relief may be granted if “the interest of 
justice” so demands.193 Others include detailed additional re-
quirements that the new evidence must not be cumulative194 or 
must not have been available at the time of trial with due dili-
gence.195 Some statutes and case law require more than mate-
riality: they require that no juror would have found guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt with the new evidence.196 The state 
statutes making available new trial motions based on newly 
discovered evidence of innocence typically also contain statutes 
of limitations, which states increasingly adopted beginning in 
the 1970s; currently only twenty states do not have statutes of 
limitations.197 For those that do, the limitations period ranges 
from a mere twenty-one days to three years, and motions aris-
 
 191. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979) (setting the federal 
standard for assessing sufficiency of the evidence, based on whether a reason-
able jury could have found guilt, with all inferences drawn in the state’s fa-
vor). 
 192. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(g) (McKinney 2005). 
 193. See, e.g., N.J. CT. R. 3:20-1. 
 194. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.72.020(b)(2)(B) (2006). 
 195. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.850(b)(1). 
 196. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.11(A)(vii) (2004). For a survey of 
state post-conviction standards regarding newly discovered evidence of inno-
cence, see David R. Dow et al., Is It Constitutional to Execute Someone Who Is 
Innocent (and If It Isn’t, How Can It Be Stopped Following House v. Bell?), 42 
TULSA L. REV. 277, 293–321 (2006). 
 197. See 1 DONALD E. WILKES JR., STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES & 
RELIEF HANDBOOK WITH FORMS § 1:6 (2007–2008 ed.). For an excellent dis-
cussion of the early development of these state new trial rules, see Daniel S. 
Medwed, Up the River Without a Procedure: Innocent Prisoners and Newly 
Discovered Non-DNA Evidence in State Courts, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 655, 666–86 
(2005). 
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ing from new evidence of innocence must be brought during the 
pertinent limitations period.198 
State courts have denied post-conviction motions for DNA 
testing and for post-testing relief, including those brought by 
subsequently exonerated individuals, citing the expiration of 
the statute of limitations period after which no motions based 
on newly discovered evidence of innocence can be brought.199 As 
described in the context of cases where DNA technology existed 
at the time of trial, a combination of reasons explain why DNA 
evidence is often unavailable or not sought until years after a 
conviction. In general, DNA testing is typically secured only 
with great difficulty. Strikingly, most DNA exonerees managed 
to obtain this testing only where law enforcement voluntarily 
provided access.200 Indeed, most DNA exonerees did not receive 
relief until long after DNA technology became available. Thus, 
the first two hundred exonerees served an average of twelve 
years before ultimately being exonerated.201 For example, only 
thirteen individuals had been exonerated by the end of 1993.202 
However, only forty-two of two hundred individuals had been 
exonerated by the end of 1997.203 Each year produces more 
high-profile exonerations of actually innocent individuals, for 
until just recently states did not provide access to post-
conviction DNA testing, and law enforcement did not always 
consent to it. Dealing with this increasing embarrassment and 
a lack of judicial remedies, governors often had to step in to 
 
 198. See 1 WILKES, supra note 197, § 1:6; see also Herrera v. Collins, 506 
U.S. 390, 410–11 (1993) (noting varying state statutes of limitations). 
 199. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Godschalk, 679 A.2d 1295, 1297 (Pa. Su-
per. Ct. 1996) (denying DNA testing where the “appellant’s conviction rests 
largely on his own confession which contains details of the rapes which were 
not available to the public”); Garrett, supra note 4, at 128. 
 200. In at least seventy-one out of two hundred exonerations (thirty-five 
percent), the innocent appellant had to obtain a court order to gain access to 
DNA testing. Garrett, supra note 4, at 119. At least 119 received access to 
DNA testing through the consent of law enforcement or prosecutors. Id. I say 
at least, because there was no information available in press reports concern-
ing how DNA testing was obtained for all two hundred DNA exonerees. Some 
obtained DNA through more than one route. These categories cannot be sharp-
ly separated; for example, in some cases law enforcement agreed to testing but 
only after a court order was imminent. See generally id. at 116–21. 
 201. See INNOCENCE PROJECT, 200 EXONERATED, TOO MANY WRONGFULLY 
CONVICTED 2–3 (2007), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/200/ 
ip_200.pdf. 
 202. Garrett, supra note 4, at 119 n.248. 
 203. See INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 201. 
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grant pardons, which they did in at least twenty percent of the 
first two hundred DNA exonerations.204 
2. Post-Conviction DNA Statutes 
Responding to the increasing political pressure and the 
lack of available remedies in the state or federal courts, states 
began enacting statutes providing a right to post-conviction 
DNA testing and a vacatur if the testing demonstrated inno-
cence, easing the traditional rules of finality that previously re-
stricted motions premised on new evidence of innocence. In 
1999, ten years after the first post-conviction DNA exoneration, 
only New York and Illinois had passed this type of DNA sta-
tute.205 However, forty-four states and the District of Columbia 
have since enacted such statutes, with most enacted in the past 
five years.206 Most of the remaining states are currently consi-
dering the adoption of such legislation.207 
In addition to these efforts at the state level, the federal 
Innocence Protection Act provides for post-conviction DNA test-
ing in federal criminal cases,208 and a companion statute, the 
 
 204. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 120. 
 205. See Act of May 9, 1997, Pub. Act No. 90-0141, 1997 Ill. Laws 2461 (co-
dified at 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/116-3(a) (2007)); Act of Oct. 18, 1999, ch. 560, 
1999 N.Y. Laws 3247 (codified at N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30(1-a) (McKin-
ney 2005)). 
 206. See infra app. 
 207. See infra app.; see also Kathy Swedlow, Don’t Believe Everything You 
Read: A Review of Modern “Post-Conviction” DNA Testing Statutes, 38 CAL. W. 
L. REV. 355, 356–87 (2002) (providing an excellent review of the first twenty-
four innocence statutes and raising many of the concerns echoed here regard-
ing the current forty-four statutes). Oklahoma, on the other hand, had a sta-
tute, but it has expired. See infra app. See generally The Innocence Project, 
National View, http://www.innocenceproject.org/news/National-View.php (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2008) (providing a state-by-state guide with links to statutes). 
Five state courts have issued rulings recognizing a constitutional right to 
claim innocence, but each state has now also passed a post-conviction DNA 
testing statute. See Ex parte Lindley, 177 P.2d 918, 927 (Cal. 1947) (en banc); 
Summerville v. Warden, 641 A.2d 1356, 1369 (Conn. 1994); People v. Wash-
ington, 665 N.E.2d 1330, 1337 (Ill. 1996); State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 103 
S.W.3d 541, 543 (Mo. 2003) (en banc); Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 206 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc); infra app. (listing states with DNA testing 
laws).  
 208. See 18 U.S.C. § 3600(g)(2) (Supp. IV 2006) (“The court shall grant the 
motion of the applicant for a new trial or resentencing, as appropriate, if the 
DNA test results, when considered with all other evidence in the case (regard-
less of whether such evidence was introduced at trial), establish by compelling 
evidence that a new trial would result in an acquittal . . . .”). 
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Justice for All Act, provides financial incentives to the states to 
make available post-conviction DNA testing.209 Seven states 
currently lack a statutory right to post-conviction DNA test-
ing.210 Of those seven, two have had their state supreme courts 
recognize a right to post-conviction DNA testing and relief 
based on newly discovered evidence of innocence.211 This leaves 
five states, Alabama, Alaska, Massachusetts, Mississippi, and 
Oklahoma, in which post-conviction DNA testing is only avail-
able when law enforcement consents to testing or a federal 
court grants it.212 
This expansion of post-conviction options has been supple-
mented by the relaxation of rules of finality in all jurisdictions 
but four. Of the five states lacking post-conviction DNA testing 
statutes or judicial rights of access to testing, three—Alaska, 
Alabama, and Massachusetts—excuse late post-conviction fil-
ings based on evidence of innocence, and a fourth, Oklahoma, 
permits post-conviction filings based on newly discovered evi-
dence of innocence at any time.213 Two states, however, Dela-
ware and Idaho, which have DNA statutes, retain statutes of 
 
 209. See 42 U.S.C. § 14163a(b)(1)(D) (Supp. IV 2006). However, allocated 
federal funds for post-conviction testing in states have not yet been spent. See 
Richard Willing, Innocence Testing on Back Burner, USA TODAY, Oct. 11, 
2007, at 1A. 
 210. The states that lack post-conviction DNA testing statutes are Ala-
bama, Alaska, Massachusetts, Mississippi, South Carolina, and South Dakota. 
See The Innocence Project, supra note 207. Oklahoma had a statute that has 
now lapsed. Supra note 207. 
 211. The South Dakota Supreme Court ruled that DNA testing be con-
ducted post-conviction where it was likely to produce an acquittal. See Jenner 
v. Dooley, 590 N.W.2d 463, 471–72 (S.D. 1999). The South Carolina Supreme 
Court did the same. See State v. Spann, 513 S.E.2d 98, 99–100 (S.C. 1999). 
 212. For example, in Alabama, which lacks a DNA testing statute, De-
wayne Scott Cunningham lacked access to such testing under state law, and 
was then denied access to DNA testing by a federal judge. See Brendan Kirby, 
Judge Denies Prisoner’s DNA Request, MOBILE PRESS-REG. (Ala.), Jan. 25, 
2007, at 1A. 
 213. Alabama, Alaska, and Massachusetts permit motions for a new trial 
based on newly discovered evidence of innocence brought after the statute of 
limitations expires, if they could not have been brought earlier. See ALA. 
R. CRIM. P. 32.1(e); ALASKA STAT. § 12.72.020(b)(2) (2006); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 
30. Wyoming’s supreme court has suggested in dicta that evidence of inno-
cence would permit a court to consider an otherwise procedurally defaulted 
claim. See Cutbirth v. State, 751 P.2d 1257, 1259–60 (Wyo. 1988). Oklahoma’s 
statute contains no statute of limitations. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1080(d) 
(2001). 
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limitations.214 Thus, all jurisdictions, except Delaware, Idaho, 
and Mississippi, now make exceptions to statutes of limitations 
to permit motions based on new evidence of innocence to be 
filed at any time. As a result of these developments, rules of fi-
nality have been substantially displaced. 
Litigation under these innocence statutes is increasingly 
common,215 with at least twenty-one exonerees obtaining post-
conviction DNA testing pursuant to these state statutes.216 This 
avenue for relief marks a new development in post-conviction 
law. No previously existing post-conviction remedies were ex-
clusively devoted to reviewing claims of innocence. 
3. Restrictions on Access to Post-Conviction DNA Testing 
Although rules of finality have been supplanted nation-
wide, these statutory innocence claims retain other limitations, 
evident in the often-arbitrary construction of these statutes, 
which appear to focus more on curtailing relief than on con-
cerns of cost, finality, or accuracy. In other words, though 
states have relaxed concern with finality, most have done so in 
a manner that nevertheless precludes classes of convicts from 
pursuing otherwise viable post-conviction DNA innocence 
claims. In contrast to rules permitting DNA testing at or before 
trial, most post-conviction statutes create procedural hurdles 
that a petitioner must overcome before DNA testing can be ob-
tained. The Appendix depicts each restriction based on a review 
of state post-conviction DNA procedures.217 
 
 214. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4504(a) (2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-
4902(a) (2004). 
 215. See generally Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, DNA Evidence as New-
ly Discovered Evidence Which Will Warrant Grant of New Trial or Other Post-
conviction Relief in Criminal Case, 125 A.L.R.5TH 497 (2005) (collecting cases 
in which courts ruled on new trial motions based on DNA evidence). 
 216. Thus, looking back at Figure 1 presenting a chart of exonerations over 
time, these statutes do not explain the sharp rise in DNA exonerations that 
began in the late 1990s, before most of these statutes took effect. For example, 
Texas had its record number of five exonerations in 2000, the year before its 
post-conviction testing statute was enacted. Rather, the explanation may be a 
delayed reaction to the introduction of more sophisticated STR testing tech-
nology in the mid-1990s. See supra notes 129–31 and accompanying text. 
 217. The fairly current survey of these statutes can be found in 1 WILKES, 
supra note 197, § 1:8. 
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a. Outcome-Based Statutory Limitations 
One way in which state innocence statutes sharply restrict 
post-conviction access to DNA testing is by adopting outcome-
based tests that place courts in the position of predicting the 
likely probative impact of the DNA testing. Currently, only 
three states, Kansas, Nebraska, and Wyoming, allow access to 
testing on a showing that there is a likelihood that DNA could 
be probative of innocence.218 This standard certainly has validi-
ty since in cases where DNA testing could not possibly be prob-
ative of innocence, it should not be granted. 
The vast majority of jurisdictions, thirty-eight of forty-five, 
or eighty-four percent, however, require a threshold showing of 
“materiality” before testing may be granted. Materiality re-
quires the petitioner to demonstrate that “a reasonable proba-
bility exists that the petitioner would not have been convicted if 
exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing.”219 
This standard mirrors the Brady standard, under which mate-
riality is a requirement for obtaining a vacatur for a constitu-
tional violation.220 Thus, even if DNA could be probative of in-
nocence, no testing will be granted if the trial judge believes 
insufficient evidence exists to satisfy the reasonable probability 
standard. 
Several states impose a still more onerous standard. Two 
states, Colorado and Texas, require that it be “more probable 
than not” that the DNA testing would prove innocence.221 
Moreover, two other states, New Hampshire and Virginia, re-
quire clear and convincing evidence of or a substantial showing 
that testing would demonstrate innocence before a petitioner 
can obtain DNA testing.222 Indeed, Virginia requires the peti-
 
 218. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2512 (2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4120(5) 
(2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-12-303 (effective July 1, 2008). 
 219. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4240 (2001 & Supp. 2007). 
 220. See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999); Brady v. Mary-
land, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“We now hold that the suppression by the prose-
cution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process 
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of 
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”). 
 221. These states require petitioners to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that DNA testing will demonstrate their innocence. See COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 18-1-413 (2007); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.03(a)(2)(A) (Ver-
non 2006). 
 222. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651–D:2(III) (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
327.1 (Supp. 2007). 
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tioner to satisfy a battery of threshold showings, including pro-
viding clear and convincing evidence that the test results would 
be materially relevant, may prove innocence, and would not be 
cumulative or contradictory. One must also demonstrate that 
the petitioner or counsel could not have sought testing earlier 
through due diligence, and that the chain of custody of the 
DNA is intact.223 Many of those exonerated by DNA testing 
could never have satisfied such rigorous requirements, for only 
through DNA testing were they able to uncover the evidence of 
their innocence. 
b. Judicial Interpretation of Outcome-Based Standards 
Nevertheless, even a materiality or reasonable probability 
requirement would not pose an insurmountable burden if it 
were properly interpreted to simply require that the DNA test-
ing could be probative of innocence. However, state courts have 
interpreted statutory threshold requirements very strictly. 
South Dakota’s supreme court, for example, cautioned that 
DNA testing should only be granted under “extraordinary cir-
cumstances.”224 Furthermore, courts strictly interpret burdens 
imposed by the statutes. Texas courts, for example, deny access 
to DNA testing if the petitioner does not show by a “preponder-
ance” of the evidence that the testing will exculpate the peti-
tioner, or if a sworn affidavit does not describe innocence with 
sufficient specificity.225 
Some courts sua sponte construct flimsy hypothetical sce-
narios and then hold that, if there exists even a possibility that 
DNA testing might not exculpate, it should not be granted. For 
instance, the lower and intermediate Texas courts denied DNA 
 
 223. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1. 
 224. See Jenner v. Dooley, 590 N.W.2d 463, 471–72 (S.D. 1999) (“Our sys-
tem of justice will hold little respect if its judgments are never final. Only in 
extraordinary circumstances should a court allow post-conviction scientific 
testing.”). 
 225. See, e.g., Hamilton v. State, No. 09-05-003 CR, 2006 WL 61937, at *3 
(Tex. App. Jan. 11, 2006) (unpublished mem. opinion) (denying defendant’s 
motion requesting DNA testing because defendant’s general assertions of in-
nocence in his affidavit were insufficient to demonstrate by a preponderance of 
the evidence that he would not have been convicted if exculpatory results had 
been obtained through DNA testing). This is despite the fact that in revisions 
to the statute, drafters made clear that “the Legislature did not intend for the 
defendant to have to prove ‘actual innocence’ (a principle under habeas law) in 
order to meet his burden to have the test done.” House Criminal Jurispru-
dence Comm., Bill Analysis, H.B. 1011, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003). 
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testing in the case of Billy James Smith, claiming that a rape 
victim could have had sex with her boyfriend, and thus any 
DNA testing results might not be exculpatory.226 The Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals reversed because it found that DNA 
testing might have prevented his conviction.227 DNA testing 
proved the defendant’s innocence and Smith was released, 
twenty years after he was first incarcerated.228 In a series of 
other cases, though, the Texas lower courts’ denials of testing 
have not been reversed, even when predicated on courts’ asser-
tions that it would be conceivable for the results to merely 
match the victim’s partner. Such hypotheticals may lack sup-
port, but further DNA testing could refute them completely. In 
these stranger-rape cases, by ordering elimination testing the 
court could rule out the partner, and a DNA databank match 
might locate another perpetrator, similarly making the DNA 
test results dispositive of identity.229 
Despite this, other courts have constructed similarly irre-
levant and refutable hypothetical scenarios. The Ohio Supreme 
Court denied DNA testing in a sexual assault case where the 
testing could have provided powerful evidence of innocence, ac-
cepting instead the prosecutor’s argument that the testing 
would not be “outcome determinative” should the test results 
match the victim’s then-boyfriend (though he could be elimi-
nated by further testing should the defendant be excluded).230 
In an unusual window into the administration of a state’s post-
conviction DNA testing program, aggregate data is available 
 
 226. See Smith v. State, No. 05-02-01411-CR, 2004 WL 213661, at *2 (Tex. 
Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2004), rev’d, 165 S.W.3d 361 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 
 227. See Smith, 165 S.W.3d at 364–65. 
 228. The Innocence Project, Profile: Billy James Smith, http://www 
.innocenceproject.org/Content/264.php (last visited Apr. 26, 2008). 
 229. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 183 S.W.3d 515, 521 (Tex. App. 2006); Phil-
lips v. State, No. 05-04-00532-CR, 2005 WL 1819598, at *6 (Tex. App. Aug. 3, 
2005). 
 230. See Phil Trexler, Court Denies DNA Test, AKRON BEACON J. (Ohio), 
Apr. 12, 2007, at B5, available at 2007 WLNR 6950157. The Court of Appeals 
of Ohio, Ninth District, found that the defendant did not show that DNA test-
ing would be outcome determinative. See State v. Wilkins, 839 N.E.2d 457, 
464 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005), aff ’d, 863 N.E.2d 590 (Ohio 2007). The Ohio Su-
preme Court summarily affirmed. See Wilkins, 863 N.E.2d 590. On the other 
hand, the Ohio Supreme Court also struck down as unconstitutional under 
state law a provision that rendered unappealable a decision by a prosecutor 
not to grant an inmate’s request for post-conviction DNA testing. See State v. 
Sterling, 864 N.E.2d 630, 635–36 (Ohio 2007). 
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regarding DNA testing since Ohio’s statute was revised in July 
2003. Perhaps in part due to the reasoning adopted by the Ohio 
courts, only nineteen applications have been granted although 
315 prisoners have made applications for DNA testing.231 
c. Additional Restrictions on Access to DNA Testing 
In contrast with states like Ohio and Texas, other states 
like Illinois and New Jersey do not create such strained hypo-
theticals, nor do they evaluate the strength of the State’s trial 
case when determining whether to grant testing.232 Yet for al-
most all states, a range of other threshold restrictions apply. 
For example, most statutes allow only post-conviction DNA 
testing; only six states and the District of Columbia permit mo-
tions related to non-DNA forensic testing, scientific evidence, or 
other new evidence of innocence.233 
All but three of the state post-conviction DNA testing sta-
tutes preclude entire categories of convicts who might other-
wise be able to prove their innocence from seeking DNA test-
ing. Only three states with such statutes, Hawaii, North 
Carolina, and Wisconsin, permit all categories of convicts 
access to DNA testing, although Connecticut merely limits re-
lief to those still incarcerated, Vermont provides access to a 
fairly large list of felons, and Wyoming provides access to all fe-
lons.234 Outside of these states—for reasons that mirror restric-
tions in traditional post-conviction law, but have little relev-
ance to the merits of a request for DNA testing—states prohibit 
 
 231. See Laura A. Bischoff & Tom Beyerlein, Evidence Preservation a Key 
Piece to Exoneration Puzzle: Ohio’s DNA Testing Law Also Closes Door to 
Many Potential Applicants, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Ohio), Dec. 16, 2007, at A12. 
The database regarding DNA petitions compiled by the Ohio Attorney Gener-
al’s Office is on file with the author and is dated September 14, 2007. 
 232. See, e.g., People v. Henderson, 799 N.E.2d 682, 690 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) 
(ordering post-conviction DNA testing despite the fact that evidence against 
defendant “was indeed overwhelming”); Bruner v. State, 88 P.3d 214, 217 
(Kan. 2004) (holding it improper to deny statutory testing on the basis that the 
evidence of guilt was overwhelming); State v. Peterson, 836 A.2d 821, 826 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (stating that under the DNA testing statute, 
“the strength of the evidence against a defendant is not a relevant factor in 
determining whether his identity as the perpetrator was a significant issue”). 
 233. Those jurisdictions are Arkansas (new scientific evidence), Washing-
ton, D.C., (new evidence of innocence), Idaho (includes other testing), Illinois 
(includes other testing), Minnesota (other scientific evidence), New York (any 
new evidence of innocence), and Virginia (any new scientific evidence). 
 234. See infra app.; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-266.4 (2007). 
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several classes of persons from requesting DNA testing. Aside 
from limiting testing to those convicted of committing serious 
crimes, the most prevalent restrictions include guilty plea ex-
clusions, custody requirements, due diligence requirements, 
and requirements that the technology has changed since the 
time of trial. 
More specifically, twenty-five states limit DNA testing to 
certain serious crimes, typically felonies, but sometimes violent 
crimes; indeed, Kentucky and Nevada limit testing to capital 
cases.235 Additionally, twenty-one jurisdictions require that the 
petitioner be incarcerated or in custody in order to obtain test-
ing.236 Moreover, only seventeen states provide for testing when 
the petitioner seeks a sentence reduction, not relief from the 
conviction, although another six states provide judges with the 
discretion to grant testing in this circumstance.237 Sixteen 
states require that identity have been an issue at the criminal 
trial.238 These restrictive provisions may forestall relief in cases 
where there was a guilty plea instead of a trial. Furthermore, 
 
 235. See infra app. 
 236. The jurisdictions are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia, Washington, 
West Virginia, and the District of Columbia. See infra app. 
 237. The states providing for testing when the petitioner seeks a sentence 
reduction are Arkansas, California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Mary-
land, Minnesota, Nebraska, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, 
Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. States that provide discretion are Ari-
zona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Kentucky, Rhode Island, and Tennessee. 
 238. The states are Arkansas, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Texas. See infra app. In addition, Utah re-
quires that a theory of innocence be “not inconsistent with theories previously 
asserted at trial.” UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-301(2)(c) (2002). The Iowa sta-
tute requires that identity “was a significant issue in the crime for which the 
defendant was convicted.” IOWA CODE § 81.10(7)(c) (2007). Delaware also re-
quires that identity must have been at issue in a criminal trial. See, e.g., An-
derson v. State, 831 A.2d 858, 865 (Del. 2003) (explaining that the state DNA 
statute’s identity-at-issue requirement is “relatively straightforward,” where 
“[i]dentity is always an issue in a criminal trial unless the defendant admits 
having engaged in the alleged criminal conduct and relies on a defense such as 
consent or justification”). New York bars relief to guilty plea cases using dif-
ferent language. See People v. Byrdsong, 820 N.Y.S.2d 296, 299 (App. Div. 
2006) (requiring conviction by verdict and judgment after trial in order to 
qualify for post-conviction DNA testing under the New York statute); cf. CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 1405(e) (West Supp. 2008) (petition for testing may be heard by 
judge who “conducted the trial, or accepted the convicted person’s plea of 
guilty or nolo contendre”). 
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they require that the defendant have disputed identity and 
have claimed innocence at the trial, which might have been dif-
ficult to do credibly without the support of DNA evidence.239 
Nine exonerees pleaded guilty and many more did not dispute 
identity at trial, which would have precluded any of them from 
obtaining DNA testing under these statutes.240 Recognizing 
this difficulty, seven states permit testing if identity “should” 
have been an issue at trial, even if it was not raised.241 Twelve 
states require that the requested testing have been technologi-
cally impossible at the trial.242 Yet few states recognize the 
need for DNA testing on the sole basis that the constantly in-
creasing size of DNA databanks establishes cold hits with ac-
tual perpetrators.243 
A smaller number of states have adopted a range of addi-
tional and significant restrictions. Five states require that mo-
tions be brought within one to three years after the conviction, 
though only Delaware and Idaho retain statutes of limitations; 
the three other states create various good-cause exceptions.244 
 
 239. See Weeks v. State, 140 S.W.3d 39, 46 (Mo. 2004) (en banc) (noting, in 
interpreting the state’s DNA statute to apply to such cases, that “[a] person 
who pleaded guilty is not somehow ‘more’ guilty, or less deserving of a chance 
to show actual innocence, than one who went to trial”). 
 240. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 123, 171 (stating that nine exonerees 
pleaded guilty and that DNA testing can only be used to show identity when 
biological evidence is left at the crime scene, which is not the case in the “vast 
majority” of criminal cases). 
 241. The states are California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Montana, New 
Hampshire, and West Virginia. 
 242. The states are Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. See infra 
app. Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia, however, only require new 
technology where the biological evidence was not newly discovered. Thus, the 
requirement functions as a due diligence requirement. Maine requires new 
technology as a reason to excuse failure to file within two years of conviction. 
Other states, such as Nebraska, New Hampshire, Vermont, West Virginia, 
and Wisconsin, impose a new technology requirement for successive testing. 
 243. A New Jersey court recognized this in State v. DeMarco, 904 A.2d 797, 
807 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006), which granted post-conviction DNA test-
ing under the New Jersey statute, on the ground that “[t]echnological ad-
vances since defendant’s conviction have enabled the production of DNA typ-
ing data, which could be run through the CoDIS system and potentially 
implicate another suspect.” 
 244. The states are Arkansas (rebuttable presumption of no timeliness af-
ter three years, though courts may excuse later applications for “good cause” 
or newly discovered evidence); Delaware (three years); Idaho (one year); Maine 
(two years after September 1, 2008, or time of conviction, or two years after 
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Four additional states have determined that attorney er-
ror, including failure to request DNA testing at the trial stage 
or to exercise due diligence, does not merit post-conviction DNA 
testing.245 Yet, as discussed above, several exonerees had inef-
fective lawyers who neglected to request DNA testing.246 Not-
withstanding the ongoing exonerations of DNA-era convicts, 
four states included sunset provisions under which the statute 
ceases to operate by a certain year,247 and one state, Michigan, 
permits relief only to people convicted before 2001. Only a few 
states have considered what additional testing should be per-
mitted when initial results are inconclusive, when new technol-
ogical advancements occur, and when new biological evidence is 
discovered. And only twenty-four states provide counsel to 
represent petitioners during the complex process of negotiating 
these procedural hurdles.248 While these statutes vary widely in 
procedural restrictions, all state statutes share the require-
ment that the application be made to the trial court that pre-
sided over the conviction. 
4. Restrictions on Post-DNA Exclusion Relief 
That long list of state limitations is only at the threshold. 
Even after DNA testing performed excludes an individual, sev-
eral states impose additional limitations. New York permits re-
lief if the DNA shows a reasonable probability of innocence, 
while Pennsylvania uses the heightened more-probable-than-
not standard.249 Even more onerous, seven states require that 
the DNA provide substantial or clear and convincing evidence 
of innocence in order to justify a vacatur.250 Offering no guid-
 
new technology available); and Minnesota (two years after conviction, unless 
there is newly discovered evidence that due diligence at the time of trial and 
within the two-year time period could not have ascertained). 
 245. The states are Minnesota (due diligence excuses two-year time limit), 
Missouri, Pennsylvania (listing permissible reasons for not having requested 
DNA testing at trial), and Virginia. 
 246. See supra Part II.C.4. 
 247. Florida repealed its sunset provision. States that still retain them are 
Louisiana, Michigan, Oklahoma, and Oregon. 
 248. Cf. Garrett, supra note 4, at 168 (finding that many states have long 
provided inadequate indigent defense funding). 
 249. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30 (McKinney 2005); 42 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9543 (West 2007). 
 250. The states are Arkansas, Delaware, Maine, Michigan, Ohio, Utah, and 
Virginia. See infra app. 
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ance or limitations, the remaining states, explicitly or implicit-
ly, grant the trial judge discretion in deciding whether to grant 
relief based on post-conviction DNA testing.251 
As in the context of access to DNA testing, courts address-
ing the effect on relief of such testing have often constructed 
hypothetical scenarios unrelated to any evidence presented at 
the original trial in order to deny relief, even after DNA testing 
excludes the appellant. Perhaps the most notorious example is 
Texas Court of Appeals Judge Sharon Keller’s explanation to 
Frontline reporters in support of her decision to deny relief to 
Roy Criner, even though DNA testing excluded him. Keller es-
sentially told the reporters that DNA testing could never suffi-
ciently prove innocence because a scenario could always be con-
structed to explain away the results. She felt that the DNA 
evidence would not have “made a difference in the verdict” in 
Criner’s case because the sixteen-year-old victim could have 
been “promiscuous” in the days before her rape-murder, al-
though this allegation of promiscuity was not based on the trial 
record or any other evidence.252 It was only after a cigarette 
butt confirmed that the semen donor was present at the crime 
scene that Criner was pardoned.253 Eschewing hypotheticals, 
other courts have simply discounted the evidence of innocence 
to reach similar results. For example, courts frequently rely 
upon equivocal evidence presented at trial and discount DNA 
evidence as merely cumulative or nonprobative.254 Such rulings 
are perhaps unsurprising where the statutes provide little 
guidance as to what standard to employ when deciding whether 
to grant relief based on a DNA exclusion. 
 
 251. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41(b)–(c) (1995 & Supp. 2007). 
 252. See Interview by Frontline: The Case for Innocence with Judge Sharon 
Keller, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (Public Broadcasting Corporation 
2000), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/case/ 
interviews/keller.html. 
 253. See Frontline: The Case for Innocence, Four Cases: Roy Criner, http:// 
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/case/cases (last visited Apr. 26, 
2008). 
 254. See, e.g., Watkins v. Miller, 92 F. Supp. 2d 824, 827 (S.D. Ind. 2000) 
(stating that the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of post-
conviction relief, finding that DNA results exonerating Jerry Watkins only 
“suggest the possibility” of another perpetrator and that the DNA evidence 
was merely “cumulative” of inconclusive serology evidence at trial); People v. 
McSherry, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 630, 636 (Ct. App. 1992) (depublished) (failing to 
vacate conviction despite DNA exclusion, citing to serology results and the vic-
tim’s identification). 
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Unquestionably, some cases do not deserve DNA testing. 
Yet the myriad threshold limitations and onerous standards 
ensure that most courts can deny access to DNA testing that 
could provide a powerful showing of innocence, and deny relief 
following highly exculpatory DNA results. Many of the statutes 
reflect a traditional reluctance to reopen a criminal case, even 
in the face of powerful DNA evidence of innocence. Those sta-
tutes appear to provide mere window-dressing for post-
conviction systems determined to deny access to proof of inno-
cence and to deny relief to meritorious claims of innocence. 
These concerns might prompt some states to amend their sta-
tutes, thereby creating another generation of post-conviction 
DNA statutes that will finally provide unobstructed avenues 
for relief to the actually innocent.255 Leaving to legislators the 
question whether actually innocent individuals may obtain 
access to evidence of their innocence, and then relief, has per-
haps predictably resulted in a patchwork of approaches that 
continue to create barriers to those who could prove innocence. 
The following Sections examine whether and how claims of in-
nocence create constitutional questions that entitle an individ-
ual to innocence-based relief in the absence of any state law 
remedy. 
D. FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: RESISTANCE AND INNOCENCE 
Traditionally, habeas corpus review provided a conduit for 
procedural constitutional claims pertaining to a criminal trial’s 
fundamental fairness, but not the defendant’s possible inno-
cence.256 Even today, the vast majority of federal criminal ap-
peals involve constitutional claims related to the integrity of 
the criminal trial, such as those alleging ineffective assistance 
 
 255. For example, New York is considering legislation to broaden access to 
post-conviction DNA testing, together with other forensic science reforms. See, 
e.g., A.08047, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007) (amending section 440.30 of 
the Criminal Procedure Law to clarify that post-conviction testing may be or-
dered whether a case was resolved by jury trial or otherwise). 
 256. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a) (2000 & Supp. IV 2006); Herrera 
v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400–02 (1993) (noting that federal habeas typically 
involves procedural and not substantive review of convictions); William J. 
Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 
447 (1995) (arguing that the “current law of criminal procedure is indeed 
about procedure,” but also that the origins of such cases lie in substantive 
questions about what government can criminalize). 
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of counsel,257 Brady violations, equal protection violations, and 
procedural violations.258 Additional procedural rights call for a 
reversal of a conviction if the trial court failed to exclude unre-
liable evidence.259 While many of these protections “promote 
the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the inno-
cent go free,” they “are granted to the innocent and the guilty 
alike.”260 Federal courts rarely conduct purely substantive 
criminal review, and when they do, it is typically to examine 
the constitutionality of a criminal prohibition’s scope as applied 
to the convict’s conduct.261 
Although the traditional focus of habeas corpus review has 
been on procedural fairness, petitioners now assert claims of 
actual innocence in far higher percentages of habeas filings.262 
Such an increase has developed even though the Court has 
failed to determine “whether federal courts may entertain con-
vincing claims of actual innocence.”263 Federal courts rarely 
 
 257. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 671 (1984). 
 258. See VICTOR E. FLANGO, HABEAS CORPUS IN STATE AND FEDERAL 
COURTS 45–59 (1994).  
 259. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 105 (finding that while few exonerees ob-
tained any relief on any claims, “the subset who did receive reversals most of-
ten received reversals on claims regarding seriously erroneous or unreliable 
factual evidence at their trials”). 
 260. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 379–80 (1986) (quoting 
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394 (1985)). Such constitutional claims each re-
quire the fault of a government actor, judge, defense attorney, prosecutor, or 
police. See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976). 
 261. For examples of substantive review, the Court recently limited the 
class of those eligible for death sentences. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execu-
tion of individuals who were juveniles at the time of the offense); Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (ruling that the execution of mentally re-
tarded felons violates the Eighth Amendment). 
 262. See NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITI-
GATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS (2007), available at http://law.vanderbilt 
.edu/article-search/article-detail/download.aspx?id=1639 (finding that, in a 
study of sampled habeas filings from 2000–2005, 3.9% of noncapital petition-
ers raised newly discovered evidence of innocence claims, as did 10.8% of capi-
tal petitioners, and that 18.9% raised sufficiency of the evidence claims). A 
quick survey of citations to the two Supreme Court cases discussing innocence-
related rights, Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), and Herrera v. Collins, 506 
U.S. 390 (1993), indicate a large increase in reliance on those decisions. Fed-
eral habeas petitions citing to Schlup increased from 111 in 1996 to 773 cites 
in 2006, and citations to Herrera rose from 40 cites in 2000, to 267 in 2006. 
These figures were generated by a search conducted using the Westlaw “all-
feds” database for cases citing either Schlup or Herrera. 
 263. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 427. 
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conduct factual review of claims asserted in habeas petitions. 
The federal habeas corpus statute prohibits evidentiary hear-
ings for the development of new factual evidence except in nar-
row circumstances, which if met, still permit a discretionary 
decision by the judge whether to hold a hearing; habeas discov-
ery is also discretionary.264 Thus, federal courts have long been 
unlikely places for development of innocence claims, helping to 
explain why only two of the first two hundred post-conviction 
DNA exonerees obtained DNA testing during habeas corpus 
proceedings.265 Federal courts can, however, provide access to 
DNA testing; several circuits have done so via § 1983 actions.266 
The Section that follows describes six tests that the Su-
preme Court has adopted to assess innocence and guilt post-
conviction, and shows how these complex, nuanced standards of 
review operate. The Section also shows how these standards ul-
timately do not provide any independent grounds for relief to 
the actually innocent. In the subsequent Section, therefore, I 
discuss how federal courts can shift their focus towards an ap-
proach that reviews claims of innocence. 
1. The Federal Framework for Substantive Review 
The Court has adopted six central tests in post-conviction 
law, and each uses a slightly different formulation of guilt or 
innocence in determining whether to grant relief. In Justice 
Antonin Scalia’s words, these tests create “ineffable gradations 
of probability . . . beyond the ability of the judicial mind (or any 
mind) to grasp.”267 Whatever the gradation, none provides a 
ground for relief to the actually innocent; instead, various rules 
permit exceptions to procedural obstacles based on showings of 
 
 264. Federal courts hold hearings in only approximately one percent of ha-
beas filings. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., FED. COURTS STUDY 
COMM., REPORT OF THE SUBCOMM. ON THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THEIR RELATION TO THE STATES 468–515 (1990) (finding hearings granted for 
1.1% of petitions); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2554(e)–(f ) (2000). 
 265. Of the sixty exonerees who had a court order access to DNA testing, 
only two had federal courts grant DNA testing. See Toney v. Gammon, 79 F.3d 
693, 700 (8th Cir. 1996); Godschalk v. Montgomery County Dist. Attorney’s 
Office, 177 F. Supp. 2d 366, 370 (E.D. Pa. 2001). Only nine of the two hundred 
had a court remand for an evidentiary hearing at any level in their appeals. 
See Garrett, supra note 4, at 105. 
 266. See infra note 302 and accompanying text. 
 267. See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 86 (2004) (Sca-
lia, J., concurring) (describing the Chapman, Brecht, Agurs, and Strickland 
standards). 
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innocence, or they deny relief for claims based on evidence of 
guilt. 
First, harmless error tests epitomize the current post-
conviction focus on guilt. Applicable during habeas corpus pro-
ceedings, the Brecht v. Abrahamson test provides that, in cases 
where the petitioner suffered a constitutional violation, courts 
can deny relief if the State can show, based on the totality of 
the evidence introduced at trial—including the evidence of the 
petitioner’s guilt—that the error did not substantially contri-
bute to the conviction.268 
Second, multiple constitutional claims incorporate a guilt-
based harmless error rule, with the most notable being the 
Brady right to material exculpatory evidence,269 and the Strick-
land ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim.270 Vindication 
of both of these rights requires a demonstration of prejudice.271 
The Court has rejected an outcome-determinative standard, but 
has required the appellant to demonstrate a reasonable proba-
bility that the error contributed to the trial outcome.272 More-
over, the Court has encouraged lower courts to evaluate the 
prejudice prong first and thus avoid reaching the question of 
the ineffectiveness of trial counsel.273 A range of other due 
 
 268. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638–39 (1993). The Supreme 
Court has cautioned lower courts not to conduct a hypothetical inquiry asking 
whether the petitioner would still be convicted based on evidence untainted by 
constitutional error. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (“The 
inquiry . . . is . . . whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was 
surely unattributable to the error. That must be so, because to hypothesize a 
guilty verdict that was never in fact rendered—no matter how inescapable the 
findings to support that verdict might be—would violate the jury-trial guaran-
tee.”). Nevertheless, lower courts persist in conducting harmless error analys-
es in that guilt-based fashion. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 107–10; see also 
Gregory Mitchell, Comment, Against “Overwhelming” Appellate Activism: 
Constraining Harmless Error Review, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1335, 1354 (1994); Ams-
terdam, supra note 17, at 52 (“One reason why the standard gets watered 
down in practice is that harmless error analysis is seldom written up in appel-
late opinions in a way that forces the authoring judge, or his or her concurring 
colleagues, or anybody else, to examine it critically.”). 
 269. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 270. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984). 
 271. See id. at 687; Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
 272. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693–94 (holding that the petitioner must 
show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofes-
sional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different”). 
 273. See id. at 697 (“If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on 
the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that 
course should be followed.”). 
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process rights also incorporates a prejudice element, and feder-
al courts require that a petitioner show both “cause” and “pre-
judice” before a court will excuse the procedural default of a 
claim.274 
Third, under the Court’s ruling in Schlup, federal courts 
consider evidence of actual innocence under a more-likely-than-
not standard,275 which is an outcome-determinative test more 
stringent than the prejudice inquiry. Despite requiring a heigh-
tened showing of innocence that is sufficient to prevail on an 
independent constitutional claim, Schlup provides no indepen-
dent innocence claim. As in House, if a court finds sufficient 
evidence of innocence, it may only excuse a procedural default 
so as to proceed to the merits of the otherwise defaulted consti-
tutional claim.276 Nevertheless, the Schlup standard permits 
courts to excuse procedural default of constitutional claims in 
cases involving new evidence of innocence.277 As developed be-
low, cases involving substantial evidence of innocence may tend 
to earn relief on underlying constitutional violations. Hence, 
the innocence gateway provides an important remedy, particu-
larly as the Court developed it in House in the context of DNA 
evidence.278  
Fourth, Jackson v. Virginia claims permit relief if the evi-
dence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the prose-
cution, was so insufficient that no reasonable juror could vote 
to convict.279 Such claims almost never earn relief given that 
the “no reasonable juror could”280 standard is more stringent 
than the more-likely-than-not Schlup standard.281 
Fifth, the habeas corpus statutes, as amended by the Anti-
terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),282 impose 
 
 274. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). 
 275. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 326 (1995). 
 276. See id. at 316–17. 
 277. See id. at 331–32. 
 278. See House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2077–87 (2006). 
 279. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (“[T]he relevant 
question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential ele-
ments of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
 280. See id. 
 281. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. 
 282. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 
28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
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substantial limits on the ability of federal courts to hear new 
evidence of innocence.283 The AEDPA imposes a one-year sta-
tute of limitations that is triggered not only when the state di-
rect appeal ends, but also on “the date on which the factual 
predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been dis-
covered through the exercise of due diligence,” whichever is lat-
er.284 If new evidence of innocence surfaces, the defense exer-
cised due diligence, and the new evidence of innocence provides 
the “factual predicate” of the claim, then a habeas petition may 
be pursued later than would otherwise be possible.285 The peti-
tion will be dismissed if the petitioner, exercising due diligence, 
should have presented the new evidence earlier, or if the evi-
dence does not provide a factual predicate for any procedurally 
preserved constitutional claim.286 
A hypothetical example helps explain the operation of this 
rule. Paul House’s habeas petition was his first,287 but suppose 
that he had already filed a petition prior to uncovering new 
evidence of innocence. In this scenario, House would have then 
encountered substantial statutory obstacles. The AEDPA bars 
refiling any claim previously brought in a federal habeas corpus 
application, even if the new evidence provides substantial addi-
tional support for the claim.288  
The AEDPA also restricts the ability to file a second or suc-
cessive petition with a new, previously unasserted claim.289 To 
bring a new claim in a second or successive petition, the statute 
 
 283. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2000). 
 284. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(D). 
 285. See, e.g., Ege v. Yukins, 485 F.3d 364, 372–74 (6th Cir. 2007) (tolling 
the statute of limitations based on new evidence of forensic fraud); see also 1 
RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 5.2b n.45 (5th ed. 2005). 
 286. The Sixth Circuit has equitably tolled the AEDPA statute of limita-
tions on the grounds of actual innocence, and additional federal courts have 
suggested that equitable tolling could excuse late filing given a sufficient 
showing of innocence. See Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 602 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(“[W]here an otherwise time-barred habeas petitioner can demonstrate that it 
is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the petitioner should be allowed to pass through 
the gateway and argue the merits of his underlying constitutional claims.”); 
Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 808 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Equitable tolling would 
be appropriate, for example, when a prisoner is actually innocent . . . . ”).  
 287. See House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2075 (2006). 
 288. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). 
 289. See id. § 2244(b)(2). 
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requires that the petitioner must seek relief on the rare, new 
constitutional rule that the Supreme Court has “made retroac-
tive” during collateral appeals.290 Alternatively, the petitioner 
may demonstrate the existence of new evidence that could not 
have been previously discovered with “due diligence,” and that 
provides “clear and convincing evidence” such that “no reason-
able factfinder” would find guilt were this evidence known.291 If 
a petitioner failed to exercise diligence in developing facts in 
the state courts, the AEDPA requires that the habeas petition-
er meet an elevated showing of innocence to obtain a federal 
evidentiary hearing.292 Demonstrating that no reasonable fact-
finder would find guilt were this evidence of innocence known 
is certainly more difficult to accomplish without the benefit of 
the evidentiary hearing sought precisely to explore that evi-
dence. Taken collectively, these procedural restrictions sharply 
limit the ability of federal courts to consider new evidence of 
innocence, particularly because such evidence often surfaces 
years after a trial.293 
 
 290. Id. § 2244(b)(2)(A). 
 291. Id. § 2254(e)(2) (2000); see also id. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) (stating that a 
petitioner filing a second claim must show that “the factual predicate for the 
claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due 
diligence”); id. (noting that a petitioner must “establish by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would 
have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense”). 
 292. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (stating that the granting of an evidentiary 
hearing is barred where the petitioner “failed to develop” the factual predicate 
for a claim, unless the petitioner can show both reliance on a new rule “made 
retroactive” or “a factual predicate that could not have been previously discov-
ered through the exercise of due diligence,” and that “the facts underlying the 
claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that 
but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the ap-
plicant guilty of the underlying offense”). The Supreme Court interpreted 
what it means for a petitioner to “fail[ ] to develop” facts within the meaning of 
§ 2254(e)(2) and ruled that the court may grant a hearing where counsel exer-
cised diligence during state proceedings. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 
430, 440 (2000). 
 293. A few habeas petitions have satisfied that standard. See, e.g., Cooper 
v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 1117, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2004) (permitting a second ha-
beas petition based on new evidence of innocence and ordering mitochondrial 
DNA testing). But see Parker v. Sirmons, No. 07-6021, 2007 WL 1652612, at 
*2 (10th Cir. June 8, 2007) (finding that the new evidence did not satisfy the 
materiality standard for the underlying constitutional claim and, thus, would 
not satisfy the statutory standard); Kutzner v. Cockrell, 303 F.3d 333, 337 (5th 
Cir. 2002) (finding that the new evidence did not satisfy the statutory stan-
dard). 
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Sixth, the only freestanding claim of innocence in our fed-
eral system remains hypothetical under the Court’s divided de-
cision in Herrera. The Court stated hypothetically that a person 
facing execution might be entitled to constitutional relief if they 
could persuasively show innocence in a way that satisfied an 
unstated but “extraordinarily high” burden.294 Only Justice 
Harry Blackmun, joined by two other Justices, suggested a 
lower, “probably actually innocent” standard for showing inno-
cence.295 Five Justices stated separately that a freestanding in-
nocence claim should exist, and as Justice Scalia predicted, the 
result was “a strange regime that assumes permanently, 
though only ‘arguendo,’ that a constitutional right exists, and 
expends substantial judicial resources on that assumption.”296 
However, given Herrera’s extraordinarily high burden, every 
claim for relief brought under Herrera has been ultimately 
dismissed.297 
With Herrera’s result preserving a mirage of an innocence 
claim bearing a standard that no one has satisfied, the five es-
tablished innocence-related inquiries offer only gestures toward 
innocence with procedural “gateways.” It should be no surprise, 
then, that not one person exonerated by post-conviction DNA 
 
 294. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993). Prior decisions had 
used the word “extraordinary” to refer to the required showing of prejudice, or 
reasonable probability of innocence. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 
494–95 (1991). 
 295. Justice Blackmun phrased his standard as requiring a showing that 
the petitioner “is probably actually innocent.” Herrera, 506 U.S. at 444 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 296. Id. at 429 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 297. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 126 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding 
that the Herrera standard was not met), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 890 (2008). 
The only exceptions were in a few cases, including House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 
2064 (2006), where a court initially granted relief on an innocence claim but 
then was reversed. See Nicholas Berg, Note, Turning a Blind Eye to Innocence: 
The Legacy of Herrera v. Collins, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121, 130–36 (2005) (re-
viewing lower court decisions relying on Herrera and finding fifty-four in 
which the court assumed a bare innocence claim was cognizable, but denied 
relief ). Commenting on this state of affairs, Anthony Amsterdam writes that 
courts  
either refuse to recognize that there is any Due Process or other con-
stitutional right to redress for a claim of mere innocence or they set 
the standard for relief so high that it cannot be met by anything short 
of divine revelation manifested by the physical appearance of God in 
the courtroom, bearing a habeas petition for the convicted defendant 
in his right hand and a confession by the true perp in his left. 
 Amsterdam, supra note 17, at 53. 
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testing prevailed on an actual innocence claim during their ap-
peals prior to obtaining DNA testing.298 Courts denied Herrera 
relief to five people who we now know were actually inno-
cent,299 including one, Darryl Hunt, who presented to the 
Fourth Circuit initial DNA test results that excluded him.300 
Following a decades-long campaign to restrict habeas review by 
emphasizing guilt-based restrictions on habeas relief and inno-
cence-based gateways, innocence remains as irrelevant as 
Judge Friendly suggested in 1970.301 
2. Innocence and Post-Conviction Review 
The adoption of a federal constitutional innocence claim 
would provide uniformity and ensure an avenue of relief in the 
states that do not yet provide for meaningful adjudication of 
innocence claims. Such a solution, sensible as it may be, does 
not appear imminent given that the Court recently dodged the 
issue again in House. Despite the Court’s inaction, federal 
courts could take several approaches other than through the 
use of freestanding innocence claims. I discuss below the way 
that innocence changes the analysis for a range of constitution-
al criminal procedure claims. Indeed, federal courts have al-
ready begun to play an unappreciated role as a backstop to 
guard against wrongful convictions in situations where new 
evidence of innocence alters (1) discovery provided during ha-
beas proceedings; (2) the merits analysis for constitutional 
criminal procedure claims; and (3) the harmless error analysis 
for constitutional claims.  
a. Post-Conviction Discovery 
Without considering the merits of any freestanding inno-
cence claim, courts may develop innocence claims factually by 
providing access to evidence of innocence during discovery. A 
series of federal courts already do this by entertaining § 1983 
petitions for DNA testing;302 other federal courts grant access 
 
 298. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 97 n.157. 
 299. See id. at 96 tbl.5. 
 300. The panel found the DNA evidence “simply not sufficiently exculpato-
ry to warrant a new trial.” Hunt v. McDade, No. 98-6808, 2000 WL 219755, at 
*3 (4th Cir. Feb. 25, 2000). 
 301. See Friendly, supra note 1, at 145. 
 302. See, e.g., Wade v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226, 229 (D. Mass. 2006). 
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to testing as part of discovery during habeas review.303 For ex-
ample, evidence of innocence is relevant discovery to a Schlup 
inquiry or to a Brady theory, is related to substantive inquiries 
under a range of criminal procedure rights, and affects preju-
dice and harmless error analyses.304 Therefore, in situations 
where state courts do not afford post-conviction discovery of 
evidence of innocence, federal courts provide an important 
backstop by providing discovery, even though they currently 
cannot grant relief on a freestanding innocence claim.305 Even 
without an innocence claim, the federal courts’ willingness to 
factually develop innocence claims may place pressure on 
states to provide access to DNA testing and other exculpatory 
evidence at the post-conviction stage, and then to review claims 
of innocence based on that evidence. 
b. Innocence and Constitutional Criminal Procedure 
In the absence of any separate freestanding innocence 
claim, new evidence of innocence affects the substantive in-
quiry for underlying criminal procedure rights. Innocence plays 
an important role in precisely those constitutional criminal 
 
 303. See Osborne v. Dist. Attorney’s Office, No. 06-35875, 2008 WL 861890, 
at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 2, 2008) (“[Defendant] has a limited due process right of 
access to the evidence for purposes of post-conviction DNA testing, which 
might either confirm his guilt or provide strong evidence upon which he may 
seek post-conviction relief.”); McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 
2007) (joining the “Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, and district courts 
in the First and Third Circuits,” in holding that “a claim seeking post-
conviction access to evidence for DNA testing may properly be brought as a  
§ 1983 suit,” and rejecting the contrary views of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Circuits), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1218 (2008). Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing 
Section 2254 Cases provides for discovery in habeas proceedings if the peti-
tioner shows “good cause.” R. GOVERNING § 2254 CASES 6(a), reprinted in 28 
U.S.C. § 2254 cmt. (2000). For a case granting such testing, see Drake v. Por-
tuondo, 321 F.3d 338, 345 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 304. See supra Part II.D.1. Such relief is limited by the narrow innocence-
based exception to the successive petition rule and the narrow innocence-
based exception to the AEDPA’s statute of limitations discussed above. See 28 
U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2000). Those limits are not insurmountable, however, given 
the relevance of new evidence of innocence to the merits analyses for a number 
of central criminal procedure claims. See infra Part II.D.2.b. 
 305. For example, Larry Peterson, exonerated by post-conviction DNA test-
ing, filed a § 1983 action in federal court seeking testing. See State v. Peter-
son, 836 A.2d 821 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003). The action was stayed so 
that he could pursue statutory testing that was denied in the lower state court 
but then provided by the appellate court, perhaps in part due to the pending  
§ 1983 action. See id. at 823. 
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procedure contexts in which the Supreme Court has incorpo-
rated guilt-based inquiries into the merits analysis to permit 
relief for a violation. As in civil wrongful conviction suits, the 
consequence is that DNA evidence can render irrelevant such 
harmless error rules—under which a court would excuse a con-
stitutional violation if presented with trial evidence of guilt—
and also dramatically undermine constitutional presumptions 
of the reliability of trial evidence.306 Evidence of innocence may 
affect a court’s ruling regarding the reliability of evidence at 
trial, which may in turn relate to its assessment of the merits 
of the constitutional violation or a prejudice inquiry.  
For example, a common claim brought by petitioners in 
which new evidence of innocence supports relief is a Brady 
claim. In its most straightforward form, Brady prohibits the 
withholding from defense counsel of material exculpatory evi-
dence.307 Some courts have also held that Brady creates an on-
going duty for the State to disclose new evidence of innocence, 
such as newly available DNA testing, even after trial.308 
Still other constitutional claims require a petitioner to 
show that a state actor undermined the fairness of the trial.309 
However, as noted above, several rights also relate to the relia-
bility or accuracy of trial evidence.310 In these cases, evidence of 
innocence may supplement existing evidence regarding State 
misconduct, thus bolstering the constitutional showing that the 
State acted so as to produce an inaccurate result.311 Most cases 
involving post-conviction DNA testing also involved an  
eyewitness identification.312 Prior to obtaining this DNA test-
ing, none of the exonerees had any success arguing that an 
eyewitness identification was unconstitutionally suggestive  
and unreliable313 under the factors set forth in Neil v. Big-
 
 306. Cf. Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal 
Wrongful Conviction Law, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 35, 62–69 (arguing that harmless 
error rules do not apply in civil wrongful conviction actions brought post-
exoneration). 
 307. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 308. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brison, 618 A.2d 420, 425–26 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1992) (remanding for DNA testing). 
 309. See, e.g., Robert Hochman, Comment, Brady v. Maryland and the 
Search for Truth in Criminal Trials, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1673, 1676 (1996). 
 310. See supra Part II.D.1. 
 311. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 109–10. 
 312. Id. at 73. 
 313. Id. at 104. 
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gers,314 and adopted by the Court in Manson v. Brathwaite.315 
For example, the court ruled against Carlos Lavernia in a case 
where the victim testified at trial, in reference to the photo 
lineup, “‘That was the man, it was that easy. I’m absolutely 
positive,’” because “Lavernia ha[d] not alleged any factor that 
would have made the photo lineups impermissibly suggestive, 
nor [was] any apparent in the trial court record.”316 However, 
DNA evidence of innocence may tend to buttress a claim that 
the eyewitness was mistaken, and therefore unreliable under 
the Manson test.317 
Similarly, evidence of innocence may bolster a claim that a 
confession was coerced, on the theory that an innocent person 
would be less likely to confess absent law enforcement pres-
sure. In addition, because DNA evidence often shows that fo-
rensic expert testimony or other testimony at trial was unrelia-
ble,318 it may support a constitutional claim that evidence 
presented at trial was fabricated. A due process fabrication 
claim requires a showing that the State knowingly presented 
false evidence to the jury.319 However, evidence of innocence 
can help show that evidence at trial was unreliable or false.320  
Additionally, new evidence of innocence alters the analysis 
for the guilt-based prejudice analysis, the second prong of the 
standard for several constitutional criminal procedure 
claims.321 As the Court explained in Strickland, “a verdict or 
conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely 
to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming 
 
 314. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199–200 (1972). 
 315. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).  
 316. See Lavernia v. Lynaugh, 845 F.2d 493, 499 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 317. See Manson, 432 U.S. at 114 (concluding that “reliability is the  
linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony”). 
 318. Cf. id. (discussing the reliability of DNA evidence). 
 319. See Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967). 
 320. An example is the case of Anthony Hicks. Hicks did not assert a fabri-
cation claim, but the state court granted Hicks a new trial, finding that, based 
on the DNA test results, the jury would have questioned “the accuracy of the 
[victim’s] identification.” State v. Hicks, 549 N.W.2d 435, 444 (Wis. 1996). In 
addition, though the prosecution expert testified that hairs found at the scene 
were consistent with Hicks, “[t]he DNA test result, in conjunction with [the 
victim’s] testimony about the source of the Negro hairs in her apartment, dis-
credit[ed] one of the pivotal pieces of evidence forming the foundation of the 
State’s case.” Id. 
 321. See supra Part II.D.1. 
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record support.”322 Thus, new evidence of innocence may un-
dermine the reliability of the guilty verdict at trial, making a 
court less likely to hold that there was not a reasonable proba-
bility that a constitutional violation affected the outcome. 
Courts already consider the strength of the prosecution’s case 
when assessing whether a constitutional violation affected the 
outcome.323 Consequently, when DNA evidence of innocence se-
verely undermines that case, the prejudice from the constitu-
tional violation is correspondingly enhanced. 
Thus, federal courts have explicitly considered evidence of 
innocence when conducting prejudice analyses in rulings re-
garding individuals exonerated by post-conviction DNA testing. 
For example, in the case of DNA exoneree Stephen Toney, the 
Eighth Circuit concluded that DNA testing would be relevant 
“[i]n order to prove the prejudice prong of his ineffective assis-
tance claim.”324 Similarly, the court emphasized preliminary 
DNA results in awarding Jerry Watkins relief on a Brady claim 
regarding suppressed police reports that supported a theory of 
third-party guilt.325 The court stated that “[w]hen the court also 
takes into account the DNA evidence” the “clear conclusion 
[that there was prejudice] becomes even stronger.”326 Likewise, 
in the case of Anthony Hicks, the only DNA exoneree to receive 
a reversal on a Strickland claim on the basis of his lawyer’s 
failure to request DNA testing, the court emphasized that there 
was prejudice because the post-conviction DNA testing showed 
that the State’s hair evidence was false.327 The handful of fed-
eral courts that have denied discovery requests for DNA testing 
 
 322. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984).  
 323. See Note, Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Crimi-
nal Defense Counsel: A New Look After United States v. Decoster, 93 HARV. L. 
REV. 752, 768–69 (1980). 
 324. Toney v. Gammon, 79 F.3d 693, 700 (8th Cir. 1996). Efforts to use dis-
covery to uncover wrongful convictions may also complement aggregative ap-
proaches that I have discussed elsewhere, where courts or administrative bo-
dies such as innocence commissions review groups of cases raising indicia of 
innocence. See Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CAL. L. 
REV. 383, 435–46 (2007). 
 325. See Watkins v. Miller, 92 F. Supp. 2d 824, 856 (S.D. Ind. 2000). 
 326. See id. at 847. “This court is considering the DNA evidence as it ap-
plies to Watkins’ claims of actual innocence and cause and prejudice to excuse 
his failure to present his Brady claims and other constitutional claims to the 
state courts.” Id. at 837. 
 327. See State v. Hicks, 536 N.W.2d 487, 491 (Wis. App. 1995), aff ’d, 549 
N.W.2d 435 (Wis. 1996). 
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by ruling that such testing is not relevant to a Brady analysis 
have not considered whether DNA results were relevant to the 
prejudice inquiry.328 
Even if courts find that DNA testing is relevant to the pre-
judice prong, such analysis will not benefit many convicts, out-
side of the cases in which DNA testing or similarly compelling 
evidence of innocence is available. Few convicts eventually ex-
onerated by post-conviction DNA testing had any new evidence 
of innocence to present to the courts prior to obtaining DNA 
testing. As a result, only thirty-three exonerees, or twenty-five 
percent of those with written decisions studied in Judging In-
nocence, raised innocence-related claims.329 Of those, seven ex-
onerees proffered third-party guilt evidence, seven presented 
police reports suppressed at the time of trial, four presented re-
cantations of key witnesses, two presented new alibi evidence, 
two presented new evidence undercutting informant testimony, 
one presented evidence of police hypnosis of the victim, one 
presented new forensic expert evidence, and one, Willie Jack-
son, offered the in-court confession of the true perpetrator 
(some presented more than one type).330  
Conversely, evidence of third-party guilt was the most 
common claim and source of relief for DNA exonerees. For ex-
ample, in ruling on Willie Jackson’s Strickland claim, the dis-
trict court emphasized that his brother had convincingly con-
fessed to the crime, which was relevant to the prejudice 
 
 328. See, e.g., Stouffer v. Reynolds, 168 F.3d 1155, 1173 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(denying a discovery request for DNA evidence because the petitioner failed to 
demonstrate a connection between DNA evidence and any cognizable claim); 
Payne v. Bell, 89 F. Supp. 2d 967, 976 (W.D. Tenn. 2000) (finding that DNA 
testing is not relevant to a Brady claim where no argument is made that the 
state was in possession of DNA evidence at the time of the trial). 
 329. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 110 (noting that only 33 of 113 exonerees 
studied raised Brady, Schlup, Herrera, or newly discovered evidence claims). 
 330. The seven with third-party guilt evidence were K. Bloodsworth, R. 
Bullock, D. Fritz, J. Jones, J. Watkins, K. Waters, and J. Willis; the four with 
recantation evidence were L. Diaz, G. Dotson, C. Elkins, and F. Smith; the two 
with evidence undercutting informants were J. Restivo and J. Watkins; the 
two with new alibi evidence were S. Avery and K. Waters; J. Pierce had new 
forensic expert evidence; L. Jean received a reversal based on the police hyp-
nosis of the victim in order to secure an identification. Those bringing claims 
regarding suppressed police records were S. Fappiano, D. Hunt, L. Waters, E. 
Washington (additional laboratory notes), W. Smith (statements to the police), 
and R. Williamson (videotape of his polygraph examination). 
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inquiry.331 Although Jackson’s habeas petition was ultimately 
dismissed by the Fifth Circuit,332 four other DNA exonerees re-
ceived reversals based on third-party guilt prior to obtaining 
the DNA testing that exonerated them; two received reversals 
based on Brady claims; and two received reversals based on 
state claims regarding exclusion at trial of third-party guilt 
evidence.333 
c. Innocence and Harmless Error 
A third and related approach incorporates new evidence of 
innocence into the harmless error inquiry. For almost any con-
stitutional violation, a judge must deny relief if the State can 
show that the error was either harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt, or, on habeas corpus review, did not substantially con-
tribute to the conviction.334 Innocence plays no formal role in 
the analysis, for a court focuses only on the degree to which a 
violation tainted the trial. 
However, new evidence of innocence may show that the 
outcome at trial was otherwise unreliable. I propose that 
courts, in conducting a harmless error inquiry, should consider 
other evidence of innocence in determining whether constitu-
tional error affected the outcome. This requires no constitu-
tional reinterpretation, but merely reflects a more balanced 
method for weighing evidence under the current Chapman v. 
California335 and Brecht harmless error approaches.336 Courts 
already consider evidence of guilt unrelated to the constitution-
al violation. This approach modifies the traditional considera-
tion by inquiring whether evidence of guilt is reliable in light of 
new evidence of innocence prior to deciding whether that evi-
dence renders error harmless. Incorporation of innocence into 
harmless error review would impact only cases where petition-
ers have compelling new evidence of innocence to present. In 
 
 331. See Jackson v. Day, No. Civ. A. 950-1224, 1996 WL 225021, at *5 (E.D. 
La. May 2, 1996), rev’d, 121 F.3d 705 (5th Cir. 1997) (table decision). 
 332. Jackson, 121 F.3d 705. 
 333. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 104 n.180.  
 334. See supra Part II.D.1. 
 335. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1966). 
 336. See supra note 268 and accompanying text; see also Chapman, 386 
U.S. at 24, 26; Garrett, supra note 306, at 56–63 (discussing the Chapman 
test). 
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such cases, this incorporation transforms the analysis to an in-
quiry focusing on both innocence and guilt. 
III.  A CONSTITUTIONAL INNOCENCE CLAIM   
The lack of a capstone innocence claim under the Federal 
Constitution has resulted in a conflicted regime. One might ex-
pect that the advent of such powerful scientific evidence as 
DNA would lead to a change in the rules surrounding that evi-
dence, from trial through the post-conviction process, so as to 
facilitate access and assess the probative power of this evi-
dence. In some respects change has occurred, most notably with 
increased pre-trial DNA testing and an explosion in new post-
conviction avenues for relief. Yet courts still do not routinely 
ask the simple question whether new evidence of innocence suf-
ficiently undermines the conviction. Instead, a range of proce-
dural hurdles and categorical exclusions persist. Meanwhile, 
the Court remains on the sidelines, only hypothetically suggest-
ing the existence of a constitutional innocence claim. 
This Part describes how DNA and other technology—
because they can provide such powerful evidence of identity—
should alter the constitutional status of innocence during the 
criminal process. Though the Court may continue to dodge the 
issue for many decades to come, the wrongful conviction of an 
innocent person is such an egregious miscarriage of justice that 
several existing constitutional rights provide likely candidates 
for relief. The advent of DNA testing undermines the Court’s 
two central rationales for avoiding the question of whether an 
innocence claim exists. Selecting a standard of review for an 
innocence claim does pose difficult questions, but I suggest an 
outcome-determinative standard that draws a line between 
outcome-altering and inconclusive cases. 
A. HERRERA REVISITED 
Our constitutional regime developed in an era in which in-
nocence could rarely be proven with any certainty. Appellate 
courts, not in a position to observe and weigh the probative 
power of witness testimony and physical evidence, could not 
sensibly review outcomes. Instead, courts developed constitu-
tional rules to preserve the “fundamental fairness” of criminal 
trials, such as by providing all defendants with procedural 
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guarantees and by excluding evidence that would be grossly 
unreliable.337 Nor was habeas corpus traditionally considered a 
proper place to raise questions of guilt or innocence. As the 
Court stated in Townsend v. Sain, “the existence merely of 
newly discovered evidence relevant to the guilt of a state pris-
oner is not a ground for relief on federal habeas corpus.”338 
Hence, the advent of DNA testing did not easily fit within 
the existing constitutional regime. Although the Court wrestled 
with the significance of DNA testing in House, it did not recog-
nize a constitutional innocence claim. Had the Court reconsi-
dered Herrera in House, it might have concluded that the ad-
vent of DNA testing upended the two pillars supporting the 
decision: reliability and finality. 
In Herrera, Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Tho-
mas joined the majority decision penned by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist that held federal habeas review is intended only “to 
ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the 
Constitution—not to correct errors of fact” occurring in state 
criminal trials.339 This begs the question whether innocence 
implicates the “constitutionality” of a detention. The Herrera 
majority, however, did not address that question. 
Herrera, a Texas death-row prisoner, argued that it would 
violate the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment for him to be ex-
ecuted, due to his asserted actual innocence.340 Six Justices in 
Herrera agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment supports a 
freestanding claim for actual innocence.341 Two of those Justic-
es, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, joined the majority result 
that denied relief.342 Thus, the holding of Herrera remains the 
narrower opinion by Justice Rehnquist,343 which disclaimed the 
 
 337. See infra text accompanying notes 368–71. 
 338. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1962). 
 339. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993) (citing Moore v. Dempsey, 
261 U.S. 86, 87–88 (1923) (Holmes, J.)). 
 340. Id. at 393. 
 341. See id. at 419 (O’Connor & Kennedy, JJ., concurring); id. at 429 
(White, J., concurring); id. at 435 (Blackmun, Stevens & Souter, JJ., dissent-
ing). 
 342. Id. at 421 (O’Connor & Kennedy, JJ., concurring). 
 343. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“[W]hen a frag-
mented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result en-
joys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that 
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the nar-
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existence of any constitutional innocence right. Even though 
the opinion assumed, “for the sake of argument,” that an inno-
cence right exists, it made clear that such a claim would re-
quire a “truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence,’” a 
standard that Herrera could not meet.344 Despite Justices 
O’Connor and Kennedy stating that a freestanding innocence 
claim should exist, they joined the majority opinion because 
Herrera’s facts were very unfavorable, and his evidence of in-
nocence was scant. This was no DNA case; Herrera’s only evi-
dence of innocence consisted of hearsay affidavits by three indi-
viduals who waited over eight years to claim that Herrera’s 
brother, now dead, was the culprit.345 The result in Herrera was 
perfectly understandable as a decision addressing an innocence 
claim with little merit. 
The advent of DNA evidence should cause us to question 
the underpinnings of Herrera: the concepts of finality and re-
liability. The Court did not chiefly rely on constitutional inter-
pretation in Herrera, but rather on those two policy considera-
tions, and thus this Section discusses those rationales before 
turning to the constitutional text. First, the Court relied in 
Herrera chiefly on the need to preserve finality,346 one of the 
central principles animating the Court’s recent habeas corpus 
jurisprudence.347 Texas courts had a rule that limited the filing 
of motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence of 
innocence to a period within sixty days after entry of judgment 
 
rowest grounds . . . .’” (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) 
(Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.))). 
 344. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417 (majority opinion); see also The Supreme 
Court, 1992 Term—Leading Cases, 107 HARV. L. REV. 144, 282 (1993). 
 345. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417. 
 346. Id. at 401 (“Few rulings would be more disruptive of our federal sys-
tem than to provide for federal habeas review on freestanding claims of actual 
innocence.”). 
 347. See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993) (“The reason 
most frequently advanced in our cases for distinguishing between direct and 
collateral review is the State’s interest in the finality of convictions that have 
survived direct review within the state court system.”); see also McCleskey v. 
Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991) (“Finality has special importance in the context 
of a federal attack on a state conviction.”); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 
90 (1977) (discussing the importance of deciding all issues at trial). See gener-
ally Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for 
State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963) (discussing the importance of fi-
nality in such situations). 
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of conviction.348 The Court noted that the practice in states re-
mained “divergent,” as seventeen states, like Texas, provided 
for sixty days or less, fifteen states allowed the motion to be 
filed more than three years after conviction, and the other 
states permitted motions somewhere in between.349 
This pillar supporting the Herrera result has been toppled 
by the advent of DNA testing. When Herrera was decided in 
1993, only four years after DNA evidence had become available, 
the Court cited the divided “contemporary practice in the 
States” regarding claims of new evidence of innocence.350 That 
practice has dramatically shifted, and as just described, almost 
all states enacted statutes to permit relief on the basis of newly 
discovered DNA or other scientific evidence of innocence. As 
noted above, not only do all but five jurisdictions ensure some 
access to post-conviction DNA testing upon which motions 
based on new evidence of innocence may be filed, all but three 
jurisdictions now make exceptions to any statutes of limitations 
to permit motions supported by new evidence of innocence.351 
Indeed, while problematic in a number of respects, almost all of 
the newly enacted statutes go much farther than Herrera by 
providing for testing and a vacatur in most serious criminal 
cases, rather than just in capital cases. And while many sta-
tutes contain various restrictions on access to testing, these re-
strictions do not rest on notions of finality. Further, few of the 
statutes restrict in any way (or define) the conditions under 
which a court may grant relief regarding new evidence of inno-
cence. 
The Court continues to rely on a finality rationale that has 
since been abandoned by the states. In addition to finality, the 
Herrera Court also emphasized federalism as a justification for 
its decision. The Court noted that “[f]ew rulings would be more 
disruptive of our federal system than to provide for federal ha-
beas review of freestanding claims of actual innocence,” given 
that state statutes of limitations codified a concern for finali-
ty.352 The Court noted that “[o]nce a defendant has been af-
forded a fair trial and convicted of the offense for which he was 
 
 348. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 410. 
 349. Id. at 410–11. 
 350. Id. at 411. 
 351. See supra Part II.C.2–3. 
 352. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 401. 
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charged, the presumption of innocence disappears,”353 demon-
strating its concern for federalism principles. Most states, how-
ever, now allow for post-conviction DNA testing.  
Further undermining a federalism rationale, the AEDPA 
now requires that any actual innocence claim would have to be 
first exhausted in the state courts, and it also entitles state 
court factual determinations to a presumption of correctness.354 
Paradoxically, establishing an innocence claim under the U.S. 
Constitution may reduce the burgeoning litigation of innocence 
in federal habeas corpus cases by ensuring that petitioners be 
required to first seek available state remedies, and therefore 
providing strong incentives for states to make adequate reme-
dies available. 
A second pillar of the Herrera decision was reliability. The 
Court’s decision “rests on assumptions about the fallibility of 
the search for truth” that the advent of DNA technology top-
pled.355 The Court in Herrera emphasized that “the passage of 
time only diminishes the reliability of criminal adjudications” 
due to the “erosion of memory and dispersion of witnesses.”356 
Granting Herrera’s request would, in the words of the Court, 
place the district court in the “difficult” position of having to 
“weigh the probative value of ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ evidence.”357 This 
concern was logical in Herrera itself because witnesses’ “belated 
affidavits” were the only “new” evidence.358 However, DNA evi-
dence alters the reliability analysis because it produces accu-
rate results, if properly stored, for decades after biological ma-
terial is gathered.359 Reliability concerns no longer provide 
strong support for the Court’s decision in Herrera, at least not 
in cases in which such new scientific evidence may be far more 
reliable than the evidence that was presented at trial. 
 
 353. Id. at 399. 
 354. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (d) (2000); Herrera, 506 U.S. at 440–41 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 355. See Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 160, at 599–600. 
 356. See also Herrera, 506 U.S. at 403–04 (majority opinion) (“[W]hen a ha-
beas petitioner succeeds in obtaining a new trial, the ‘erosion of memory and 
dispersion of witnesses that occur with the passage of time’ prejudice the gov-
ernment and diminish the chances of a reliable criminal adjudication . . . .” 
(quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991)) (alteration in original)). 
 357. Id. at 404. 
 358. Id. at 418. 
 359. See Christopher H. Asplen, Integrating DNA Technology into the 
Criminal Justice System, 83 JUDICATURE 144, 146 (1999). 
GARRETT_5fmt 7/20/2008 8:38 AM 
1704 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [92:1629 
 
Although its original underpinnings have eroded, it is poss-
ible other concerns could justify the holding in Herrera. One 
concern not discussed by the Court in Herrera is deterrence. 
This omission is unsurprising, however, for deterrence itself is 
undermined when the innocent continue to be punished while 
the guilty go free.360 Similarly, another concern could be the 
cost of relitigating judgments. As the Court noted in Schlup, 
however, the number of meritorious innocence claims will not 
be high.361 DNA testing itself is increasingly inexpensive. And 
outside the majority of states that now pay for access to DNA 
testing, nonprofit innocence projects willingly fund this test-
ing.362 Further, federal courts already conduct a range of time-
consuming factual review focusing on questions of guilt and in-
nocence, which includes review of newly discovered evidence of 
innocence. As the dissenters in Herrera noted, over the past 
several decades, “the Court adopted the view of Judge Friendly 
that there should be an exception to the concept of finality 
when a prisoner can make a colorable claim of actual inno-
cence.”363 As discussed above, federal judges review guilt and 
innocence in myriad ways, but they cannot provide relief to pe-
titioners raising free-standing innocence claims. As this Section 
has demonstrated, neither original nor current rationales pro-
vide strong support for Herrera, suggesting the need to consider 
a constitutional framework for review of innocence claims, 
which the next Section develops. 
B. INNOCENCE AND DUE PROCESS 
The Due Process Clause provides a natural foundation for 
a claim of innocence. Justice Scalia expressed a view to the con-
trary in Herrera, stating that 
there is no basis in text, tradition, or even in contemporary practice 
(if that were enough) for finding in the Constitution a right to de-
mand judicial consideration of newly discovered evidence of innocence 
 
 360. See A. Mitchell Polsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Pub-
lic Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 60–62 (2000) (showing 
that erroneous convictions lower deterrence by reducing the difference be-
tween the penalties expected from violating the law and from not violating it). 
 361. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 311–12 (1995). 
 362. See, e.g., Innocence Project, About the Organization, http://www 
.innocenceproject.org/about/Mission-Statement.php (last visited Apr. 26, 
2008). 
 363. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 438 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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brought forward after conviction . . . . With any luck, we shall avoid 
ever having to face this embarrassing question again.364 
Unsurprisingly, the Court faced the embarrassing question 
again, in House, and because it again failed to resolve the exis-
tence of an innocence claim—this time in an era in which new 
technology more readily proves innocence—the Court may con-
tinue to face this question. A less conclusory look at text, tradi-
tion, and contemporary practice is entirely justified. 
First, the text of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a 
basis for “an independent constitutional violation” if an indi-
vidual would be subjected to criminal punishment despite ac-
tual innocence.365 The Due Process Clause provides that mini-
mally fair due process be afforded to those deprived by the 
government of life, liberty, or property, with the amount of 
process required dependent on its cost, the risk of error, and 
the individual interest at stake.366 A strong procedural due 
process argument in favor of recognizing an innocence claim 
can be made given the very low cost of considering new evi-
dence of innocence, the great interest of both the prisoner and 
the State in correcting a wrongful conviction, and the reduction 
in the risk of erroneous determinations due to the reliability of 
new scientific evidence, including DNA technology.367  
In addition, the concerns of fundamental fairness that un-
derlie our constitutional criminal procedure seek to prevent 
imprisoning an innocent person, and therefore support an inno-
cence claim.368 As Justice Lewis Powell wrote in Kuhlmann v. 
Wilson, “a prisoner retains a powerful and legitimate interest 
in obtaining his release from custody if he is innocent of the 
charge for which he was incarcerated.”369 Similarly, in his con-
currence in Herrera, Justice Byron White focused on the 
Court’s due process rationale in Jackson v. Virginia, which held 
 
 364. Id. at 427–28 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 365. Id. at 400 (majority opinion). 
 366. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 
(1976). 
 367. See Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 160, at 593–94 (developing a 
procedural due process theory of a right to potentially exculpatory DNA test-
ing post-conviction); see also George C. Thomas III et al., Is It Ever Too Late 
for Innocence? Finality, Efficiency, and Claims of Innocence, 64 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 263 (2003) (arguing that the Due Process Clause requires allowing inde-
pendent claims of actual innocence in cases with “powerful claims”). 
 368. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 435 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 369. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 452 (1986). 
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that the conviction should be overturned if a jury could not 
have rationally convicted beyond a reasonable doubt.370 Finally, 
the Court’s aforementioned and longstanding jurisprudence 
surrounding interests of trial accuracy and fundamental fair-
ness supports an innocence claim where the jury would not, 
based on new evidence, convict beyond a reasonable doubt.371 
The Court has also interpreted the Due Process Clause as 
providing substantive protections. As the Herrera dissenters 
and Justice O’Connor in her concurring opinion pointed out, 
decades of substantive due process opinions ruled out practices 
“contrary to contemporary standards of decency”372 or “shocking 
to the conscience”373 or contrary to a “‘principle of justice so 
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be 
ranked as fundamental.’”374 Those Justices concluded that con-
victing an innocent person runs contrary to fundamental prin-
ciples of justice. 
In addition to due process, both the Eighth and Sixth 
Amendments could provide support for a freestanding inno-
cence claim. While the Herrera majority did not address the is-
sue, the dissenters in Herrera advocated extending the Eighth 
Amendment to innocent people facing capital punishment.375 
The dissenters argued that “executing an innocent person epi-
tomizes ‘the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and 
suffering’” and therefore constitutes “cruel and unusual pu-
nishment” within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.376 
Similar arguments can be made that it would be cruel and un-
usual to punish innocent people by incarcerating them for non-
capital offenses.377 
 
 370. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 429 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Jackson v. Vir-
ginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979)). 
 371. See supra notes 256–66 and accompanying text. 
 372. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Ford v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986)); id. at 419 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(same). 
 373. Id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Rochin v. California, 342 
U.S. 165, 172 (1952)); id. at 419 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (same). 
 374. Id. at 419 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 406, 
Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172, and Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445–46 
(1992)).  
 375. Id. at 431–35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 376. Id. at 431–32 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)). 
 377. See, e.g., Vivian Berger, Herrera v. Collins: The Gateway of Innocence 
for Death-Sentenced Prisoners Leads Nowhere, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 
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Another previously unexplored source in the Constitution 
that supports an innocence claim arises from the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial.378 In the Apprendi line of deci-
sions, the Court held that criminal defendants have a right to 
have a jury find all the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt, as well as any facts that affect the length of their sen-
tence.379 In part due to the truth-finding purpose of a jury, the 
Court has defined this as a bright-line rule.380 One can argue 
that a defendant does not receive a valid jury trial if false evi-
dence on a material issue was presented to the jurors. Howev-
er, such Sixth Amendment review would still be subject to a 
harmless error analysis.381 
In response to the dissent, the Herrera majority cited to the 
range of celebrated constitutional protections that ensure 
against wrongful convictions, but then noted that “‘[d]ue 
process does not require that every conceivable step be taken, 
at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an 
innocent person.’”382 Here, too, technology has changed the 
analysis. The cost of DNA testing is fairly low, with the most 
expensive tests costing a few thousand dollars and with the 
typical price being much less.383 As noted, some states have 
 
1012 (1994). 
 378. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 379. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 
 380. The Court stated in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005), 
that the Sixth Amendment serves to secure “the interest in fairness and relia-
bility protected by the right to a jury trial . . . [which] has always outweighed 
the interest in concluding trials swiftly.” See also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477. 
 381. All fifty states adopt the harmless error doctrine, which allows “a re-
viewing court to consider the trial record as a whole and to ignore errors that 
are harmless, including most constitutional violations.” United States v. Lane, 
474 U.S. 428, 445 (1986) (referring also to the congressional policy embodied in 
28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2000), which provides that “judgments shall not be reversed 
for ‘errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties’”); 
see also RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 420 
(2d ed. 2007) (explaining that “a trial error that is not of constitutional dimen-
sion . . . is harmless when it plainly appears from the facts and circumstances 
of the case that the error did not affect the verdict”). 
 382. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 399 (1993) (quoting Patterson v. New 
York, 432 U.S. 197, 208 (1977)). 
 383. At the upper end, DNA tests can cost several thousand dollars. See 
Teresa Johnson, Orange County’s Innocence Project, ORANGE COUNTY LAW., 
Dec. 2001, at 18, 19. The price also depends on how many pieces of evidence 
must be tested and the types of tests employed. See, e.g., Tania Simoncelli & 
Barry Stenhardt, California’s Proposition 69: A Dangerous Precedent for Crim-
inal DNA Databases, DNA FINGERPRINTING & CIV. LIBERTIES, Summer 2006, 
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passed statutes agreeing to pay for testing.384 If the state in 
certain categories of cases was unwilling to pay for testing, the 
costs of testing would likely be borne by a nonprofit Innocence 
Project; such projects have often paid for DNA testing in cases 
where the results might exculpate.385 Even supposing that the 
state did pay for every DNA test without federal or nonprofit 
assistance, doing so would still cost far less to the state than 
the litigation of the typical criminal procedure claims prisoners 
bring, which can demand complex briefing and judicial review 
during lengthy state and federal appeals that can last for years. 
The minimal cost of DNA testing is also overwhelmed by 
the cost of keeping an innocent person behind bars, even 
putting to one side the social cost of such a wrongful incarcera-
tion. One must also consider the great social cost arising from 
cases in which the actual perpetrator continues to commit addi-
tional serial crimes, as many did in the cases for which individ-
uals were exonerated by post-conviction DNA testing.386 
Not only are the costs of litigating claims of innocence far 
less than the great sums we already expend on far more time-
consuming and resource-intensive claims, but there is also little 
danger of the floodgates opening such that courts would be in-
 
at 199, 209 (describing the average cost of testing DNA of blood samples at one 
lab as $315 per sample). 
 384. Many states require payment for DNA testing only if the petitioner is 
able to pay. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 770.16 (2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-
9.1-12(c) (2007). But see MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(g) (LexisNexis 
2007) (stating that the petitioner shall pay expenses unless the results are fa-
vorable to the petitioner, in which case the court shall order the state to pay). 
 385. Thus, proposals to sanction petitioners whose guilt is confirmed by 
post-conviction DNA testing have little merit and overstate the costs of test-
ing, which are continually decreasing. See, e.g., Gwendolyn Carroll, Comment, 
Proven Guilty: An Examination of the Penalty-Free World of Post-Conviction 
DNA Testing, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 665, 692–97 (2007) (proposing 
the adoption of a system like Missouri’s, whereby petitioners whose tests con-
firm guilt are sanctioned through the loss of good time credit); see also MO. 
REV. STAT. § 650.058 (2007). Yet deterring meritorious applications is socially 
costly for reasons discussed. In contrast, DNA testing that confirms guilt may 
terminate otherwise burdensome appeals. Further, many for whom DNA test-
ing is relevant serve life terms or face the death penalty, and such a proposal 
would have little effect on those individuals. Cf. Carroll, supra, at 695 (recog-
nizing that “this proposal . . . would have no consequences for a petitioner who 
has accumulated no good time credit”). 
 386. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 119 (relaying that 37% of the first two 
hundred DNA exonerations involved identification of the perpetrator, and 
24.5% through a “cold hit” in which the perpetrator had subsequently been in-
volved in additional crimes and was identified in a felon database). 
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undated with innocence claims. On the one hand, where the 
technology has continued to improve, the very same convicts 
may seek repeated tests. Indeed, some have been exonerated 
only by improved testing technology after initial testing was in-
conclusive.387 Yet most criminal cases do not often both have 
identity as a disputed issue and also involve relevant biological 
evidence. Currently, a narrow category of prisoners can be ex-
onerated pursuant to an innocence claim. To date, 216 prison-
ers have been exonerated by post-conviction DNA testing 
through the Innocence Project alone.388 Additional cases may 
involve other scientific or otherwise compelling evidence of in-
nocence, though such non-DNA cases may sometimes pose 
more difficult questions for courts depending on how probative 
the new scientific evidence is.389 
Our post-conviction system does not resemble any model of 
efficient dispute resolution. That system typically imposes a 
range of procedural barriers that limit assertion of innocence 
claims, based on the view that any new avenue for review of 
innocence claims imposes a new cost on the system. However, 
innocent convicts without an avenue for innocence-based relief 
will typically not just face routine dismissals of innocence 
claims, but will instead pursue traditional remedies and assert 
innocence through indirect and procedurally difficult-to-
adjudicate means. Guilty appellants will do the same. Review-
ing innocence claims certainly provides far more targeted relief 
than the raft of criminal procedure rules that apply compre-
hensively to regulate all criminal investigations and trials.  
The only consideration remaining from the Herrera deci-
sion is tradition. In support of its decision, the Herrera Court 
 
 387. For an example, see the story of Stephen Avery, who was exonerated 
by more sophisticated DNA technology after spending more than eighteen 
years in prison. Wisconsin Innocence Project, Steven Avery Exonerated After 
18 Years in Prison, http://www.law.wisc.edu/fjr/innocence/avery_summary.htm 
(last visited Apr. 26, 2008). 
 388. The Innocence Project, supra note 3. 
 389. For example, revelations regarding improper testimony by FBI ana-
lysts concerning bullet lead comparison may result in a series of reversed con-
victions in non-DNA cases. John Solomon, FBI Forensic Test Full of Holes, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2007, at A1 (describing how hundreds of defendants’ 
convictions are now in question due to now-discredited FBI bullet lead testi-
mony introduced at their trials); see also John Solomon, Silent Injustice: Bul-
let-Matching Science Debunked, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/discussion/2007/11/15/DI2007111501575 
.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2008). 
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cited the paucity of relief available after trial at common law390 
(though explanations for lack of such post-conviction remedies 
at common law include the lack of prisons and near-summary 
execution for felonies). Such long-ago discarded practices have 
no relevance today, nor do comparatively recent post-conviction 
rules—now amended by DNA statutes—that limited claims 
based on new evidence of innocence. While in the past a court 
reviewed the fairness of a trial with difficulty, in an era where 
innocence can be proved with great certainty, a court is in a far 
better position to assess actual innocence. Indeed, why have 
constitutional criminal procedural protections “ensuring 
against the risk of convicting an innocent person” if federal 
courts must remain powerless when convicted individuals are 
known to be innocent?391 
C. AN OUTCOME-DETERMINATIVE STANDARD 
The above discussion suggests several constitutional 
sources, some considered by the Court but none established, 
that could ground a constitutional innocence claim. What form 
such a claim should take and under what standard innocence 
should be assessed remain important questions. Any meaning-
ful standard would ensure at a minimum that substantial 
claims of innocence receive relief, for when new evidence of in-
nocence demonstrates someone’s innocence either substantially 
or clearly and convincingly, there is little, if any, justification 
for denying relief. Courts should decide whether to grant a new 
trial based on the outcome-based more-likely-than-not standard 
advanced by the Herrera dissenters and adopted by the Court 
in House in the context of excusing procedural default. The 
Court in House emphasized that Schlup review requires “a ho-
listic judgment about ‘all the evidence’ and its likely effect on 
reasonable jurors applying the reasonable-doubt standard.”392 
Adopting that standard would ensure relief in cases where 
scientific or other evidence shows innocence so strongly that a 
new jury would probably not convict, and the standard would 
also deter frivolous filings. 
What I have termed substantial claims of innocence face no 
difficulty meeting this standard; by definition such claims sa-
 
 390. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 408 (1993). 
 391. Id. at 398. 
 392. House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2078 (2006) (citation omitted). 
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tisfy a higher clear and convincing standard of review. Other 
cases, perhaps like House, will pose harder questions in which 
the petitioner would have to persuade the court that “more like-
ly than not” no reasonable juror would convict in light of the 
new evidence of innocence.393 
Though neither has adopted such a standard in the context 
of innocence claims, federal appellate courts have long applied 
outcome-determinative standards in the context of constitu-
tional claims, and many state courts apply such a standard for 
new trial motions.394 Further, following House, courts now have 
guidance regarding the central importance of DNA evidence to 
a holistic inquiry, making it more difficult for a court to impro-
perly deny relief using hypothetical scenarios in the face of a 
clear exclusion. And even if DNA evidence does not totally un-
dercut evidence at trial, it may still raise sufficient questions 
such that no reasonable juror would come out the same way.395 
Other cases may remain inconclusive and would not satisfy the 
standard.396 In those situations, a petitioner would have to first 
exhaust state process, as § 2254 requires for the consideration 
of any constitutional claim during federal habeas corpus pro-
 
 393. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995). A few state courts adopt such 
a formal distinction between relatively easier and harder cases. For example, 
the Nebraska courts vacate a conviction if DNA results exclude, but courts 
may instead grant a new trial if merely exculpatory DNA results suggest a 
probability of a substantially different outcome at trial. See, e.g., State v. 
Buckman, 675 N.W.2d 372, 381 (Neb. 2004). 
 394. As the Court put it in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 
(1984), an “outcome-determinative standard has several strengths. It defines 
the relevant inquiry in a way familiar to courts, though the inquiry, as is in-
evitable, is anything but precise.” State courts typically adopt the same stan-
dard for new trial motions; for example, New York asks whether it is probable 
that new evidence of innocence would have caused a different result. See N.Y. 
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(g) (McKinney 2005). 
 395. For example, Lonnie Erby, convicted of the serial rape of three tee-
nage girls, was exonerated based on DNA testing of two rapes, but the crime 
scene evidence was destroyed in a third separate incident prosecuted as part 
of the same serial pattern of attacks; the court concluded that the DNA evi-
dence from the two cases also supported a vacatur in the third. See Peter 
Shinkle, Man Cleared by DNA Tests Is Freed After 17 Years, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Aug. 26, 2003, at A1. 
 396. A case that raised great difficulties for the Wisconsin courts involved 
DNA testing that uncovered two male profiles, one that was not the convict, 
but one that was inconclusive. See State v. Armstrong, 700 N.W.2d 98, 128–29 
(Wis. 2005) (reversing for a new trial, concluding that “[t]he jury did not have 
an opportunity to hear and evaluate the DNA evidence that excludes 
Armstrong as the source of the hairs and the semen”). 
GARRETT_5fmt 7/20/2008 8:38 AM 
1712 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [92:1629 
 
ceedings,397 which would create pressure for states to resolve 
innocence claims in the first instance. 
Likewise, the existence of an innocence right under the 
Due Process Clause would affect the conduct of local law en-
forcement, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges.398 Vacat-
ing a conviction and granting a new trial confronts the prosecu-
tor with deciding whether sufficient evidence exists to retry a 
case. In those situations where witnesses are still available and 
where the prosecutor is convinced the case has merit, a retrial 
may be pursued. For that reason, a post-conviction reversal 
does not necessarily ensure that a wrongful conviction is reme-
died; indeed, a dozen exonerees had more than one retrial—two 
had three trials—before DNA testing ultimately exonerated 
them.399 
D. INSTITUTIONALIZING INNOCENCE REVIEW 
In this Part, I have described and then advocated a consti-
tutional claim of innocence with an outcome-based standard 
applicable to all convicts. Such a claim is far broader than the 
one narrowly rejected by the Supreme Court in Herrera. Even 
in the absence of a uniform innocence claim correlated to the 
evidence’s probative impact, new evidence of innocence already 
has altered the inquiry for constitutional criminal procedure 
claims. Commentators feared that a shift towards reviewing 
innocence claims might weaken constitutional criminal proce-
dure protections while benefiting only a narrow group of actual-
ly innocent persons.400 That shift has already occurred, as DNA 
evidence has reshaped how our criminal system reviews cases 
at every stage. It is hard to maintain that our system should 
not always provide relief to the identifiable, actually innocent 
convicts, especially when the costs of identifying them may be 
far less than resolving the complex procedural claims they 
would otherwise assert. 
 
 397. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (2000). 
 398. Concealment of evidence of innocence would violate Brady for a new 
reason, because doing so would involve suppression of potentially outcome de-
terminative evidence relevant to a claim of innocence. See supra note 271 and 
accompanying text. 
 399. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 98–99. 
 400. See generally Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Seduction of 
Innocence: The Attraction and Limitations of the Focus on Innocence in Capital 
Punishment Law and Advocacy, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 587 (2005). 
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court appears unlikely to in-
terpret the Due Process Clause or any other constitutional pro-
vision as supporting an innocence claim of the type described. 
Nor have most states adopted anything like the optimal statute 
advanced, which simply assesses the probative impact of new 
evidence of innocence. 
Adding still more gloom to the picture, there are good rea-
sons to think that whatever standard of review is adopted, con-
stitutional or statutory, courts may misinterpret it to deny re-
lief to the innocent because of an adherence to finality, however 
wrongheaded. After all, appellate courts have long been criti-
cized for inconsistent application of the more permissive 
Chapman harmless error standard, which, like any potential 
innocence claim, requires courts to weigh evidence of guilt.401 
My dataset of the first two hundred post-conviction DNA ex-
onerees provides additional reasons to distrust appellate adju-
dication of innocence claims. In these exonerees’ cases, courts 
frequently found constitutional error to be harmless, and even 
called the evidence of guilt “overwhelming.”402 
Indeed, federal and state courts denied at least twelve ex-
onerees relief despite being presented with DNA test results 
excluding them.403 For example, after DNA test results ex-
cluded Stephen Avery, the Wisconsin intermediate court never-
theless denied his appeal.404 The court concluded that even 
DNA evidence did not meet the fairly lenient reasonable-
 
 401. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human, but Not Always Harm-
less: When Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1171–72 
(1995) (describing the application of the harmless error doctrine as the “guilt-
based approach”); James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Brecht v. Abrahamson: 
Harmful Error in Habeas Corpus Law, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109, 
1110–11 (1994) (noting the varying impact of Brecht on the application of the 
harmless error doctrine in different courts); Mitchell, supra note 268, at 1335 
(explaining the three harmless error tests and arguing that the disparity be-
tween the tests may determine whether a conviction is upheld or overturned); 
Jason M. Solomon, Causing Constitutional Harm: How Tort Law Can Help 
Determine Harmless Error in Criminal Trials, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1053, 1059–
64 (2005) (noting that most scholars believe the different approaches are irre-
concilable). 
 402. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 107–09. 
 403. Those exonerees are S. Avery, R. Criner, W. Dedge, C. Elkins, D. Hals-
tead, A. Hicks, L. Holdren, D. Hunt, J. Kogut, L. McSherry, J. Restivo, and J. 
Watkins. For profiles of those individuals, see The Innocence Project, supra 
note 123. 
 404. State v. Avery, 570 N.W.2d 573, 580 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997). 
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probability standard under a state new-trial statute.405 In mak-
ing this determination, the court relied on the certainty of the 
victim who identified him, who said, “It’s as if I have a photo-
graph in my mind.”406 A court did not vacate Avery’s conviction 
until six years later, in 2002, when more powerful DNA testing 
confirmed the exclusion and also resulted in a cold hit with a 
prisoner who was incarcerated for crimes similar to the ones 
with which Avery was charged.407 Thus, because of the possibil-
ity courts will misinterpret the standards applicable to an inno-
cence claim, such rulings may persist even if legislators and 
courts adopt the proposed standard for assessing claims based 
on the probative impact of new evidence of innocence. 
In light of the reluctance of courts to upset finality and the 
unlikelihood the Court will adopt a constitutional innocence 
claim, our system could instead turn to outside institutions to 
review innocence claims. The United Kingdom, for example, 
empowers its Criminal Cases Revision Commission to investi-
gate wrongful convictions.408 Similarly, in Canada, a Minister 
of Justice can convene a Criminal Conviction Review that can 
order a new trial.409 North Carolina has adopted such an ap-
proach, creating an Innocence Commission to determine 
whether a convict has shown factual innocence.410 The Com-
mission then refers cases to a three-judge panel that has au-
thority to grant a new trial.411 In addition to North Carolina, 
five other states have created innocence commissions or study 
commissions.412 
Such institutions can also be created within the criminal 
justice system. Prosecutor’s offices have established internal 
 
 405. Id. at 581 (“[T]he presence of DNA from an unidentified third party 
did not create a reasonable probability of a different result on retrial.”). 
 406. Id. at 580. 
 407. See Wisconsin Innocence Project, supra note 387. 
 408. I assess Innocence Commissions and the United Kingdom model in a 
prior work. See Garrett, supra note 324, at 437. 
 409. Id. 
 410. Id. 
 411. Id. 
 412. Id. at 438 (describing Innocence Commissions in California, Connecti-
cut, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin); see also Sandra Svoboda, Righting the 
Wrongfuls: DNA Lessons Guide Proposed Laws, METRO TIMES (Detroit), Oct. 
17, 2007, http://www.metrotimes.com/editorial/story.asp?id=11932 (discussing 
current legislative proposals in Michigan). 
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institutions to review potential wrongful conviction cases,413 as 
have public defenders, sometimes in collaboration with mem-
bers of the nationwide network of Innocence Projects.414 In ad-
dition, courts have engaged in systemic inquiries, conducting 
DNA testing and reviewing cases as part of inquiries into faulty 
case work in forensic laboratories.415 Finally, state pardon pro-
cedures and boards can and do consider evidence of actual in-
nocence, and could do so in a more formalized manner; such 
remedies remain discretionary, however.416 
These new institutions remain new, largely untested, and 
highly experimental. Yet regardless of the approach adopted, 
there are reasons to think that an institution acquainted with 
the causes of wrongful convictions and with special administra-
tive expertise in reviewing claims of innocence could do a better 
job than generalist appellate courts when reviewing claims of 
innocence.  
Evaluating the probative impact of new exculpatory evi-
dence produces a narrow band of cases from which innocence 
claims can be more readily identified and remedied. It takes no 
more analysis to separate substantial and outcome-
determinative from inconclusive cases than it does to conduct 
complex post-conviction harmless error inquiries. This is espe-
cially true since, regardless of the actor conducting the inno-
cence review, the inquiry should be limited to the probative im-
pact of the new evidence of innocence. The continued 
application of categorical exclusions, guilt-based standards, and 
procedural limitations on access to evidence of innocence and 
 
 413. Garrett, supra note 324, at 440–41. 
 414. See Jennifer Emily, Dallas County OKs Adding Post to Review DNA 
Requests, WFAA.COM (Dallas), Oct. 16, 2007, http://www.wfaa.com/ 
sharedcontent/dws/news/localnews/stories/101707dnmetdaldna.17a13e9f8 
.html. 
 415. See Garrett, supra note 324, at 412–16 (describing the West Virginia 
Supreme Court’s appointment of a Special Master to review cases affected by 
state crime laboratory forensic fraud); see also Roma Khanna & Steve McVick-
er, Panel Will Review 180 HPD [Houston Police Department] Crime Lab Cases, 
HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 12, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 20049034 (“Harris 
County criminal district judges are poised to appoint a panel to review 180 
cases with problematic Houston crime lab evidence, ending a dispute about 
how to scrutinize those cases.”). 
 416. See Dow et al., supra note 196, app. B (providing a comprehensive 
survey of state pardon and clemency procedures and structures and noting 
any provisions for review of new evidence of innocence). 
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relief will ensure that wrongful convictions and high-profile ex-
onerations persist. 
Our system should certainly not view post-conviction re-
view as a substitute for efforts to more accurately determine 
innocence at the trial level. If evidence of innocence is properly 
developed at trial, appellate and post-conviction judging be-
comes less necessary. In Part II, I recommended criminal in-
vestigation and trial protections to ensure that DNA testing is 
conducted properly, test results and lab notes are disclosed, 
and evidence is properly preserved. Other efforts to ensure a 
more reliable investigative record, such as requiring police to 
videotape confessions and eyewitness identifications, can better 
inform those tasked with judging innocence after the fact. 
Avoiding wrongful convictions in the first instance can hopeful-
ly reduce the need to assess claims of innocence during criminal 
appeals and post-conviction proceedings. 
  CONCLUSION   
Everything and nothing has changed since 1970, when 
Judge Friendly called the lack of a freestanding constitutional 
innocence claim “an anomaly.”417 Decades later, the status of 
claims of innocence is no longer anomalous. Yet, despite a surge 
in the consideration of innocence claims in various forms, well 
into the DNA age, remedies for innocence remains incomplete. 
This seems intuitively odd. A false conviction is fundamentally 
unjust in any system of law; indeed, the Supreme Court has 
long recognized this, characterizing federal review as “designed 
to guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal 
justice systems.”418 Those words ring hollow when the Court 
continually refuses to recognize an innocence claim, even when 
presented with convincing proof of “extreme malfunctions.”419 
In response to the Court’s failure, almost all states have 
enacted statutes to permit relief based on evidence of inno-
cence, since, after all, it is the states and local governments 
who face first-hand the injustice and political embarrassment 
of mounting numbers of DNA exonerations. Although the crea-
tion of this new post-conviction avenue represents a definitive 
 
 417. See Friendly, supra note 1, at 158–60 & n.87. 
 418. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979) (Stevens, J., con-
curring). 
 419. Id. 
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turn away from finality, states have included in these statutes 
arbitrary restrictions that deny DNA testing to those who could 
otherwise prove innocence if given the chance, and that block 
relief to many who have demonstrated, to a high degree of cer-
tainty, their innocence. 
Our criminal system’s conflicted reaction to the advent of 
DNA testing illuminates the strained relationship between 
science, technology, and the substance and procedure of crimi-
nal law protections. The Supreme Court could ensure a more 
uniform approach towards claims of innocence by adopting a 
constitutional innocence claim. This remains unlikely. In 
House, the Court evaded its most recent opportunity to estab-
lish such a claim, instead permitting only “gateway” relief.420 
The Court did, however, point the way towards a sensible stan-
dard of review for innocence claims by highlighting the role of 
probative but not dispositive DNA evidence, and by adopting an 
outcome-determinative standard that asks if a new jury would 
still convict. Whether the Court eventually reaches the issue or 
not, the groundwork for an innocence-based regime has 
emerged. Already, lower federal courts recognize that the abili-
ty to prove innocence alters the analysis of underlying criminal 
procedure rights and application of a harmless error analysis. 
The advent of DNA testing created enormous pressure at 
each stage of the criminal process to provide relief to those who 
can prove their innocence. Miscarriages of justice uncovered 
through DNA testing, DNA databanks, and other evolving 
technology will continue to test our criminal justice system as it 
adapts to new methods of proof. Yet only if our criminal justice 
system adopts stronger protections to secure access to evidence 
of innocence during investigations and trials can wrongful con-
victions be averted in the first instance. Due process should be 
understood to require full access to DNA and other scientific 
evidence at the time of trial. Until our criminal trial courts en-
sure such access, post-conviction DNA exonerations will main-
tain pressure on political actors to create more effective reme-
dies by, for example, revising statutory innocence claims, or by 
establishing Innocence Commissions to review potential wrong-
ful convictions. Similarly, the Supreme Court will continue to 
face the question whether to recognize a freestanding constitu-
tional claim of innocence. While constitutional interpretation 
 
 420. House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2077 (2006). 
GARRETT_5fmt 7/20/2008 8:38 AM 
1718 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [92:1629 
 
lags, new technology will persist in illuminating powerful new 
evidence of innocence. As technology drives change, the existing 
constellation of rights and remedies in our criminal system may 
finally evolve to ensure full access to evidence of innocence at 
trial, as well as a meaningful post-conviction avenue for claims 
of innocence. 
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APPENDIX: STATE POST-CONVICTION DNA STATUTES 
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42
3  
Alabama No statute       
Alaska No statute       
Arizona ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN.  
§ 13-4240 (2001 
& Supp. 2007) 
2000 R   C  
Arkansas ARK. CODE ANN.  
§§ 16-112-201 to  
-207 (2006 & 
Supp. 2007) 
2001 R   I, T C 
California CAL. PENAL 
CODE  
§ 1405 (West 
Supp. 2008) 
2000 R Y  C  
Colorado COLO. REV. 
STAT.  
§§ 18-1-411 to  
-416 (2007) 
2003 M Y    
Connecticut CONN. GEN. 
STAT.  
§ 54-102kk 
(2007) 
2003 R Y    
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 11,  
§ 4504 (2007) 
2000 R  Y I, T C 
District of 
Columbia 
D.C. CODE  
§§ 22-4131 to  
-4133  
(Supp. 2007) 
2002 R Y  C  
Florida FLA. STAT.  
§§ 925.11, 
943.3251 (2007) 
2001 R   C  
 
 421. (L) Just a likelihood (the DNA test results could be relevant to inno-
cence); (R) Materiality (or reasonable probability that testing could prove in-
nocence); (M) More probable than not (preponderance); (C) Clear and convinc-
ing or a substantial showing. 
 422. (A) Trial attorney fault; (C) Limited to certain crimes (typically felo-
nies); (G) Guilty plea cases excluded; (I) Identity must have been an issue at 
trial; (S) Sunset provision; (T) Time limit. 
 423. If left blank, the trial judge has discretion whether to provide relief. 
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3  
Georgia GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 5-5-41(c) 
(Supp. 2007) 
2003 R   C  
Hawaii HAW. REV. 
STAT.  
§§ 844D-121 to  
-133  
(Supp. 2007) 
2005 R     
Idaho IDAHO CODE 
ANN.  
§§ 19-4901(a) 
(6), 4902(b)–(f ) 
(2004) 
2001 R   Y I, T  
Illinois 725 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/116-3 
(2006) 
1997 R  Y  I  
Indiana IND. CODE  
§§ 35-38-7-1 to  
-19 (LexisNexis 
Supp. 2007) 
2001 R   C  
Iowa IOWA CODE  
§ 81.10 (2007) 
2005 R   C, I  
Kansas KAN. STAT. 
ANN.  
§ 21-2512 
(Supp. 2006) 
2001 L Y  C  
Kentucky KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN.  
§ 422.285 
(LexisNexis 
Supp. 2007) 
2002 R Y  C424  
Louisiana LA. CODE CRIM. 
PROC. ANN. art. 
926.1  
(Supp. 2008) 
2001 R   C, S  
Maine ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 15,  
§§ 2137–2138 
(Supp. 2007) 
2001 R Y  Y  C, I, 
T 
C 
 
 424. Capital cases only. 
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3  
Maryland MD. CODE ANN., 
CRIM. PROC.  
§ 8-201  
(Supp. 2007) 
2001 R   C  
Massachu-
setts 
No statute       
Michigan MICH. COMP. 
LAWS  
§ 770.16 (2006) 
2001 R Y  C, G, 
I, S 
C 
Minnesota MINN. STAT.  
§ 590.01(1a) 
(2006) 
1999 R  Y A, I, 
T 
 
Mississippi No statute       
Missouri MO. REV. STAT.  
§§ 547.035, .037 
(Supp. 2007) 
2001 R Y Y A, I C 
Montana MONT. CODE 
ANN.  
§ 46-21-110 
(2007) 
2003 R Y  C  
Nebraska NEB. REV. STAT.  
§§ 29-4116 to  
-4125 (2006 & 
Supp. 2007) 
2001 L Y    
Nevada NEV. REV. STAT.  
§§ 176.091, 
.0919 (2007) 
2003 R   C425   
New  
Hampshire 
N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN.  
§ 651–D:2 
(2007) 
2004 C Y    
New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN.  
§ 2A:84A-32a 
(West Supp. 
2007) 
2002 R Y  I  
New Mexico N.M. STAT.  
§ 31-1A-2 
(Supp. 2007) 
2003 R   C, I  
        
 
 425. Capital cases only. 
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3  
New York N.Y. CRIM. 
PROC. LAW  
§ 440.30(1-a) 
(McKinney 
2005) 
1994 R G R 
North  
Carolina 
N.C. GEN. STAT. 
ANN.  
§§ 15A-269,  
-270 (2007) 
2001 R     
North  
Dakota 
N.D. CENT. 
CODE  
§ 29-32.1-15 
(2006) 
2005 R  Y I  
Ohio OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN.  
§§ 2953.21, .23, 
.71–.83  
(LexisNexis 
Supp. 2007) 
2003 R Y Y C, I C 
Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 22,  
§§ 1371–1372 
(West Supp. 
2008) 
2002 R Y  C, 
S426 
 
Oregon 2005 Or. Laws 
2205; 2003 Or. 
Laws 1128; 
2001 Or. Laws 
1817 
2001 R Y  C, I, 
S 
 
Pennsylvania 42 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN.  
§ 9543.1  
(West 2007) 
2002 R Y Y A, I M 
Rhode Island R.I. GEN. LAWS  
§§ 10-9.1-10 to  
-12 (Supp. 
2007) 
2002 R Y    
South  
Carolina 
No statute       
 
 426. Statute expired in 2005. 
GARRETT_5fmt 7/20/2008 8:38 AM 
2008] CLAIMING INNOCENCE 1723 
 
St
at
e 
St
at
ut
e 
D
at
e 
en
ac
te
d 
W
ha
t  
st
an
da
rd
 to
 
ob
ta
in
 D
N
A 
te
st
in
g?
42
1  
Pe
tit
io
ne
r 
m
us
t b
e 
in
 
cu
st
od
y 
Li
m
ite
d 
to
 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
 
no
t a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 tr
ia
l 
O
th
er
  
Li
m
ita
tio
ns
42
2  
Th
e 
st
an
da
rd
 
to
 o
bt
ai
n 
re
-
lie
f i
f t
es
tin
g 
ex
cl
ud
es
42
3  
South  
Dakota 
No statute       
Tennessee TENN. CODE 
ANN.  
§§ 40-30-301 to  
-313 (2006 & 
Supp. 2007) 
2001 R   C  
Texas TEX. CODE 
CRIM. PROC. 
ANN. arts. 
17.48, 64.01–
.05 (Vernon 
2006 & Supp. 
2007) 
2001 M   I R 
Utah UTAH CODE 
ANN.  
§§ 78-35a-301 
to -304 (2002 & 
Supp. 2007) 
2001 R  Y C C 
Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 13, § 5561 
(Supp. 2007) 
2007 R   C   
Virginia VA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 19.2-327.1 to  
-327.6 (Supp. 
2007) 
2001 C  Y Y A, C C 
Washington WASH. REV. 
CODE  
§ 10.73.170 
(2006) 
2000 R Y Y C  
West  
Virginia 
W. VA. CODE 
ANN.  
§ 15-2B-14 
(LexisNexis 
Supp. 2007) 
2004 R Y  C  
Wisconsin WIS. STAT.  
§ 974.07  
(2005–2006) 
2001 R     
Wyoming WYO. STAT. 
ANN.  
§ 7-12-303  
(effective  
July 1, 2008) 
2008 L   C  
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